PNC Bank v. Boytor
| Decision Date | 10 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 18 C 4167 |
| Parties | PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, v. SAMUEL G. BOYTOR and CAROL A. BOYTOR, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
In this action, Plaintiff PNC Bank, National Association sues Defendants Samuel G. Boytor and Carol A. Boytor for defaulting on two loans the Boytors entered into with a predecessor bank in April 2006. Specifically, PNC has moved to foreclose a mortgage securing the payment of a $203, 000 note (Count I), and for the entry of a money judgment relating to the nonpayment of a $200, 000 note (Count II). The Court presided over a two-day virtual bench trial beginning on May 25, 2021.[1] Docs. [133-35]. A couple of weeks before trial, the Boytors filed a motion for leave to file an amended answer and affirmative defenses, Doc. [129]. For the following reasons, the Court grants the Boytors' motion Doc. [129], and finds in favor of PNC on both counts.
Before turning to the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court initially addresses the Boytors' Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses Doc. [129].
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that leave to amend a pleading should be freely given when justice so requires. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). The liberal allowance of pleadings reflects the preference that controversies be decided on the merits when practicable. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 520 (7th Cir. 2015). At the same time, the decision to grant or deny a motion to amend a pleading is within the sole discretion of the trial court. Daugherity v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 970 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir.1992). As such, the trial court may refuse to grant leave “if the moving party has unduly delayed in filing the motion, if the opposing party would suffer undue prejudice, or if the pleading is futile.” Campania Mgmt. Co. v. Rooks, Pitts & Poust, 290 F.3d 843, 849 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
PNC opposes the Boytors' Rule 15 motion, arguing first that the Boytors unduly delayed in seeking leave to amend their answer. Doc. [139] at 4-5. In Campania, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of a Rule 15 motion, which was filed a mere six days before the close of discovery. 290 F.3d at 846. Here, the delay is even more pronounced, as the Boytors' motion was filed two years after the close of discovery and only two weeks before the trial began. Docs. [45, 129, 134]. However, the Boytors obtained new counsel, with leave of the Court, on April 29, 2021. Doc. [128]. The new lawyer quickly apprised himself of the case and requested leave to amend the answer, less than a couple of weeks after filing his appearance. Doc. [129]. Boytors' new counsel also immediately produced any new documents that he obtained from the Kane County Recorder's office relating to the loans in question. While the Court agrees with PNC that the appointment of new counsel does not, in and of itself, excuse a two-plus year delay in requesting to amend the pleadings, see Doc. [139] at 5, it does constitute a reason for the Boytors' delay. In addition, the Court prefers to resolve the case on the merits, rather than on procedural shortcomings. See Runnion, 786 F.3d at 520. The Court therefore will not deny the Rule 15 motion based on the Boytors' admittedly lengthy delay in filing the motion in this case.
PNC's second contention is that it will suffer undue prejudice if the Court allows the Boytors to amend their answer now. Doc. [139] at 5. Amendments to pleadings “may be prejudicial when they force parties to re-litigate issues that have already been settled or to incur additional discovery costs, or if they would render a party's litigation preparation wasted.” Hoenig v. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 983 F.Supp.2d 952, 960 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (citations omitted). PNC alleges here that it would be “severely prejudiced” by the Boytors' amended answer because PNC “was deprived of proper notice as to the contents of the proposed Amended Answer and affirmative defenses and thus was unable to properly pursue further discovery related to the release of mortgage and alleged payment to PNC.” Doc. [139] at 5. At the outset, the Boytors' motion alerted PNC to its amended answer and affirmative defenses prior to trial, and thus PNC had a sufficient opportunity to prepare its response. The documents supporting the Boytors' new defenses, moreover, largely comprise of documents already in discovery, or documents from the Kane County Recorder's office (publicly available), which were immediately produced to PNC upon the appointment of the Boytors' new counsel. As a result, it is not clear what “further discovery related to the release of mortgage and alleged payment to PNC, ” would be needed, Doc. [139] at 5, and PNC has not elaborated. And, as discussed further below, PNC already holds the burden to show that the Boytors failed to pay off their loans, so a payment defense is simply the opposite position and thus should not expand the scope of discovery in the case. All in all, PNC has not demonstrated that the amended answer and affirmative defenses would require the parties to re-litigate issues, incur additional discovery costs, or render PNC's litigation preparation wasted, see Hoenig, 983 F.Supp.2d at 960, so the Court does not find that PNC would be unduly prejudiced by the granting of the Rule 15 motion.
Third and finally, PNC asserts that the Boytors' proposed amendment is futile to their case. “A court may determine that a proposed amendment is futile if it sets forth facts or legal theories that are redundant, immaterial, or unresponsive to the allegations in the complaint.” Campania, 290 F.3d at 850 (citation omitted). See, e.g., Wade v. WellPoint, Inc. 892 F.Supp.2d 1102 (S.D. Ind. 2012) (). PNC argues that allowing the Boytors to file an amended answer with new affirmative answers would be futile because the affirmative defenses are not adequately pled in accordance with Rules 8 and 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. [139] at 5-6. PNC further argues that the proposed amendment is futile because it is redundant in “mirror[ing] the themes of the answers set forth in the Boytors' original answers: payment, bank error, condition precedent.” Doc. [139] at 5.[2]
PNC's futility arguments do not persuade the Court that the Rule 15 motion should be denied. As an initial matter, arguing that it would be pointless to allow the Boytors to amend their answer because they have already alleged payment, bank error, and condition precedent defenses undermines PNC's argument that it would be severely prejudiced by allowing the amended answer. For, if the amended answer so resembles the original answer, it is unlikely that the amended answer should lead to additional discovery costs or wasted litigation preparation by PNC. In terms of the sufficiency of the Boytors' pleading of affirmative defenses, the Court does share some of PNC's concerns. For instance, the proposed estoppel defense states only that “[t]he plaintiff is estopped from pursuing any claims based upon the releases they recorded which stated the obligation was paid.” Doc. [129] at 9. This barebones assertion omits not only basic information regarding the dates and documents, but also fails to identify which type of estoppel is being pled, as well as the elements for an estoppel claim. Such a defense would be unlikely to survive a motion to strike. See Edwards v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 310 F.R.D. 382, 386 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (collecting cases) (one-sentence affirmative defenses that are threadbare recitals of the elements, conclusory statements, or mere denials of the complaint are insufficient to survive a motion to strike). That said, the Court still prefers to decide this case on the merits, and the Court heard evidence-from both sides-regarding the Boytors' new affirmative defenses at trial, including the estoppel defense, despite their scant pleading language. (See, e.g., 5/25/21 Trial Tr. 97:1-99:14[3](PNC soliciting testimony on direct examination from bank employee on the Boytors' release defense)). Despite this reality, PNC fails to address the Boytors' request that the Court allow them to amend their pleadings to conform to the evidence presented at trial. Put another way, even if the Court were inclined to deny the Boytors' motion for leave to file an amended answer under Rule 15(a) due to their delay in filing the motion or the limited nature of their affirmative defenses, the Boytors have additionally requested that their answer be amended to reflect the evidence in the record regarding the Boytors' affirmative defenses. Doc. [129] at 2.
Under Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may grant leave to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence presented at trial. Rule 15(b) creates a system in which “the complaint does not fix the plaintiff's rights but may be amended at any time to conform to the evidence.” Winger v. Winger, 82 F.3d 140, 144 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Duckworth v. Franzen, 78 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S 816 (1986)). By the same token, courts have granted defendants leave under Rule 15(b) to amend their answers to conform to the evidence. See Stepan v. City of Evanston, No. 91 C 6713, 1993 WL 210534, at *5 n.3 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1993) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial