Plourde v. Hartford Elec. Light Co., 023066

• Citation: 31 Conn.Supp. 192,326 A.2d 848
• Decision Date: 17 April 1974
• Docket Number: No. 023066,023066
• Court: Superior Court of Connecticut
• Parties: Dean PLOURDE, Administrator (ESTATE of Rodney A. PLOURDE) v. The HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY.

Page 848

326 A.2d 848

31 Conn.Supp. 192

Dean PLOURDE, Administrator (ESTATE of Rodney A. PLOURDE) v. The HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY.

No. 023066.

Superior Court of Connecticut, Litchfield County.

April 17, 1974.

Reilly & Peck, New Haven, for plaintiff.

Carmody & Torrance, Waterbury, for defendant.

SPEZIALE, Judge.

The plaintiff, administrator of the estate of the decedent, Rodney A. Plourde, brought this action against The Hartford Electric Light Company and Northeast Utilities Company, alleging that the current transmitted on lines supported by a high tension electric tower maintained by the defendants caused the decedent's death and that the defendants, thereby, are liable for the decedent's loss of enjoyment of his normal life and life's activities and the funeral expense incurred by the estate. While both counts of the complaint, to which certain amendments have been made, claim that the decedent's death was proximately caused by the defendants' negligence, it is further alleged that the electric current, as mintained by the defendants, constitutes an agency which is 'inherently dangerous and intrinsically dangerous and ultra hazardous.' The complaint against the Northeast Utilities Company has been withdrawn. The defendant, The Hartford Electric Light Company, has demurred to both counts of the complaint to the extent that the complaint seeks to impose upon this defendant liability without fault based upon the plaintiff's contention that the agency maintained by this defendant is inherently dangerous and ultrahazardous.

A demurrer properly may be addressed to counts in a pleading insofar as such counts allege facts which are insufficient to support a particular cause of action contained within the counts. Practice Book § 106. A demurrer addressed to an entire count which contains a valid cause of action cannot be sustained. Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 553, 227 A.2d 418. A demurrer admits well-pleaded facts but does not admit either legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated therein. McAdam v. Sheldon, 153 Conn. 278, 282, 216 A.2d 193. In testing allegations against attack by demurrer, the complaint must be construed in the manner most favorable to the pleader. Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., supra, 154 Conn. 557, 227 A.2d 418.

The defendant, The Hartford Electric Light Company, demurs to the cause of action which would impose liability without fault on the grounds that (1) the doctrine invoked by the plaintiff is not supported by facts which necessarily must be pleaded and (2) the transmission of electricity, as alleged in the complaint, is not, as a matter of law, intrinsically dangerous and ultrahazardous, because it does not necessarily and obviously expose others to harm irrespective of due care.

The first ground of the defendant's demurrer can be disposed of quickly because its brief and oral argument reveal that essentially its technical attack amounts to a claim that certain language from Caporale v. C. W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., 149 Conn. 79, 85, 175 A.2d 561, is not found in the plaintiff's complaint. Claimed to be lacking is the necessary allegation that there are circumstances and conditions in the transmission of high-voltage electricity which, irrespective of lawful purpose or due care, involve a risk of probable injury to such a degree that the activity fairly can be said to be intrinsically dangerous to the person or property of others. While a carefully drafted complaint should, perhaps, contain this allegation, what is necessarily implied need not be expressly alleged. Senior v. Hope, 156 Conn. 92, 98, 239 A.2d 486; Wexler Construction Co. v. Housing Authority, 144 Conn. 187, 193, 128 A.2d 540; Wachtel v. Rosol, 159 Conn. 496, 500, 271 A.2d 84. The description of an activity as inherently dangerous and ultrahazardous perforce implies that the activity necessarily and obviously exposes others to probable injury despite the employment of due care. The allegation is implicit in the description of the agency as intrinsically dangerous and ultrahazardous. Whitman Hotel Corporation v. Elliot & Watrous Engineering Co., 137 Conn. 562, 565-566, 79 A.2d 591; Worth v. Dunn, 98 Conn. 51, 59-60, 118 A. 467; Caporale v C. W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., supra, 149 Conn. 84, 175 A.2d 561. Furthermore, since such an allegation approaches a legal conclusion, it would not be an admitted supportive fact for the purpose of ruling upon the demurrer. McAdam v. Sheldon, supra.

The second ground of the defendant's demurrer goes beyond any claimed technical defect in the pleading by arguing that as a matter of law the transmission of electricity by high-tension wires is not intrinsically dangerous and ultrahazardous. A complaint is tested on demurrer by the facts provable under its allegations. Benson v. Housing Authority, 145 Conn. 196, 199, 140 A.2d 320. It appears that the facts which would support a conclusion that high-voltage electricity in transmission lines is an inherently dangerous and ultrahazardous agency are the potency of the generated electricity and its capability of leaping out or arcing through the air and being conducted through the air. While this determination may involve an application of law to the facts, it has become settled as a matter of law, with regard to certain instrumentalities or activities and the circumstances and conditions under which they are used, that they either are or are not intrinsically dangerous and ultrahazardous. Whitman Hotel Corporation v. Elliot & Watrous Engineering Co., supra, 137 Conn. 565, 79 A.2d 591; Caporale v. C. W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., supra, 149 Conn. 86 175 A.2d 561; Starkel v. Edward Balf Co., 142 Conn. 336, 341, 114 A.2d 199; Wright & FitzGerald, Connecticut Law of Torts (2d Ed.) § 122; Prosser, Torts (3d Ed.) § 77. It has been held in Connecticut that certain activities and instrumentalities are not intrinsically dangerous and ultrahazardous. Greeley v. Cunningham, 116 Conn. 515, 518, 165 A. 678; Godfrey v. Connecticut Co., 98 Conn....