Plumtree v. City of Naperville
| Docket Number | 22 C 6635 |
| Decision Date | 22 August 2023 |
| Parties | CLAYTON PLUMTREE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NAPERVILLE and JASON ARRES, police chief, in his official and individual capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff Clayton Plumtree formerly served as a police officer for the City of Naperville, Illinois. During Plaintiff's employment, the Naperville Police Department (“Department”) maintained a policy under which officers were expected to perform at least two traffic stops per day. Plaintiff alleges that he raised concerns about the legality of that policy. In retaliation for those communications, he alleges, Naperville's Police Chief-Defendant Jason Arres-and its Board of Fire and Police Commissioners (the “Board”), terminated him without due process. Defendants have moved to dismiss arguing that Plaintiff was a probationary officer at the time he was fired and was therefore not entitled to notice or a hearing before being discharged. For the reasons explained below, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff Clayton Plumtree has served as a police officer in various municipalities for more than 14 years. (Pl.'s Second Am Compl. (“SAC”) [19-2] ¶ 17.) Plaintiff regularly received high praise from his former employers, and had a stellar disciplinary history. (Id. ¶¶ 20-24.) In April 2021, Plaintiff began working for Naperville as a probationary police officer. (Id. ¶ 18.)
From at least 2019 through 2022, the Department maintained a written “Traffic Stop Expectation Policy” that required all officers “to conduct at least two traffic stops per shift.”[1] (Id. ¶ 31.) While the policy was in effect, Department “supervisors and other police officers, including Plumtree, verbally expressed their concerns and opposition” to it. (Id. ¶ 38.) The record is unclear about when or for how long these officers expressed those concerns, but it appears that the existence of the policy is undisputed: In December 2021, the Department's Patrol Deputy Chief and Commander sent a memorandum to patrol personnel explaining that the policy was intended to “[i]ncrease proactive traffic enforcement and community engagement” in order to “solv[e] problems within [Naperville's] community.” (Id. ¶ 31.) The memo also warned, without specifics, of consequences for failure to comply, stating that “[o]fficers who do not meet expectations and cannot demonstrate they were consistently working [on other assignments] will be held accountable.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the policy was controversial; he says it generated five “Office of Professional Standards investigations” within the Department and has caused “considerable discontent” and “heated discussion[s]” within the patrol division. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 39-40.)
In April 2022, at an officer roll call, Plaintiff's supervisor, Sergeant Heun, stated: (Id. ¶¶ 40-41.) Another patrol officer Officer Razionale, had not been meeting his quotas and faced potential discipline. (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff alleges that both he and Razionale “understood Heun's statement to mean that . . . Razionale could add himself to some of [Plaintiff]'s traffic stops.” (Id. ¶ 45.) Razionale then began changing some of both Plaintiff's and Heun's traffic stop reports-listing (i.e., “adding”) himself as the primary officer and Plaintiff or Heun as the backup officer. (Id. ¶¶ 46-47.)
Around August 16, 2022, Plaintiff notified Sergeant Heun that Razionale was “taking credit for [Plaintiff]'s stops,” but Heun did not object, nor did he “tell [Plaintiff] that such conduct was against Department Policy.” (Id. ¶¶ 47-48.) Plaintiff also alleges that Heun told his own supervisor, Commander Deuchler, about Razionale's conduct, and that Deuchler responded by saying that the practice fell in a “gray area,” but that it was permissible “so long as everyone met their traffic stop quotas.” (Id. ¶ 50.)
Razionale continued “adding” himself to Plaintiff's stops-with Plaintiff's and Sergeant Heun's knowledge-until late August 2022, when Commander Deuchler directed Heun to discontinue the practice. (Id. ¶¶ 52-57.) Heun passed along that message to Razionale, but not to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 59-60.) On September 2, 2022, Plaintiff was summoned to the police station prior to his shift, notified that he was under investigation for the traffic stops falsely attributed to Razionale, and placed on paid administrative leave. (Id. ¶ 62.)
On October 14, 2022, after the Department investigated Plaintiff's conduct, Defendant Arres, Naperville's Police Chief, unilaterally terminated Plaintiff for violating the Department's general orders that “[o]fficers shall be truthful and complete . . .” and that “[e]mployees shall not make false or untrue statements during the course of their duties[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 64-65.) Arres reported Plaintiff's termination in a department-wide email. (Id. ¶ 66.) Arres also spoke about the termination in Department meetings, reported Plaintiff to the DuPage County and Will County State's Attorney's Offices for “Brady violations,” and reported Plaintiff to the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board “to prevent him from ever being hired as a police officer” again. (Id. ¶¶ 70, 72-73.)
On October 19, 2022, one day after Plaintiff's probationary period would have expired, Arres “rescinded his unilateral termination of [Plaintiff] after receiving notice from the Naperville Fraternal Order of Police . . . that he lacked [the authority] to unilaterally fire [Plaintiff].” (SAC ¶ 81.) According to Board rules, probationary officers may be discharged “after the Police Chief has received from the Board a notice in writing that the Board has approved the discharge.”
(Defs.' Mem., Ex. B (“Rule 4.17”) [23-2].) In contrast, an officer who has successfully completed probation may be discharged only “after a hearing before the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners as provided by law.” (SAC ¶ 15.) The same day that Arres rescinded his termination of Plaintiff, Arres extended Plaintiff's “probationary period for an additional 30 days for ‘disciplinary purposes,'” another action Plaintiff alleges that Arres was not authorized to take. (Id. ¶ 82.) Plaintiff asserts that his probationary status was extended “in retaliation for the Naperville FOP's letter [to Arres about Plaintiff's unlawful termination] and public support of [Plaintiff].” (Id. ¶ 83.)
Plaintiff never received any hearing, though he would have been entitled to one if he were a full-time officer at the time he was terminated. (Id. ¶ 88(a).) On or about October 21, 2022, Arres submitted a recommendation to the Board to terminate Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 85.) That same day, Plaintiff submitted a memorandum to the Board outlining “the City's/Arres's improper traffic expectation system and further communicated that this policy created considerable confusion and discontent within the Department, which led to Arres's charges against him.” (Id. ¶ 86.) On October 24, 2022, the Board met-with Arres, but not Plaintiff, in attendance-to discuss Arres's recommendation to terminate Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 87-88.) There, the Board voted unanimously to terminate Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 88.)
Plaintiff filed this suit in November 2022 [1]. After Defendants moved to dismiss [11], Plaintiff sought leave to file an amended complaint [15], which this court granted [17]. When Plaintiff conferred with Defendants about various factual allegations to which they objected, Plaintiff sought [19] and received [21] leave to file the operative Second Amended Complaint [192]. Plaintiff's six-count Second Amended Complaint asserts claims against (I) Defendants collectively for violating his due process rights in terminating him, (II) Arres individually for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (III) Naperville for § 1983 Monell violations, (IV) Naperville for Illinois state law administrative review pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq., (V) Arres for state law defamation per se, and (VI) Naperville, claiming that the City must indemnify Arres on these claims. Defendants have moved to dismiss counts I through V [22].
To withstand a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “[R]ecitals of the elements . . . supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. While the court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Olson v. Champaign Cty., Ill., 784 F.3d 1093, 1099 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted), a complaint need only be “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
At this stage, the court presumes the truth of Plaintiff's allegations. Lett v. City of Chi., 946 F.3d 398, 399 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Although plaintiffs must state sufficient facts “about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together,” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010), they need not “come forward with evidence to survive a motion to dismiss.” Hunt v. Dart No. 07 C 6003, 2010 WL 300397, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2010) (citation omitted). Further, matters of...
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