Plummer v. Johnson.

Decision Date04 February 1944
Docket NumberNo. 156.,156.
Citation35 A.2d 647
PartiesPLUMMER v. JOHNSON.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Division.

Action by Henry A. Johnson against F. N. Plummer on a note. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

James J. Laughlin, of Washington, D.C., for appellant.

Joseph H. Batt, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before RICHARDSON, Chief Judge, and CAYTON and HOOD, Associate Judges.

HOOD, Associate Judge.

Plaintiff, as endorsee and holder of a promissory note in the sum of $2,950, brought suit thereon against the maker. Defendant's answer was, in substance, a general denial, but in his affidavit of defense he admitted signing the note and averred that he had signed ‘without any consideration whatsover.’ In his opening statement counsel for defendant informed the court that the defense was ‘no consideration.’

Plaintiff introduced the note in evidence, and testified to its genuineness and that he was the holder in due course. On cross-examination, he testified the note was given in renewal of a prior note. Defendant's counsel attempted to interrogate plaintiff concerning the making and delivery of the original note but on objection by plaintiff was not permitted to do so.

Defendant, on direct examination, admitted his signature on the note and admitted its execution and delivery, and testified the note was a renewal of a prior note. Defendant's counsel attempted to question defendant respecting the making of the original note and the circumstances surrounding the same but objection was made and sustained to this line of questioning. Thereupon, defendant's counsel asked leave of court to amend the answer ‘to show fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence in connection with the making of the original note.’ Plaintiff objected to such amendment and the court denied leave to amend.

The court found for the plaintiff in the full amount of the note, plus interest and attorney's fee as provided in the note, and judgment was duly entered on the finding.

As the basis for this appeal, defendant originally assigned a number of errors, but in his brief and argument in this court he asserts there is a single question of law involved in the appeal, stating that question thus: ‘Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in denying appellant the right to amend his answer?’ Accordingly, we limit our review to this single question.

Section 13-301 of the Code provides that in all judicial proceedings the court shall have power upon such terms as shall seem best, at any stage of the case, to allow amendments of the pleadings. That section does not make it mandatory on the courts to allow amendments, but reposes in the court a reasonable discretion in the allowance or refusal of amendments. 1

In Chunn v. City & Suburban Ry., 23 App.D.C. 551, reversed on other grounds, 207 U.S. 302, 28 S.Ct. 63, 59 L.Ed. 219, it was said: ‘The grant or refusal of leave to amend is a power intrusted to the trial courts that injustice and hardship may be prevented and the merits of the case fairly tried. Whether in the particular instance the leave should be granted or refused is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and is not reviewable in the appellate court.’

It has been repeatedly held in this jurisdiction that the grant or refusal of leave to amend is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that its action cannot be reviewed on appeal except for abuse of discretion. 2

The case had been at issue more than eight months before trial, and no reason was given to the trial court why the desired amendment was not sought prior to trial. Orderly procedure requires that amendments of pleadings ordinarily should be had before and not during trial, and while our Code gives the trial court broad discretion in permitting amendments at any stage of the case, that discretion, as we have said, is committed to the sound judgment of the trial court.

A party comes to trial prepared to meet the issues raised by the pleadings. A change of claim or defense in the midst of trial will usually require a continuance to enable opposing side to...

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12 cases
  • Coates v. Ellis.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • August 20, 1948
    ...Street Corporation v. Jardin, D.C.Mun.App., 53 A.2d 278; 75 W.L.R. 639. 7Kaplowitz Brothers v. Kahan, D.C.Mun.App., 59 A.2d 795, 76 W.L.R. 765. 8Plummer v. Johnson, D.C.Munn.App., 35 A.2d 647; 72 W.L.R. 132; Yellow Cab Co. of D. C. v. Rogers, D.C.Mun.App., 34 A.2d 36; 71 W.L.R. 1111. 9Willi......
  • Taylor v. United Brd.. Co. Inc.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • September 27, 1948
    ...v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, 3 Cir., 136 F.2d 991, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Mason, 3 Cir., 115 F.2d 548. 5Plummer v. Johnson, D.C.Mun.App., 35 A.2d 647; Yellow Cab Co. of D. C. v. Rogers, D.C.Mun.App., 34 A.2d 36. 6Listed supra in footnote 2. 1Young v. Unit......
  • Conrad v. Medina
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • June 5, 1946
    ...effective). 4Continental Oil Co. v. Mulich, 10 Cir., 70 F.2d 521. See also Van Ingen v. Berger, 82 Ohio St. 255, 92 N.E. 433, 19 Ann.Cas. 799. 5Plummer v. Johnson, D.C.Mun.App., 35 A.2d 647; Werth v. Nolan, D.C.Mun.App., 32 A.2d 386, reversed on other grounds 79 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 142 F.2d 9.......
  • Howard University v. Good Food Services
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • April 28, 1992
    ...as an additional insured. The grant or denial of a motion to amend is committed to trial court discretion, e.g., Plummer v. Johnson, 35 A.2d 647, 648 (D.C.1944), and this court's role is to "examine the record and the trial court's determination for those indicia of rationality and fairness......
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