Plott v. State
| Decision Date | 18 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. SC12–922.,SC12–922. |
| Citation | 148 So.3d 90 |
| Parties | William J. PLOTT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
148 So.3d 90
William J. PLOTT, Petitioner
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. SC12–922.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sept. 18, 2014.
Robert Buschel of Buschel Gibbons, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Petitioner.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Robert Jay Krauss, Bureau Chief, and Marilyn Muir Beccue, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Respondent.
Opinion
QUINCE, J.
William Plott seeks review of the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Plott v. State, 86 So.3d 516 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of this Court in State v. Fleming, 61 So.3d 399 (Fla.2011), and the First District Court of Appeal in Hughes v. State, 826 So.2d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), approved on other grounds, 901 So.2d 837 (Fla.2005), on a question of law. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
The question before us is whether a motion brought under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) is an appropriate vehicle to attack a defendant's upward departure sentence under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). We conclude that a claim of error under Apprendi and Blakely is cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion. Accordingly, we quash the Second District's decision in Plott and approve the First District's decision in Hughes. We remand to the Second District for the application of a harmless error analysis under Galindez v. State, 955 So.2d 517 (Fla.2007), and, if it is determined not to be harmless, to remand the case for resentencing.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In November 1997, a jury convicted Plott of four counts of armed sexual battery, and the trial court imposed four life sentences pursuant to the 1995 sentencing guidelines. Plott, 86 So.3d at 517.1 The trial court's judgment was affirmed on direct appeal. See Plott v. State, 731 So.2d 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (table). In May 2005, Plott was resentenced pursuant to Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000).2 At the resentencing hearing, the State requested an upward departure sentence of life imprisonment on the armed sexual battery convictions because the victim was treated in an unnecessarily cruel fashion.
Without empaneling a jury, the circuit court reimposed the four life sentences as upward departure sentences.3 In support of the upward departures, the circuit court made findings in open court while referring to specific portions of the trial testimony transcript:
[T]he defendant and his conduct and acts in this case established that the crimes were committed in an extraordinary cruel, egregious, vicious, and wicked manner; that the conduct went beyond that of ordinary sexual battery.
That particularly establishing the criteria under the Weekley [v. State, 584 So.2d 78 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)4 ] case, the Court finds that the defendant, after picking up the victim, showed her a gun and threatened her. At the first location he punched her in the face with his fist so hard that it knocked her out of the Jeep to the ground. He continued to hit her. I find that in trial testimony pages 38, 39, and 90.
In addition, he pressed his forearm to the throat where she could not breathe and was seeing stars; that is found at trial testimony page 40.
He committed extremely rough anal sex on her the first time; that's found at trial testimony page 44. He then drove her to another area and ... had her commit oral sex upon him, in a rough and threatening manner; at trial testimony 45 to 49.
At the second location he again anally and vaginally raped her. He hit her in the head again, even though she had asked him to please not hurt her or hit her again. That's in trial testimony pages 50 to 53.
After committing those sexual batteries, again he straddled her in the vehicle, yanked her head back, placed the gun in her mouth to the point where she was gagging; that's found at trial testimony page 55 and 59. He in addition threatened her with a knife, at trial testimony page 88 and 89.
I find that in and of itself to be a sufficient basis for an upward departure and ask that the State attorney transcribe these findings and attach them to the sentencing guidelines.
Plott's counsel “did not argue [at the resentencing proceeding] that the trial court erred by refusing to conduct a jury trial to determine the factual basis for the upward departure,” even though the issue of whether a jury was required was “hotly debated” at the time. Plott, 86 So.3d at 518. However, Plott's counsel expressed to the circuit court that there is “recent case law on enhancement of penalties that the U.S. Supreme Court has [said that] it's supposed to be a jury determination on certain issues.” The Second District affirmed Plott's four life sentences that were imposed on resentencing. See Plott v. State, 940 So.2d 432 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (table).
In September 2010, Plott, pro se, filed the instant motion to correct illegal sentence under rule 3.800(a), claiming that under Apprendi and Blakely he was entitled to a jury trial at his resentencing for the determination of the factual grounds since it resulted in an upward departure sentence. Plott, 86 So.3d at 517. Plott
asked the circuit court to vacate his sentence and resentence him to a valid guidelines sentence. Plott maintained that under the 1994 sentencing guidelines, the maximum sentence he could have received on resentencing was 22.06 years. Finding that Plott's sentences were within their statutory maximums, the circuit court denied Plott's claim and ultimately denied the rule 3.800(a) motion.5 Id.6
Plott appealed the circuit court's order denying his rule 3.800(a) motion. Id. The Second District found that the claim of Apprendi error was a procedural error in sentencing that could have been preserved and raised on direct appeal, and therefore, it was not a ground for relief under rule 3.800(a). Id. at 519. Because the error was not cognizable under rule 3.800(a), the Second District affirmed the circuit court's denial of relief. Id.
ANALYSIS
The question before the Court is whether a rule 3.800(a) motion is a proper vehicle to attack an upward departure sentence—which was imposed at resentencing—based on a claim of error under Apprendi and Blakely. Because this is a pure question of law, this Court's review is de novo. Keck v. Eminisor, 104 So.3d 359, 366 (Fla.2012).
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) states in pertinent part:
(a) Correction. A court may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed by it, or an incorrect calculation made by it in a sentencing scoresheet, when it is affirmatively alleged that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to that relief, provided that a party may not file a motion to correct an illegal sentence under this subdivision during the time allowed for the filing of a motion under subdivision (b)(1) [“Motion Before Appeal”] or during the pendency of a direct appeal.
Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(a). Rule 3.800 allows defendants to petition “the courts to correct sentencing errors that may be identified on the face of the record.” Williams v. State, 957 So.2d 600, 602 (Fla.2007). The intent of rule 3.800(a) is “to balance the need for finality of convictions and sentences with the goal of ensuring that criminal defendants do not serve sentences imposed contrary to the requirements of law.” Carter v. State, 786 So.2d 1173, 1176–78 (Fla.2001).
“Since 1968, our procedural rules have provided for the correction of illegal sentences.” Id. at 1176. An “illegal sentence” is undefined in rule 3.800. This Court has “generally defined an ‘illegal sentence’ as one that imposes a punishment or penalty that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes and laws could impose under any set of factual circumstances.” Williams, 957 So.2d at 602 (quoting Carter, 786 So.2d at 1181 ).
“[T]he definition of ‘illegal sentence’ as interpreted by case law has narrowed significantly since that term was used in the 1960s and 1970s.” Carter, 786 So.2d at 1176. In Davis v. State, 661 So.2d 1193 (Fla.1995), this Court defined an “illegal sentence” as “one that exceeds the maximum period set forth by law for a particular offense without regard to the guidelines.” Id. at 1196. We later rejected the contention that Davis mandates
that only those sentences that facially exceed...
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