Pogia v. Ramos, 16526

• Decision Date: 20 July 1994
• Docket Number: No. 16526,16526
• Citation: 876 P.2d 1342,10 Haw.App. 411
• Parties: Auina T. POGIA and Loretta Pogia, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Elena P. RAMOS, Defendant-Appellant, and John Does 1-10, Jane Does 1-10, Doe Partnerships 1-10, Doe Corporations 1-10, and Doe Governmental Agencies 1-10, Defendants.
• Court: Hawaii Court of Appeals

Page 1342

876 P.2d 1342

10 Haw.App. 411

Auina T. POGIA and Loretta Pogia, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Elena P. RAMOS, Defendant-Appellant and John Does 1-10, Jane Does 1-10, Doe Partnerships 1-10, Doe Corporations 1-10, and Doe Governmental Agencies 1-10, Defendants.

No. 16526.

Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai'i.

July 20, 1994.

Syllabus by the Court

In order to establish excusable neglect in a motion to set aside an entry of default under Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 55(c) or a default judgment under HRCP Rule 60(b)(1), a defaulted party who failed to answer a complaint must make a showing of why the party was justified in failing to respond to the complaint or to obtain an extension of time to respond.

Ignorance of court rules does not constitute excusable neglect.

Lack of legal sophistication cannot form the basis of a claim of excusable neglect for purposes of HRCP Rule 60(b) where the defendant, after receiving notice, failed to appear or answer.

HRCP Rule 5(a) does not require that a defaulted party who has failed to appear in the action receive notice of a proof of damages hearing.

A party in default for failure to appear is not entitled to receive a copy of any paper in the action except a pleading asserting a new or additional claim for relief.

HRCP Rule 55(b)(2) does not require notice of the application for default judgment to a party in default who has failed to appear in the action.

Kevin P.H. Sumida (Daryl M. Arakaki, with him on the brief), Matsui Chung & Sumida, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.

Richard C.F. Chun, on the brief, Honolulu, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before BURNS, C.J., and HEEN and ACOBA, JJ.

ACOBA, Judge.

Plaintiffs Auina T. Pogia and Loretta Pogia (hereinafter Plaintiffs) filed a complaint on November 9, 1988 against Defendant Elena P. Ramos (hereinafter Defendant) and "Doe" co-defendants for damages arising out of an automobile collision. Attached to the Complaint was a Summons addressed to the Defendants which stated:

You are hereby summoned and required to serve upon plaintiff's attorney, whose address is stated above, an answer to the complaint which is attached. This action must be taken within twenty days after service of this summons upon you, exclusive of the day of service.

If you fail to make your answer within the twenty day time limit, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.

A Return and Acknowledgement of Service signed by Defendant was filed on November 28, 1988, indicating that the sheriff served the Complaint on Defendant at 2024 North King Street in Honolulu, Hawai'i on November 26, 1988.

Defendant did not file an answer.

On August 2, 1989, Plaintiffs filed a Request for Entry of Default of Defendant, stating that "the time within which said Defendant may answer or otherwise move as to the Complaint and Summons has expired; that said Defendant has not answered or otherwise moved and that the time ... to answer or otherwise move has not been extended[.]" The clerk thereafter filed an entry of default against Defendant on August 2, 1989. On January 22, 1991, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Proof Hearing for Default Judgment. The Notice was addressed to Defendant at 1604 Kamohoali'i Street, Honolulu, Hawai'i 96819. Plaintiffs obtained the 1604 Kamohoali'i Street address from a police report of the collision. Plaintiffs certified that the Notice was mailed to Defendant.

The hearing was continued and finally held on June 4, 1991. ¹ The court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, awarding damages to Plaintiffs against Defendant. Pursuant to the findings of fact and conclusions of law, default judgment was entered against Defendant on November 7, 1991.

On August 14, 1992, Defendant moved to set aside the Entry of Default and the Default Judgment pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 55(c). Her affidavit in support of the motion states that the 1604 Kamohoali'i Street address was her parents' home which was sold in June of 1987, that she was served with the Complaint at 2024 North King Street which was her then current place of employment, that at the time she was served she was "having problems with [her] marriage," that she "did not understand what the legal papers meant," that after she "signed the papers that the sheriff asked [her] to sign, [she] believed that was all [she] had to do," and that "[o]ther than the Complaint [she had] not received any of the other documents filed in this case."

On appeal Defendant contends that the court erred in failing to set aside the Entry of Default and the Default Judgment pursuant to HRCP Rule 55(c). We disagree.

I.

HRCP Rule 55(c) states that "[f]or good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)." ²

"It is well-settled that an application under Rule 55(c), Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside the entry of a default is addressed to the sound discretion of the court." Hupp v. Accessory Distrib., 1 Haw.App. 174, 177, 616 P.2d 233, 235 (1980). "The function of an appellate court in an appeal from the trial court's refusal to set aside a default judgment [under HRCP Rule 60(b) ] 'is to determine whether the ... court ... abused its discretion.' " Richardson v. Lane, 6 Haw.App. 614, 622, 736 P.2d 63, 69, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 953, 108 S.Ct. 345, 98 L.Ed.2d 371 (1987), reh'g denied, 484 U.S. 1037, 108 S.Ct. 764, 98 L.Ed.2d 781 (1988) (quoting Textile Banking, Co. v. Rentschler, 657 F.2d 844, 850 (7th Cir.1981)). "[A] motion for relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b) is addressed to the discretion of the court[.] ... Appellate review is limited to determining whether the [lower] court abused its discretion." 11 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2857, at 157-58 (1983) (footnotes omitted). The court's "determination to grant or deny relief normally involves a discretionary appraisal of the facts of the particular case and the relief, if any, to be granted: this matter, then, is largely within the judicial discretion of the trial court.... While such discretionary action will not be lightly interfered with by an appellate court, the latter may, however, review for abuse and will reverse when discretion is abused." 7 J. Moore and J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice p 60.19 at 60-149 to -154 (1993) (footnotes omitted).

The Supreme Court of Hawai'i has stated that "a motion to set aside a default entry or a default judgment may and should be granted whenever the court finds (1) that the nondefaulting party will not be prejudiced by the reopening, (2) that the defaulting party has a meritorious defense, and (3) that the default was not the result of inexcusable neglect or a wilful act." BDM, Inc. v. Sageco, Inc., 57 Haw. 73, 77, 549 P.2d 1147, 1150 (1976). We believe that the third ground is dispositive.

While Defendant claims that she was having "problems with her marriage" at the time that she was served with the Complaint, there is nothing in the record which indicates how such problems prevented her from responding to the Complaint in a timely manner. We have held that a party requesting relief under Hawai'i Family Court Rules Rule 60(b)(1) "must make some showing of why [the party] was justified in failing to avoid mistake or inadvertence." Joaquin v. Joaquin, 5 Haw.App. 435, 443, 698 P.2d 298, 304 (1985). ³ Likewise, we hold that in order to establish excusable neglect in a motion to set aside entry of default or default judgment under HRCP Rule 60(b)(1), a defaulted party who failed to answer a complaint must make a showing of why the party was justified in failing to respond to the complaint or to obtain an extension of time to respond. No showing was made here.

Defendant also claimed that she "did not understand what the legal papers meant." But "[i]gnorance of court rules does not constitute excusable neglect...." Swimmer v. Internal Revenue Service, 811 F.2d 1343, 1345 (9th Cir.1987). And "[t]he weight of authority has not recognized ignorance of the law ... to be excusable neglect justifying the invocation of relief under HRCP Rule 60(b)(1)." Isemoto Contracting Co. v. Andrade, 1 Haw.App. 202, 205, 616 P.2d 1022, 1025 (1980). Defendant offers no justification for her failure to seek an explanation of "what the ... papers meant." A similar claim of ignorance was proffered in Dillingham Inv. Corp. v. Kunion Yokoyama Trust, 8 Haw.App. 226, 797 P.2d 1316 (1990). The defendants in that case failed to answer the complaint because they determined without professional assistance that the complaint did not involve "their" property. Therefore, they believed they did not need to answer the complaint. This court found that the defendants' failure to answer was "both 'inexcusable neglect' and a 'willful act'." Dillingham, 8 Haw.App. at 236, 797 P.2d at 1321.

Finally, Defendant asserted that when she "signed the papers" presented by the sheriff, she believed that was all she "had to do." But the Summons clearly sets forth Defendant's obligation to respond within twenty days or have judgment by default taken against her. Under analogous circumstances, we said "[a] mistake as to the nature and effect of a document caused by a failure to read it is not an excusable mistake." Joaquin, 5 Haw.App. at 442, 698 P.2d at 303 (citing Nawahie v. Peterson, 24 Haw. 558, 563 (1918)). Also, "lack of legal sophistication ... cannot form the basis of a claim of excusable neglect ... for purposes of Rule 60(b)" where the defendant, after receiving notice, failed to appear or answer. Original Appalachian Artworks v. Yuil Int'l Trading Corp., 105 F.R.D. 113, 116 (1985).

Generally, the failure to answer a complaint or to obtain a court order extending the time to answer is inexcusable neglect. Hupp v. Accessory Distrib., 1 Haw.App. 174, 616 P.2d 233 (1980) (failure to...