Plunkett v. State

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: Plunkett v. State, 810 A.2d 787 (R.I. 2002)
• Decision Date: 05 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. 2001-303-Appeal.,2001-303-Appeal.
• Parties: Edward J. PLUNKETT v. STATE of Rhode Island.

810 A.2d 787

Edward J. PLUNKETT v. STATE of Rhode Island.

No. 2001-303-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

December 5, 2002.

Present: LEDERBERG, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Bernard Patrick Healy, Foster, for Plaintiff.

James R. Lee, Providence, for Defendant.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

The plaintiff, Edward J. Plunkett, has appealed a Superior Court judgment denying his request for injunctive relief, after the Chief Justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to reappoint him as executive director of the Statewide Judicial Information System (SJIS).¹ The plaintiff has raised two issues on appeal; first, whether the SJIS executive director is an assistant to the court administrator and serves at the pleasure of the Chief Justice, pursuant to G.L.1956 § 8-15-4; and second, if the executive director is found to be such an assistant, whether G.L.1956 § 36-4-59 entitles the executive director to full status or tenure after twenty years of state service, thereby protecting him from being subject to discharge without cause.

This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on October 31, 2002, pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining the record and the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown, and we proceed to decide the appeal at this time.

The essential facts in this case are not in dispute. The plaintiff had been employed by the State of Rhode Island for more than twenty-one years, beginning with his appointment in 1978 as director of SJIS. In 1986, he became the executive director of SJIS, a position he held until the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court notified him by letter dated March 1, 2001, that his employment would be terminated, effective April 1, 2001. The plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court, alleging that he had been wrongfully discharged and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Superior Court justice denied injunctive relief, and plaintiff appealed.

Both issues in this case hinge on questions of statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews de novo. State v. Fritz, 801 A.2d 679, 682 (R.I.2002). The first issue is whether the SJIS executive director is an assistant to the court administrator and thus serves at the pleasure of the Chief Justice, pursuant to § 8-15-4(a), which provides: "The chief justice shall appoint a court administrator and such assistants as he or she deems necessary to aid in the administration of the judicial system. The administrator and his or her assistants shall serve at the pleasure of the chief justice." The plaintiff argued that the executive director is not an assistant to the court administrator because "[t]he various offices of state government who use and are served by [SJIS] extend far beyond the judiciary branch," and thus SJIS and its executive director are "simply not under the exclusive direction of the Chief Justice."

We disagree with plaintiff's interpretation of the SJIS executive director's position. Although other state agencies, such as the Department of Corrections and the Office of the General Treasurer, use the SJIS database, plaintiff's work dealt with dissemination of judicial information. Moreover, whether the SJIS executive director is an assistant to the court administrator depends on whether the oversight and management of plaintiff's position lies within the control of the court. The plaintiff admitted in deposition testimony that he "wouldreport to the state court administrator," that it was plaintiff's "responsibility to do assignments from the state court administrator," and that "if either the chief justice or the state court administrator requested to meet with [him], it would be part of his job performance, job duties, to meet with those people[.]" These responsibilities constitute clear indicia that plaintiff, as SJIS executive director, served as an assistant to the court administrator. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the Superior Court justice on this issue.

Having established that the SJIS executive director is an assistant to the court administrator for purposes of § 8-15-4, the next issue we address is whether plaintiff achieved full status as SJIS executive director because he held that position at the time he obtained twenty years of service credit for the state. Section 36-4-59(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part:

"Every person who shall have twenty (20) years * * * of service credit, the credits having been earned in either the classified, nonclassified, or unclassified service of the state * * *, shall be deemed to have acquired full status in the position he or she holds at the time of obtaining twenty (20) years of service credit."

Subsection 36-4-59(a)(2)(iii), however, distinguishes § 36-4-59(a)(1) by providing that "[section 59] shall not apply to employees of the state government whose method of appointment and salary and term of office is specified by statute."

The plaintiff argued that § 8-15-4 does not provide a definitive and finite term to the position of assistants to the court administrator, but merely stipulates that assistants "shall serve at the pleasure of the chief justice." Therefore, plaintiff contended, § 8-15-4 neither conflicts with § 36-4-59, nor falls within the exception set forth in § 36-4-59(a)(2)(iii). Thus, plaintiff urged, even if he served at the discretion of the Chief Justice during his first twenty years of service, at the time he obtained full status by March 2001, he no longer was subject to discharge...