Poage v. Ribicoff

• Decision Date: 23 April 1962
• Docket Number: No. N 60 C 8.,N 60 C 8.
• Citation: 205 F. Supp. 938
• Parties: Haskell B. POAGE, Plaintiff, v. Abraham A. RIBICOFF, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

205 F. Supp. 938

Haskell B. POAGE, Plaintiff, v. Abraham A. RIBICOFF, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant.

No. N 60 C 8.

United States District Court E. D. Missouri, N. D.

April 23, 1962.

Wm. B. Spaun, Hannibal, Mo., for plaintiff.

D. Jeff Lance, U. S. Atty., and W. Francis Murrell, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for defendant.

REGAN, District Judge.

This action is before the Court for review of the decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare denying plaintiff's application for a period of disability under Section 216(i) of the Social Security Act, as amended, (42 U.S.C.A. § 416(i)) and disability benefits as provided by provisions of Tit. 42 U.S.C.A. § 423. Plaintiff was given a hearing on his application before the Hearing Examiner of the Social Security Administration, who denied his application, and plaintiff's request for review by the Appeals Council was denied. After filing of this action, the matter was, on motion of the Secretary, remanded to the Appeals Council for further administrative action. Additional evidence was received by the Appeals Council, and considered with the record before the hearing examiner, resulting in a decision on June 30, 1961, of the Appeals Council affirming the action of the Hearing Examiner. Subsequently, the defendant secretary answered the complaint herein, filing with its answer a transcript of the entire administrative record as provided by Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g)). The matter is before the Court on defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) and (h) limit this Court's scope of review to a determination as to whether or not the findings of fact of the Secretary are supported by substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence" has often been defined by the Courts. The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, in Cody v. Ribicoff 289 F.2d 394 (1961), a case in which it reviews denial of Social Security benefits, cites the definition in Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456:

"* * * `substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126). Accordingly it `must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established * * * it must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.' Labor Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (59 S.Ct. 501, 505, 83 L.Ed. 660)."

See also Pirone v. Flemming, D.C.N.Y. 1959, 183 F.Supp. 739, aff'd 2 Cir., 278 F.2d 508.

The burden is on the claimant to establish disability as defined by the Act, i. e.:

"* * * inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or to be of long-continued and indefinite duration * * *."

The Appeals Council found that at the time of plaintiff's application, June, 1957, while claimant had sustained some osteoarthritic changes, no medically determinable impairment was found in explanation of the severe pains of which plaintiff complained. The arthritic condition apparently progressed, but following surgery performed in March,...