Plyler v. Burns
| Decision Date | 11 June 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 26335.,26335. |
| Citation | 647 S.E.2d 188 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Chandler B. PLYLER f/k/a Mary C. Burns, Appellant, v. Michael J. BURNS, Laura Burns, Selective Insurance Company of America, South Carolina Retirement Systems, Horry County Probate Court, BB & T Corporation, Ted H. Watts, individually and on behalf of The National Bank of South Carolina, Debbie Ann Dellavecchia, Individually and on behalf of John Doe Mortgage Company, Tracy Leavens, Colony Bank SouthEast-Broxton, The Conway National Bank, First Citizens Bank of South Carolina, SunTrust Banks, Inc., Allen Bailey and Bailey, Patterson, Caddell, Hart & Bailey, P.A., Defendants, Of Whom Horry County Probate Court is Respondent. |
Russell S. Stemke, of Isle of Palms, for Appellant.
Emma Ruth Brittain and Matthew R. Magee, both of Thompson & Henry, of Myrtle Beach, for Respondent.
This is an appeal from a grant of a motion to dismiss a cause of action brought by a beneficiary of a conservatorship against a county probate court. We affirm.
In December 1992, Appellant Chandler Plyler's ("Plyler") mother died as a result of complications from surgery. Plyler was fourteen years old at the time of her mother's death. Because Plyler was a minor, the Horry County Probate Court ("HCPC") established a conservatorship to protect Plyler's interests in the estate benefits she received as a result of her mother's death. HCPC appointed Michael Burns ("Burns"), Plyler's father, as conservator.
Burns initially filed documentation with HCPC estimating the value of the conservatorship estate to be eighty-five thousand dollars ($85,000.00). Burns obtained a bond in that amount and filed it with HCPC. Approximately two months later, Burns filed an initial inventory and appraisal with HCPC indicating the value of the estate to be $85,618.00 which was held in two certificates of deposit. After the first year of the conservatorship, Burns filed an annual accounting showing the value of the conservatorship to be $90,727.84. The second annual accounting reported a conservatorship value of $152,066.84. The third annual accounting reported a conservatorship value of $158,164.29.
After Plyler reached the age of majority, Burns filed a final accounting with HCPC indicating payments on behalf of Plyler in the amount of $43,410.00 and a balance of $118,935.52. Burns indicated that the balance had been distributed to Plyler and provided a notarized receipt to HCPC. Burns filed a petition for discharge and HCPC granted the petition. This terminated the conservatorship.
In 2004, approximately seven years after the termination of the conservatorship, Plyler commenced an action against Burns, HCPC, and several other entities alleging several causes of action, including gross negligence or recklessness in the supervision of her conservatorship, breach of fiduciary duties, and civil conspiracy. Specifically, Plyler alleged that she never received the proceeds held for her benefit under the conservatorship managed by Burns, that Burns converted the proceeds for his own benefit, and that HCPC was liable for negligent supervision of the management of her conservatorship.
HCPC filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP. In its memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, HCPC asserted affirmative defenses under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act ("Tort Claims Act") and that it was protected by common law judicial immunity. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted HCPC's motion to dismiss on the grounds that HCPC was entitled to judicial immunity under both the common law and the Tort Claims Act. Plyler appealed, and this Court certified the case from the court of appeals pursuant to Rule 204(b), SCACR. Plyler raises the following issues for review:1
I. Did the trial court err in granting HCPC's motion to dismiss on the basis of the common law doctrine of judicial immunity?
II. Did the trial court err in considering HCPC's motion to dismiss because HCPC waived its right to assert common law judicial immunity?
III. Did the trial court err in declining to apply a gross negligence standard in its review of HCPC's entitlement to immunity pursuant to the Tort Claims Act?
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), SCRCP, the trial court should consider only the allegations set forth on the face of the plaintiff's complaint. Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 300, 457 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1995). A 12(b)(6) motion should not be granted if "facts alleged and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom would entitle the plaintiff to any relief on any theory of the case." Id. The question is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief. Toussaint v. Ham, 292 S.C. 415, 416, 357 S.E.2d 8, 9 (1987). Further, the complaint should not be dismissed merely because the court doubts the plaintiff will prevail in the action. Id.
Plyler contends the trial court erred in granting HCPC's motion to dismiss on the basis of the common law doctrine of judicial immunity. We disagree.
Judicial immunity serves as a bar to litigation against a judicial officer in certain circumstances. O'Laughlin v. Windham, 330 S.C. 379, 385, 498 S.E.2d 689, 692 (Ct.App.1998). This immunity, however, is not absolute. "[J]udges and other officials are not entitled to judicial immunity if: (1) they did not have jurisdiction to act; (2) the act did not serve a judicial function; or (3) the suit is for prospective, injunctive relief only." Faile v. South Carolina Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 350 S.C. 315, 324, 566 S.E.2d 536, 541 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
The majority of Plyler's argument against the application of common law judicial immunity is based on whether HCPC was performing a judicial act when supervising Plyler's conservatorship estate. Plyler does not dispute the jurisdiction of the probate court. Plyler does, however, contend that her claims against HCPC involve prospective, injunctive relief because she requests an accounting and relief from HCPC's orders.
First, assuming the requested accounting qualifies as injunctive relief, Plyler has made no allegation that HCPC ever possessed any property or money on her behalf. Therefore, the request for an accounting has no application to HCPC. Second, Plyler's requested relief from HCPC's orders does not require any injunctive action against HCPC, but instead implies injunctive relief against any of the other defendants seeking to utilize those orders in their defense. Accordingly, the prospective, injunction relief exception to judicial immunity has no application to HCPC.
For these reasons, we focus our analysis on the determination of whether HCPC performed a judicial act in supervising the management of Plyler's conservatorship.
In determining whether an act serves a judicial function, the Court must look to the nature and function of the act as opposed to the title of the person committing the act. Id. at 325, 566 S.E.2d at 541. The line must be drawn between acts which are truly judicial and those acts which simply happen to have been performed by a judge. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988).
In Forrester, the United States Supreme Court discussed the difference between "judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform." Id. When a court undertakes any adjudicative act within its jurisdiction, regardless of allegations of malicious or corrupt motive, the act is considered a judicial function for which the court will have absolute immunity. Id. However, "[a]dministrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not similarly been regarded as judicial acts." Id. at 228, 108 S.Ct. 538. Furthermore, judicial immunity has not been applied to a judge's action pursuant to rulemaking authority. Id.
In South Carolina, the probate court has jurisdiction to determine the need for the protection of the minor's assets. S.C.Code Ann. § 62-5-402 (2005). Section 62-5-402 provides:
After the service of notice in a proceeding seeking the appointment of a conservator or other protective order and until termination of the proceeding, the probate court in which the petition is filed has:
(1) exclusive jurisdiction to determine the need for a conservator or other protective order until the proceedings are terminated;
(2) exclusive jurisdiction to determine how the estate of the protected person which is subject to the laws of this State must be managed, expended, or distributed to or for the use of the protected person or any of his dependents; and
(3) concurrent jurisdiction to determine the validity of claims for or against the person or estate of the protected person except as limited by Section 62-5-433.
In the instant case, Plyler alleges that HCPC negligently supervised the management of her conservatorship estate. Plyler contends that the court's act of supervising a conservator is fundamentally an administrative act because it requires only the handling of paperwork and other clerical actions. In support of this contention, Plyler relies on the deposition testimony of Burns stating that he rarely discussed the handling of the conservatorship with the judge, he never appeared in the actual courtroom, and he conducted most of his interaction with the staff of the probate court over the phone.
Despite Plyler's contention, the informality of Burns' interaction with the probate court is not determinative of the character of the court's acts. Although a cursory examination of the relationship between a conservator and the probate court may appear to require only the handling of paperwork, the probate court's...
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