Plummer v. People of State
| Decision Date | 30 September 1874 |
| Citation | 1874 WL 9141,74 Ill. 361 |
| Parties | JOHN PLUMMERv.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Stephenson county; the Hon. WILLIAM BROWN, Judge, presiding.
Mr. J. M. BAILEY, and Mr. J. I. NEFF, for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. JAMES S. COCHRAN, State's Attorney, for the People.
Plaintiff in error was indicted and convicted under the approved February 29, 1872 (Laws of 1871-2, p. 462).
Evidence was given on the trial, showing that the title of the bill for this act, as it passed the House of Representatives, was, “a bill for an act to prevent the keeping of common gaming houses;” but when it was introduced in the Senate it bore the title, “a bill for an act to prevent the keeping of common gaming houses, and to prevent gaming,” by which title it passed that body; and it was then reported back to the House of Representatives, with the message, that the Senate had concurred with the House in the passage of the bill, by that title. Subsequently, the chairman of the committee on enrolled and engrossed bills reported to the House, as properly enrolled, “an act to prevent the keeping of common gaming houses and to prevent gaming,” and by this title it was approved by the Governor, and his approval reported to the House. The bill for the act was designated as “House bill No. 769,” and this designation was preserved unchanged in its passage through both houses; and it was likewise affixed to the act when it was reported as enrolled, and also when it was reported as approved by the Governor. The identity of the body of the bill, through every step, from its introduction in the House, until it was finally declared a law, is thus sufficiently established; and the only question in this regard is, does the mere change that occurred in the title render the law void?
It is claimed that the law cannot be sustained, because of this change in its title, under section thirteen, article four of the constitution, which reads: Formerly, the title was considered no part of the statute, for it was usually framed by the clerk of that house in which the bill first passed, and was seldom read more than once. Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, 102; Sedgwick on the Construction of Statutory and Const. Law (2d ed.), 38. Nor can it now, in strictness, be considered any part of the law, although the constitutional mandate is to be observed, for this is simply to give notice of the general subject of the bill, so that neither the public nor the members of the Legislature shall be misled by the title. And, therefore, there is not the same necessity that the precise language of the title shall, with that formality and strictness necessary in regard to the body of the bill, receive the concurrence of both houses. Unless the change in the title is one of substance, and calculated to mislead as to the subject of the bill, we are of opinion it may be regarded as merely a clerical mistake, in nowise impairing the validity of the law. The People v. The Supervisors, etc., 16 Mich. 254.
The requirement of the constitution, it will be observed, is not, that but one subject shall be expressed in the title, it is, “the act” shall embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed in the title. It is unnecessary to also express in the title the incidental results expected to flow from the act; but, if it be done, it does not render the act void; and the additional words here added may, we think, be regarded as an unnecessary specification of an object expected to be attained by the act, for, if gaming-houses are prevented, it must follow as an incident that, to some extent, gaming will likewise be prevented. It is impossible that any one, reading the title of the act as it was when the bill passed the Senate, should not understand that it was intended thereby to prevent the keeping of gaming-houses, because the words “and to prevent gaming” are not repugnant to, but, on the contrary, are entirely consistent with that idea.
We feel, therefore, constrained to hold that the act is liable to no constitutional objection on the grounds urged.
The objections to the form of the indictment, we think also untenable.
The offense is stated, although not in the precise terms and language of the statute creating the offense, yet so plainly that the nature of the offense may be easily understood by the jury,...
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