Plumley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 5:15-CV-1229 (GTS/WBC)
| Decision Date | 08 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | 5:15-CV-1229 (GTS/WBC) |
| Parties | WILLIAM PLUMLEY, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
STANELY LAW OFFICES, LLP
Counsel for Plaintiff
STEPHANIE VISCELLI, ESQ.
GRAHAM MORRISON, ESQ.
This matter was referred for report and recommendation by the Honorable Judge Suddaby, Chief United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 72.3(d). (Dkt. No. 21.) This case has proceeded in accordance with General Order 18.
Currently before the Court, in this Social Security action filed by William Plumley ("Plaintiff") against the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant" or "the Commissioner") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), are the parties' cross- motions for judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. Nos. 12, 16.) For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that Plaintiff's motion be denied and Defendant's motion be granted.
Plaintiff was born on August 18, 1969. (T. 153.) He completed the 8th grade. (T. 185.) Generally, Plaintiff's alleged disability consists of degenerative disc disease and a heart condition. (T. 184.) His alleged disability onset date is March 29, 2012. (T. 48.) His date last insured is September 30, 2013. (Id.) He previously worked as a cook and mover. (T. 175.)
On March 30, 2012, Plaintiff applied for a period of Disability Insurance Benefits ("SSD") under Title II, and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI, of the Social Security Act. (T. 48.) Plaintiff's applications were initially denied, after which he timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("the ALJ"). On April 30, 2014, Plaintiff appeared before the ALJ, John P. Ramos. (T. 27-47.) On May 8, 2014, ALJ Ramos issued a written decision finding Plaintiff not disabled under the Social Security Act. (T. 9-26.) On September 23, 2015, the Appeals Council ("AC") denied Plaintiff's request for review, rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (T. 2-7.) Thereafter, Plaintiff timely sought judicial review in this Court.
Generally, in his decision, the ALJ made the following five findings of fact and conclusions of law. (T. 14-22.) First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured statusrequirements through September 20, 2013 and Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 29, 2012. (T. 14.) Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of lumbar spine degenerative disc disease, borderline intellectual functioning, and alcohol abuse. (Id.) Third, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments located in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix. 1. (T. 15-17.) Fourth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform sedentary work with additional non-exertional mental limitations. (T. 17.)1 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the ability to understand and follow simple instructions and directions; perform simple tasks with supervision and independently; maintain attention/concentration for simple tasks; regularly attend to a routine and maintain a schedule; could relate to and interact with others to the extent necessary to carry out simple tasks; and could handle reasonable levels of simple work-related stress in that he could make decisions directly related to the performance of simple work and handle usual work place changes and interactions associated with simple work. (Id.) Fifth, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was incapable of performing his past relevant work; however, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy Plaintiff could perform. (T. 20-21.)
Plaintiff makes three separate arguments in support of his motion for judgment on the pleadings. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not evaluate the medical opinion of the treating physician according to the relevant legal standards and as a result the RFC assessment was the product of legal error and not support by substantial evidence. (Dkt. No. 12 at 9-12 [Pl.'s Mem. of Law].) Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not evaluate Plaintiff's subjective statements in accordance with the relevant legal standards. (Id. at 12-14.) Third, and lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have consulted a vocational expert ("VE") because Plaintiff's non-exertional limitations were more than negligible. (Id. at 14-15.)
In response, Defendant makes three arguments. First, Defendant argues that the ALJ properly evaluated the medical evidence in the record. (Dkt. No. 16 at 4-6 [Def.'s Mem. of Law].) Second, Defendant argues that the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff's subjective complaints. (Id. at 6-7.) Third, and lastly, Defendant argues that the ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff could work. (Id. at 7-8.)
A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Commissioner's determination will only be reversed if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it was not supported by substantial evidence. See Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987) (); Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979).
"Substantial evidence" is evidence that amounts to "more than a mere scintilla," and has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971). Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
"To determine on appeal whether the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from its weight." Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's finding must be sustained "even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court's independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner's]." Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other words, this Court must afford the Commissioner's determination considerable deference, and may not substitute "its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review." Valente v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).
The Commissioner has established a five-step evaluation process to determine whether an individual is disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The Supreme Court has recognized the validity of this sequential evaluation process. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The five-step process is as follows:
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on a 'residual functional capacity' assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.
A plaintiff's RFC is the most he can do despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). RFC is the individual's maximum remaining ability to do sustained work activities in an ordinary setting on a regular and continuing basis, and the RFC assessment must include a discussion of the individual's abilities on that basis. "A regular and continuing basis means eight hours a day, for five days a week, or an equivalent work schedule." Pardee v. Astrue, 631 F. Supp. 2d 200, 210 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). In determining Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ can consider a variety of factors, including a treating physician's or examining physician's observations of limitations, Plaintiff's subjective allegations of pain, physical and mental abilities, as well as the limiting effects of all impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a).
The relevant factors considered in determining what weight to afford an opinion include the length, nature and extent of the treatment relationship, relevant evidence which supports the opinion, the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and the specialization (if...
To continue reading
Request your trial