Plumb v. Salt Lake Cnty. & Skyview Excavation & Grading, Inc., Case No. 2:13-cv-1113 CW
| Decision Date | 17 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:13-cv-1113 CW |
| Parties | JACK SAMUEL PLUMB and JENNIFER PLUMB, Plaintiffs, v. SALT LAKE COUNTY and SKYVIEW EXCAVATION & GRADING, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Utah |
Plaintiffs Jack Samuel Plumb and Jennifer Plumb (the Plumbs") own property in Emigration Canyon that has a stream running through it. Their property became part of a flood control project developed by Defendant Salt Lake County (the "County"). The County contracted with Skyview Excavation & Grading, Inc. ("Skyview") to perform the remediation work on various sites in the canyon. Although the Plumbs' property was listed in the project plans, the County and Skyview were required to obtain permission from the Plumbs before entering their property and doing remediation work. The Plumbs contended they did not give permission, but Defendants nevertheless entered their property and significantly damaged it. Consequently, they sued the County and Skyview for negligence and trespass. They also sued the County for inverse condemnation.
A five-day jury trial was held on August 3, 2015 through August 7, 2015. The Plumbs proved Defendants entered their property without permission and damaged it by, among other things, making a gravel ramp on the property to access the streambed, running heavy equipment over the property and through the streambed, tearing out vegetation and rocks, destabilizing and changing the depth of the stream banks, widening the stream, and generally altering the flow of it. The jury awarded Plaintiffs $112,000 in compensatory damages against the County as follows: (1) Negligence Claim - $26,000; (2) Trespass Claim - $36,000; (3) Fifth Amendment Inverse Condemnation Claim - $50,000. It also awarded compensatory damages against Skyview as follows: (1) Negligence Claim - $ 14,000 and (2) Trespass Claim - $9,000.1
Now before the court is the Plumbs' proposed Judgment Upon Jury Verdict. In the proposed judgment, the Plumbs seek an award of prejudgment interest and attorney fees. The County does not dispute the Plumbs are entitled to prejudgment interest on the inverse condemnation action. It filed an Objection, however, to awarding such interest on the negligence and trespass claims.2 With respect to attorney fees, the Plumbs seek fees pursuant to the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4654 and 4655, to which the County also objects.3 For the reasons stated below, the court awards prejudgment interest and concludes the Plumbs are also entitled to attorney fees.
Plaintiffs' proposed judgment asks for "prejudgment interest at the rate of 8.0%, compounded annually." Proposed Jdgmt., at 2 (Dkt. No. 116). As stated above, "Salt Lake County does not contest [Plaintiffs'] entitlement to prejudgment interest on the Fifth Amendment takings award." Salt Lake County's Objection, at 2 (Dkt. No. 115). It does object, however, to prejudgment interest on the negligence and trespass claims based upon Utah law. The County contends the Plumbs' damages were not calculable with mathematical accuracy because no set standard exists by which to calculate them. It also asserts the jury had the broad discretion to determine how to allocate damages between the two defendants and among the claims at issue. Additionally, the County asserts the damages were not fixed as of a particular date because the stream bank and other portions of the property have continued to erode over time. These facts, according to the County, preclude prejudgment interest under Utah law.
"Where state law claims are before a federal court on supplemental jurisdiction, state law governs the court's award of prejudgment interest." Olcott v. Del. Flood Co., 327 F.3d 1115, 1126 (10th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Under Utah law, "[p]rejudgment interest may be recovered where the damage is complete, the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and the loss is measurable by facts and figures." Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, ¶ 51, 210 P.3d 263 (quotations and citation omitted). This does not mean "that at the time the damages accrued, all of the damage figures must be known and remain static throughout the litigation." Id. ¶ 52. Instead, the main focus is "on the measurability and calculability of the damages." Id. Thus, "[w]here damage figures are subject to calculation . . .even if the method of calculating is uncertain, or the damage figures change, prejudgment interest is appropriate." Id. ¶ 55.
In contrast, "[p]rejudgment interest is inappropriate where the trier of fact is left to assess damages based on a mere description of the wrongs done or injuries inflicted." Id. ¶ 53 (quotations and citation omitted). Cases such as wrongful death, "libel, slander, false imprisonment" and so forth, are not amendable to prejudgment interest because they require a jury to use "its best judgment as to valuation rather than fixed standards of valuation." Id. ¶ 53 n. 23 (quotations and citations omitted).
Two cases illustrate how this law has been applied. In the first case, a landlord sued a tenant for breach of a lease and sought recovery for lost rent and repair costs. Crowley v. Black, 2007 UT App 245, 167 P.3d 1087. "The trial court found that the house sustained abnormally high wear and tear during Defendant's lease." Id. ¶ 3. Rather than adopting the amount requested by the landlord, however, the trial court attributed some repair costs to normal wear and tear, other repair costs to the landlord for failing to maintain the property, and additional repair costs to the tenant due to his hard treatment of the property. Id. ¶ 8. Additionally, the trial court reduced the "lost rent amount from one month to a half a month" because of the typical time a place remains vacant after a tenant moves out. Id. The trial court then denied prejudgment interest.
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of prejudgment interest. Id. ¶ 11. Although the trial court had reduced the lost rent amount and had to allocate the cost of repairs, it nevertheless had known rent amounts, repair amounts, and specific dates. Id. ¶ 8. It "reviewed receipts and work orders" to show "the dates of repairs and their associated costs." Id. ¶ 9. Thus, even though it determined "which costs to include and which to exclude, thisdetermination did not render the resulting damage award less measurable by facts and figures." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). Because damages were complete and the loss was measurable, the Court concluded prejudgment interest should have been awarded.
In the second case, Sundial Inc. ("Sundial") brought suit against a Home Owner's Association ("HOA") for unjust enrichment. Sundial Inc. v. The Villages at Wolf Hollow Condominium Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc., 2013 UT App 223, 310 P.3d 1233. Sundial purchased thirty-four condominium units in a distressed project. Id. ¶ 3. It paid the HOA $44,500 "to cover the monthly assessment on the Sundial units and a large additional sum to ensure the Project's survival." Id. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for Sundial, concluding "Sundial paid significantly more than the monthly fees it was required to pay" to "prevent[] liens from being recorded against the Project and avoid[] foreclosure." Id. ¶ 5 (quotations and alteration omitted).
To calculate damages, "the trial court adopted a formula to isolate the benefit unjustly conferred on the HOA from the benefit to Sundial itself." Id. The trial court had broad discretion in adopting the formula because no set standard existed to calculate the benefit conferred on the HOA. Id. ¶ 9. Rather, it had to rely on a "mere description of the benefits conferred on Sundial as opposed to those conferred on the HOA." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). "Until the trial court selected a methodology, the amount of damages could not be ascertained with precision." Id. ¶ 10. Because the damages were not based on mathematical facts and figures, the trial court ultimately denied prejudgment interest. Id. ¶ 6. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling. Id. ¶ 11.
The difference between Crowley and Sundial, Inc. pertains to the tangibility of the damages. Damages that capture a nebulous deprivation of benefits, emotional harm, or uncertainfuture conditions4 are not subject to measurable facts and figures. One must resort to "a mere description of the wrongs done or injuries inflicted." Encon Utah, LLC, 2009 UT 7, ¶ 53 (quotations and citation omitted). In contrast, damages that are quantifiable and shown through receipts, work orders, and other such items are amenable to prejudgment interest. This is so even if one disagrees with how much a repair cost may be or whether such costs must be allocated.
In this case, the damage to the Plumbs' property commenced on February 4, 2013 and continued on for two days. By February 6th, the streambed was gouged with heavy equipment tracks, the gravel ramp was in place, the vegetation and rocks had been removed, and the cut of the banks and stream had been altered. All substantial damage was therefore complete by February 6th. Any further erosion was attendant to the County's completed actions and not a result of new trespass and negligence claims.
Thereafter, the Plumbs obtained different bids to determine the cost of stabilizing the stream banks and returning the stream back to its previous form. One contractor suggested bringing in boulders to restore the streambed, planting vegetation to stabilize the stream banks, and so forth. The cost for the labor, materials, and equipment were set forth. Likewise, the County presented its cost estimates to revegetate and stabilize the stream banks. Although the costs differed significantly from the Plumbs' estimated repair costs,...
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