Pocahontas Fuel Co. v. Monahan

• Decision Date: 03 August 1929
• Docket Number: No. 913.,913.
• Citation: 34 F.2d 549
• Parties: POCAHONTAS FUEL CO., Inc., et al. v. MONAHAN, Deputy Commissioner, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

34 F.2d 549 (1929)

POCAHONTAS FUEL CO., Inc., et al. v. MONAHAN, Deputy Commissioner, et al.

No. 913.

District Court, D. Maine, S. D.

August 3, 1929.

Wm. B. Mahoney, of Portland, Me., for plaintiffs.

Edward J. Harrigan, of Portland, Me., for defendants.

PETERS, District Judge.

This is a bill in equity brought by the Pocahontas Fuel Company and its insurance carrier to set aside an award of compensation made by the deputy commissioner under the provisions of the United States Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (33 USCA §§ 901-950).

By reason of the wording of section 21 (b) of the act referred to (33 USCA § 921(b), the court in such a case as this is limited to the inquiry as to whether or not the compensation order made by the deputy commissioner is in accordance with law; if not, it may be set aside through injunction proceedings.

The plaintiffs' first claim is that the act does not apply, and that the deputy commissioner had no jurisdiction because there was no sufficient evidence that the death resulted from an injury occurring upon navigable waters of the United States. The act specifies that compensation under it shall be payable only in case the death results from injury occurring upon navigable waters and in case recovery through workmen's compensation proceedings cannot validly be had under state law. Under the same section, which is section 3 of the act (33 USCA § 903), it is also provided that no compensation shall be payable if the injury was occasioned solely by the intoxication of the employee or by willful intent of the employee to injure or kill himself or another. Under section 20 (33 USCA § 920), under the head of "Presumptions," it is provided that, in proceedings for the enforcement of a claim under this act, it shall be presumed, in the absence of satisfactory evidence to the contrary —

"(a) — That the claim comes within the provisions of this Act.

"(b) — That sufficient notice of such claim has been given.

"(c) — That the injury was not occasioned solely by the intoxication of the injured employee.

"(d) — That the injury was not occasioned by the willful intention of the injured employee to injure or kill himself or another."

I take it that the provision under (a), that any claim is presumed to be within the provisions of the act, refers to other circumstances than the jurisdictional fact of the accident occurring upon navigable waters. The act does not say that, when a claim is made, there shall be a presumption that the accident occurred upon navigable waters. I regard this as a fundamental jurisdictional fact which must appear to exist. Otherwise the whole act is inapplicable.

Counsel for plaintiffs argue that there is no sufficient evidence that the deceased was injured on the vessel. He was discovered to be...