Podolski v. U.S. Dep't of Def.

Decision Date29 March 2022
Docket NumberCivil Action 2:20cv935-MHT (WO)
PartiesPETER PODOLSKI, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
OPINION

MYRON H. THOMPSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Peter Podolski has brought this lawsuit against defendants United States Department of Defense, United States Department of the Air Force, and United States Air Force Officer Training School, claiming that they removed him from the Training School without following proper procedure, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C §§ 701 through 706, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He has invoked the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question).[1]

This cause is now before the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss Podolski's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted.

I. Standard on Motion to Dismiss

Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be asserted by either party or by the court, on its own motion, at any time during the pendency of an action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The burden of establishing a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction, once challenged, rests on the party asserting jurisdiction. See Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 445 (1942).

As a general rule, a district court's first duty is to determine whether it enjoys subject-matter jurisdiction, because that implicates the court's “very power to hear the case.” Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946). Accordingly, the court is permitted to undertake a wide-ranging investigation and, in order to ascertain whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, may look beyond the pleadings and may review or accept any evidence submitted by the parties. See Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).

II. Factual Background

Podolski is a member of the Michigan Air Force National Guard. He applied for and was accepted into the United States Air Force Officer Training School at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama. The Training School is a nine-week course that enlisted members of the Air Force must pass in order to become officers. Throughout the course, trainees are periodically evaluated by their instructors and their peers. A trainee who struggles to pass his evaluations may receive individual counseling, or may be placed on “Special Monitoring Status.” If a trainee on Special Monitoring Status continues to struggle, his Squadron Commander may decide to remove the trainee from the course. Before such a decision is made, however, the trainee must be notified verbally and in writing that he is being placed on “Commander's Review, ” and he must be afforded a certain amount of time to submit materials to the Commander in an effort to convince him or her that he should be allowed to complete the course.

Podolski struggled to pass his evaluations, received individual counseling to no avail, and was placed on Special Monitoring Status. After he continued to struggle, he was placed on Commander's Review. The Training School, however, did not at that time notify Podolski in writing that he was being placed on Commander's Review. The Commander decided to remove Podolski from the course, but offered him the opportunity to take the course again the following year.

Approximately one month later, the Training School realized that it had not notified Podolski in writing that he was being placed on Commander's Review. It sent him the requisite notification, informed him that the Commander would reconsider his decision, and gave him his allotted amount of time to submit materials to the Commander. Podolski submitted materials, but the Commander ultimately stood by his decision to remove him from the course. Podolski then emailed a Lieutenant Colonel to ask whether the Commander's decision was final. The Lieutenant Colonel responded that the decision was final, and not subject to further review.

III. Discussion

Podolski claims that the defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously, in violation of the APA, and deprived him of procedural and substantive due process, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, by failing to notify him in writing that he was being placed on Commander's Review, failing to inform him why he was being removed from the course, improperly altering certain of his evaluations, and improperly relying on hearsay statements by his peers in deciding to remove him from the course. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, a declaration that the defendants acted illegally in removing him from the course, and an order requiring the defendants to reinstate him in the course or, in the alternative, to permit him to personally appeal the decision to remove him.

The defendants argue that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Podolski's claims because he did not appeal the Commander's decision to the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records and therefore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.[2] Podolski responds that he was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies because a Lieutenant Colonel informed him that the Commander's decision was final, and not subject to further review.

The court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Podolski's claims, but for a different reason from that offered by the defendants, namely, that they are barred by Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), and its progeny. In Feres, the Supreme Court held that “the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of duty incident to service.” 340 U.S. at 146. The Court has since expanded the doctrine announced in Feres to apply to all service-related claims for damages on the basis that the availability of such claims would disrupt the “peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, ” and impede discipline. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 299 (1983) (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (163)); United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). On that same basis, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has further expanded the doctrine to apply to all service-related claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. See Speigner v. Alexander, 248 F.3d 1292, 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2001).[3]

A service-member's challenge to a decision by the military regarding his competency to perform a certain task, or his eligibility for a promotion, is, by definition, a service-related claim. See Id. at 1298 (“Military promotion is one of the most obvious examples of a personnel decision that is integrally related to the military's structure.” (quoting Mier v. Owens, 57 F.3d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Id. (“To dictate to the military which officers should be considered competent would be to interfere in just the way that Feres and its progeny preclude.”); Chappell, 462 U.S. at 302 (“The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.” (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)). Therefore, because Podolski's claims concern the defendants' determination that he was not competent to complete the Training School, they are barred.[4] Podolski is not completely without redress: he can still seek review of the Commander's decision to remove him from the Training School from the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records. See 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a); see also Id. at § 1552(b) (providing that review must be sought “within three years after discovering the error or injustice”); Hanson v. Wyatt, 552 F.3d 1148, 1152 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The language ‘correction of military records' may be somewhat misleading, because the authority of BCMRs goes well beyond correcting paperwork.”); Chappell, 462 U.S. at 303 (“The Board is empowered to order retroactive back pay and retroactive promotion.”).[5] Moreover, the Feres doctrine does not bar Podolski from seeking judicial review of the Board's decision. See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 303 (“Board decisions are subject to judicial review and can be set aside if they are arbitrary, capricious or not based on substantial evidence.”).[6] Under no circumstances, however, can the court award Podolski damages for his removal from the Training School, or order his reinstatement, as he requests. See Speigner, 248 F.3d at 1298; see also Kreis v. Secretary of Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (in reviewing a decision of the Air Force Board of Correction of Military Records, a court may not “substitute its judgment for that of the [Board], ” but may “only require the [Board], on remand, to explain more fully the reasoning behind [its] decision and ... apply the appropriate legal standard”).

The court notes that, although the defendants did not invoke the Feres doctrine in their motion to dismiss, the court is not barred from considering it, for it goes to the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, and courts “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).[7] Nevertheless, if any party disagrees with the court's application of the doctrine, it may file a motion for reconsideration.

Accordingly, the court will grant the defendants' motion to dismiss.

An appropriate judgment will be entered.

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Notes:

[1] Podolski also invokes...

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