Pogue v. Retail Credit Company
| Decision Date | 19 January 1972 |
| Docket Number | 71-1271.,No. 71-1270,71-1270 |
| Parties | Marti POGUE, Appellant, v. RETAIL CREDIT COMPANY, Appellee. Marti POGUE, Appellant, v. George HAMMERLY, t/a Garrett Insurance Agency, a/k/a George P. Hammerly Associates, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Daniel G. Grove, and Amram, Hahn, Sandlun & Sandground, Washington, D. C., and Edward Whitaker, Arlington, Va., on brief, for appellant in Nos. 71-1270 and 71-1271.
Adelard L. Brault and Brault, Lewis & Geschickter, Fairfax, Va., on brief, for appellee Retail Credit Co. in No. 71-1270.
E. Waller Dudley and Boothe, Dudley, Koontz, Blankingship & Stump, Alexandria, Va., on brief, for appellee George Hammerly in No. 71-1271.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and SOBELOFF and BOREMAN, Senior Circuit Judges.
In 1967 Miss Pogue, of Miami, Florida, read an advertisement placed by the Walker & Townsend Co. of New York. The advertisement stated that Walker & Townsend would make loans, with securities as collateral, up to ninety per cent of the value of the securities. By comparison, bank loans to finance stock purchases were then restricted to twenty per cent of the value of the securities due to margin requirements. Miss Pogue, an experienced businesswoman who had dealt extensively in the stock market, regarded this offer as an opportunity to pyramid her stock holdings. By borrowing against stock she then held, she could buy more stock, which would in turn be used as collateral for another loan to buy still more stock.
After reading the ad, Miss Pogue traveled to New York to meet representatives of Walker & Townsend. At that time she signed two notes for a total of $33,000 and a blank power of attorney so that Walker & Townsend could obtain her securities from her broker, Walston & Co.
After signing and delivering the notes and the power of attorney, Miss Pogue called appellee, George Hammerly, in Leesburg, Virginia. Hammerly, apparently a friend of Miss Pogue, was in the insurance business. Occasionally, he would rely on Miss Pogue's advice regarding the stock market. Also, Pogue and Hammerly were co-signers of a note. When Miss Pogue telephoned, she told Hammerly of her transaction with Walker & Townsend and asked him to get for her a Dun & Bradstreet report on Walker & Townsend. Instead, Hammerly sent her a report published by Retail Credit, Inc., the other appellee. He sent the Retail Credit report rather than one published by Dun & Bradstreet, as requested, because he was a subscriber to Retail Credit and not to Dun & Bradstreet. When Miss Pogue received the report, she expressed some chagrin. Hammerly reassured her by saying that Retail Credit had a department for commercial credit as well as one for individual credit, and so it was just as good as Dun & Bradstreet.
This initial report contained no information because Retail Credit had never investigated Walker & Townsend. Hammerly offered to get a complete report but explained that it might be expensive. At Miss Pogue's request, he sought the complete report. This second report also contained little information, explaining that the principals of the company refused to divulge their identity and that Retail Credit could confirm no financial information about Walker & Townsend.
Some months later, Miss Pogue became suspicious of Walker & Townsend because they failed to forward her dividend checks. Discovering that she could obtain a Dun & Bradstreet report through her bank, she did so. The Dun & Bradstreet report disclosed the fact that principals of Walker & Townsend were under a federal indictment. Miss Pogue tried to pay off her loan in order to have her securities returned. But Walker & Townsend had closed their offices and absconded with Miss Pogue's securities.
Miss Pogue related this scenario at the trial. She tried to rely on a breach of contract theory in order to avoid the Virginia statute of limitations. Apparently, that statute requires an action based on deceit where defendant was indirectly responsible for plaintiff's loss to be brought within one year. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Turner, 211 Va. 552, 178 S. E.2d 503; Carva Food Corp. v. Dawley, 202 Va. 543, 118 S.E.2d 664; Cover v. Critcher, 143 Va. 357, 130 S.E. 238. The trial judge reserved...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Kim v. Coppin State College
...reasonable minds could differ." Proctor v. Colonial Refrigerated Transp., Inc., 494 F.2d 89, 93 (4 Cir. 1974); Pogue v. Retail Credit Co., 453 F.2d 336, 338 (4 Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109, 93 S.Ct. 910, 34 L.Ed.2d 689 (1973); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d ......
-
Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corporation
...the Court concludes that there are no controverted issues of fact upon which reasonable people could differ, Pogue v. Retail Credit Co., 453 F.2d 336, 338 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109, 93 S.Ct. 910, 34 L. Ed.2d 689 (1973), and that a verdict should be directed in favor of th......
-
In re LCS Homes, Inc.
...is appropriate is where there are no controverted issues of fact upon which reasonable minds could differ); Pogue v. Retail Credit Co., 453 F.2d 336, 338 (4th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109, 93 S.Ct. 910, 34 L.Ed.2d 689 (1973) (motion for directed verdict appropriate if no controver......
-
Serio-Us Industries v. Plastic Recovery Technolog.
...submit desired instructions, it cannot complain on appeal unless it shows plain error, as required under Rule 51(d). Pogue v. Retail Credit Co., 453 F.2d 336 (4th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109, 93 S.Ct. 910, 34 L.Ed.2d 689 (1973); Hyde v. Land-of-Sky Regional Council, 572 F.2d 988 ......