Plunkett v. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION
Decision Date | 03 November 2009 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 284320. |
Citation | 779 NW 2d 263,286 Mich. App. 168 |
Parties | PLUNKETT v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Fieger, Fieger, Kenney, Johnson & Giroux, P.C. (by Victor S. Valenti), Southfield, for plaintiff.
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, B. Eric Restuccia, Solicitor General, and John P. Mack, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.
Before: SAAD, C.J., and WHITBECK and ZAHRA, JJ.
In this governmental immunity highway exception case, defendant, the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT), appeals as of right the trial court's order denying MDOT summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). This case arises out of a single-motor-vehicle accident in which plaintiff Jerome Plunkett's wife, decedent Holly Marie Plunkett,1 died after losing control of her vehicle, causing her vehicle to leave the roadway and strike a tree. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On May 19, 2005, at approximately 8:30 p.m., Holly Plunkett was driving her minivan south on US-127 in Clare County, at or near Bailey Road in Frost Township. The posted speed limit was 70 miles an hour, and data allegedly taken from the vehicle's diagnostic module reflected that Holly Plunkett was traveling 77 miles an hour when she lost control of the vehicle, which then struck a tree on the west side of the highway. At the time and place of the accident, it was raining and the road surface was wet. The injuries Holly Plunkett sustained as a result of the accident caused her immediate death.
Plunkett alleged that Holly Plunkett's vehicle "hydroplaned on the defective and dangerous roadway surface, causing loss of control of said vehicle...."
However, Plunkett alleged, "1999 and/or 2001 micro surfacing projects negligently altered the cross-slope/crown and/or super-elevation of the highway at issue from the proper cross-slope/crown and/or super-elevation of the 1990 construction" because a uniform thickness was not applied and the "cross-slope/crown and/or super-elevation" then became inadequate.
Plunkett further alleged that, at least 30 days before and at the time of the accident, MDOT "knew, or after the exercise of due diligence should have known," about the defective conditions, "which needed to be repaired."
In November 2007, MDOT filed its third motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that Plunkett had failed to plead a cause of action in avoidance of governmental immunity, that Plunkett had failed to perfect his claim with proper presuit notice, and that the damages recoverable by Plunkett were restricted to those specifically allowed under MCL 691.1402(1). After hearing oral arguments on the motion, the trial court denied the motion, finding that Plunkett's presuit notice sufficiently described the nature of the defect; that Plunkett had properly pleaded in avoidance of governmental immunity by alleging that there was a persistent defect in the highway that, in combination with the falling rain, created an unsafe situation; and that Plunkett was entitled to recover wrongful death act damages for loss of companionship and society. The trial court entered a formal written order in March 2008.
MDOT now appeals as of right the trial court's denial of its motion for summary disposition.4
MDOT argues that the trial court erred by denying MDOT summary disposition because Plunkett's claim, that an inadequate superelevation or rutting of the highway surface constituted the alleged "defect," is barred because MDOT was not given sufficient presuit notice of that specific condition as required by MCL 691.1404. According to MDOT, the notice did not contain a strictly accurate or correct identification of the alleged highway defect.
We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition.5 Further, the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to our de novo review.6
As stated previously, in September 2005, Plunkett filed his presuit notice of claim, which alleged that a defect existed on US-127 that led to Holly Plunkett's accident. The notice stated, in pertinent part:
A police report regarding Holly Plunkett's accident was attached to the notice. The report stated that "it was raining hard at the time, there was some standing water on the roadway where the vehicle tires travel...." The report suggested that Holly Plunkett lost control of her vehicle "possibly from hydro-planing sic...." A second police report described the location of the accident:
To bring a claim under the highway exception to governmental immunity, an injured person must timely notify the governmental agency having jurisdiction over the roadway of the occurrence of the injury, the injury sustained, "the exact location and nature of the defect," and the names of known witnesses.7 The notice need not be provided in a particular form. It is sufficient if it is timely and contains the requisite information.8
The Michigan Supreme Court has established that "MCL 691.1404 is straightforward, clear, unambiguous, and not constitutionally suspect" and "must be enforced as written."9 However, when notice is required of an average...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Streng v. Bd. of Mackinac Cnty. Rd. Comm'rs
... ... Substantial compliance will suffice. " Plunkett v. Dep't of Transp., 286 Mich.App. 168, 178, 779 N.W.2d 263 (2009), quoting Hussey v. Muskegon ... ...
-
Doe v. Dep't of Corr.
... ... Dept of Corrections (On Rehearing) , 232 Mich. App. 730, 734-737, 592 N.W.2d 370 (1998), which ... and "allege facts warranting the application of an exception to governmental immunity." Plunkett v. Dept of Transp. , 286 Mich. App. 168, 180, 779 N.W.2d 263 (2009). Plaintiffs complaint ... ...
-
Proctor v. Saginaw Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners
... ... "We review de novo the applicability of government immunity." Plunkett v. Dep't of Transp. , 286 Mich.App. 168, 180, 779 N.W.2d 263 (2009). As stated in Dextrom v ... ...
-
Russell v. City of Detroit
... ... It is sufficient if it is timely and contains the requisite information." Plunkett v. Dept of Transp. , 286 Mich.App. 168, 176, 779 N.W.2d 263 (2009). Further, the information ... ...