Plunkett v. State

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: GOLDBERG, Justice.
• Citation: Plunkett v. State, 869 A.2d 1185 (R.I. 2005)
• Decision Date: 10 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2003-473-M.P.,2003-473-M.P.
• Parties: Edward J. PLUNKETT v. STATE of Rhode Island.

869 A.2d 1185

Edward J. PLUNKETT v. STATE of Rhode Island.

No. 2003-473-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 10, 2005.

Bernard P. Healy, Providence, for Plaintiff.

James R. Lee, Providence, for Defendant.

Present: GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

GOLDBERG, Justice.

This employment discrimination case came before the Supreme Court on February 3, 2005, pursuant to a petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner, the State of Rhode Island (petitioner or state), seeking review of a Superior Court order denying its motion for summary judgment. The petitioner had moved for summary judgment, asserting that the claim of the respondent, Edward J. Plunkett (Plunkett or respondent), was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The petitioner contended that Plunkett had the opportunity to litigate his discrimination claim in his previous wrongful termination action, Plunkett v. State, 810 A.2d 787 (R.I.2002) (Plunkett I), and challenges, before this Court, the motion justice's determination that the respondent's claim is not precluded by principles of res judicata. For the reasons set forth herein, we grant the petition for certiorari and quash the order of the Superior Court.

Facts and Travel

The pertinent facts giving rise to Plunkett I and this case are identical. In 1978, respondent began his employment with the state when he was appointed director of the Statewide Judicial Information System (SJIS). He later was appointed to the position of executive director of SJIS and served in that capacity until he was terminated. On March 1, 2001, the Chief Justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court (Chief Justice) notified respondent, by letter, that his employment would be terminated as of April 1, 2001.

The Chief Justice's letter prompted Plunkett to file a wrongful termination action in Superior Court on March 27, 2001, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plunkett argued that he could be discharged only for cause because he had reached the milestone of twenty years of state employment while in the position of executive director of SJIS. See G.L.1956 § 36-4-59 (granting full status to state employees with twenty years of service). The suit was expedited by agreement of the parties, who submitted it to the Superior Court on memoranda in early May 2001. On or about July 5, 2001, the Superior Court justice denied respondent's claim for injunctive relief.

Plunkett promptly appealed to this Court, and on December 5, 2002, the decision of the Superior Court was affirmed. Plunkett I, 810 A.2d at 790. We held that the executive director of SJIS is an assistant to the Court Administrator, within the meaning of G.L.1956 § 8-15-4(a), and therefore, serves at the pleasure of the Chief Justice, § 36-4-59 notwithstanding. Plunkett I, 810 A.2d at 789; see also § 8-15-4(a) ("The [C]hief [J]ustice shall appoint a [C]ourt [A]dministrator and such assistants as he or she deems necessary to aid in the administration of the judicial system.").

On November 14, 2001, while his appeal was pending, Plunkett filed a second complaint in the Superior Court, this time alleging age and disability discrimination. The state moved to dismiss respondent's complaint under principles of res judicata. The motion was denied on the condition that respondent file an amended complaint within twenty days stating a claim for relief under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 5 of title 28 (FEPA). The respondent timely filed an amended complaint alleging that he had asserted a claim of discrimination with the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights (RICHR or commission) on April 23, 2001, and obtained a right-to-sue letter from the commission on or about October 30, 2001. See § 28-5-24.1 (requiring claimants to obtain the right to sue from the commission before filing a complaint under FEPA in the Superior Court).

The state's motion for summary judgment on the amended complaint, based on res judicata, was denied on August 26, 2003. The motion justice explained that res judicata did not apply because Plunkett's two complaints did not allege the same operative facts. We granted certiorari to review the motion justice's order, and the Superior Court stayed its proceedings pending our disposition of the matter.

Standard of Review

When we grant certiorari to review the denial of a motion for summary judgment, our review is governed by the same standard of review that applies to a grant of summary judgment. McKinnon v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 713 A.2d 245, 247 (R.I.1998). This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment on a de novo basis, with the contours of our review shaped by the same standards that apply to a trial justice. DiBattista v. State, 808 A.2d 1081, 1085 (R.I.2002) (citing M & B Realty, Inc. v. Duval, 767 A.2d 60, 63 (R.I.2001) and Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 93 (R.I.1996)). Summary judgment is an extreme remedy and should be granted only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as [a] matter of law." Wright v. Zielinski, 824 A.2d 494, 497 (R.I.2003) (quoting Super.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).

Discussion

The petitioner argues that respondent could have included his discrimination claim in the original suit and should not be permitted to circumvent the doctrine of res judicata merely by seeking different relief or arguing a different legal theory. The respondent counters that res judicata does not preclude him from litigating the discrimination issues, and furthermore, that he could not have included a claim for discrimination in his previous suit.

The doctrine of res judicata relates to the preclusive effect of a final judgment in an action between the parties. Foster-Glocester Regional School Committee v. Board of Review, 854 A.2d 1008, 1014 n. 2 (R.I.2004) (citing E.W. Audet & Sons, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. of Newark, New Jersey, 635 A.2d 1181, 1186 (R.I.1994)). "This doctrine ensures that judicial resources are not wasted on multiple and possibly inconsistent resolutions of the same lawsuit." ElGabri v. Lekas, 681 A.2d 271, 275 (R.I.1996) (quoting Gaudreau v. Blasbalg, 618 A.2d 1272, 1275 (R.I.1993)). The doctrine applies when "there exists identity of parties, identity of issues, and finality of judgment in an earlier action." Beirne v. Barone, 529 A.2d 154, 157 (R.I.1987).

The parties do not dispute the existence of identity of parties or finality of judgment in the original lawsuit. The respondent alleges that his claim is not precluded by the judgment in the original suit, however, because identity of issues does not exist. We, therefore, focus our analysis on the identity of issues prong of the res judicata analysis.

As we recently explained, the term "res judicata" is commonly used to refer to two preclusion doctrines: (1) collateral estoppel or issue preclusion; and (2) res judicata or claim preclusion. Foster-Glocester Regional School Committee, 854 A.2d at 1014 n. 2 (citing 1 Restatement (Second) Judgments ch. 1, Intro. at 1, 2 (1982) and E.W. Audet & Sons, Inc., 635 A.2d at 1186). In Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 77 n. 1, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984), the United States Supreme Court discussed the preclusion terminology and elected to use the term "claim preclusion," instead of res judicata, to avoid confusion. The Court explained:

"The preclusive effects of former adjudication are discussed in varying and, at times, seemingly conflicting terminology, attributable to the evolution of preclusion concepts over the years. These effects are referred to collectively by most commentators as the doctrine of `res judicata.' See Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Introductory Note before ch. 3 (1982); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4402 (1981). Res judicata is often analyzed further to consist of two preclusion concepts: `issue preclusion' and `claim preclusion.' Issue preclusion refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing relitigation of a matter that has been litigated and decided. See Restatement, supra, § 27. * * * Claim preclusion refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing litigation of a matter that never has been litigated, because of a determination that it should have been advanced in an earlier suit. Claim preclusion therefore encompasses the law of merger and bar. See id., Introductory Note before § 24." Migra, 465 U.S. at 77 n.1, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56.

Although issue preclusion generally operates to bar relitigation of only those issues that actually were decided in the prior lawsuit, it may even apply when the second lawsuit asserts a different claim. Foster-Glocester Regional School Committee, 854 A.2d at 1014 n.2. Claim preclusion, on the other hand," `precludes the relitigation of all the issues that were tried or might have been tried in the original suit.'" Id. (Emphasis added.)

This Court considered the question of what constitutes a "claim" for purposes of claim preclusion in ElGabri and adopted the transactional rule set forth in the Restatement (Second) Judgments. ElGabri, 681 A.2d at 276. Section 24 of the Restatement provides:

"Dimensions of `Claim' for Purposes of Merger or Bar-General Rule Concerning `Splitting'

"(1) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff's claim * * * the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.

"(2) What factual grouping constitutes a `transaction'[ ] and what groupings constitutes a `series'[ ] are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are

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