Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., Civil Action No. 94-2341-GTV.
| Decision Date | 08 August 1997 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 94-2341-GTV. |
| Citation | 975 F.Supp. 1387 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
| Parties | Linda L. POINDEXTER, Plaintiff, v. ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant. |
Mark C. Beam-Ward, Hill, Beam-Ward & Kruse, L.L.C., Overland Park, KS, for Plaintiff.
Nola Wright Viola, Frieden, Haynes & Forbes, Topeka, KS, Margaret S. Garvey, Freeborn & Peters, Denver, CO, for Defendant.
This disability discrimination case is before the court upon defendant Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company's motions to stay execution of judgment (Doc. 79) and for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial (Doc. 80).1 For the reasons stated below, Santa Fe's motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial is denied, and its motion to stay execution of judgment is denied in part and granted in part.
Plaintiff Linda L. Poindexter brought this disability discrimination action pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Poindexter alleged that she suffers from the disability of panic or anxiety attacks and depression, which prevents her from commuting from Lenexa, Kansas to her job in Topeka, Kansas, and that Santa Fe refused to accommodate her disability by transferring her to a position in Kansas City, Kansas. She also alleged that Santa Fe's discrimination was intentional. Santa Fe subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. The court denied the motion, finding material factual disputes concerning the issues of disability, qualifications, and undue hardship. (Doc. 43).
At the close of trial, Santa Fe moved for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R.Civ.P. 50(a), which the court denied. The jury returned a verdict in Poindexter's favor, finding that she was disabled under the ADA, that she could perform the essential functions of the job she requested with reasonable accommodation, and that Santa Fe intentionally discriminated against her. The jury awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $75,000.00. After a hearing to determine equitable relief, the court awarded $36,729.00 in back pay plus $4,906.03 prejudgment interest. Because the parties agreed that reinstatement, rather than front pay, was the appropriate remedy, the court ordered that Poindexter be reinstated to Santa Fe's Kansas City office on the extra board. (Doc. 78.)
Santa Fe has filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). In the alternative, Santa Fe seeks a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.
If the court denies a party's motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the evidence, the movant may renew its request. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). In ruling on a renewed motion following a jury verdict, the court may allow the judgment to stand, order a new trial, or direct entry of judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b)(1).
"Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when `a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary bases for a reasonable jury to find for that party on the issue.'" Finley v. United States, 82 F.3d 966, 968 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1)). The jury's verdict must stand if "viewing the record in the light most favorable to [plaintiff], there is evidence upon which the jury could properly return a verdict for [her]." Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1546 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 297, 136 L.Ed.2d 216 (1996).
"A motion for a new trial is not regarded with favor and should only be granted with great caution." United States v. Sinclair, 109 F.3d 1527, 1531 (10th Cir.1997)(citing United States v. Chatman, 994 F.2d 1510, 1518 (10th Cir.1993)). The decision whether to grant such a motion is committed to the trial court's sound discretion. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 850, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984); Royal College Shop, Inc. v. Northern Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 670, 677 (10th Cir.1990).
A new trial based upon an error of law is unwarranted unless that error affected the substantial rights of the parties. Fed. R.Civ.P. 61; Heyen v. United States, 731 F.Supp. 1488, 1489 (D.Kan.1990), aff'd, 945 F.2d 359 (10th Cir.1991). Thus, the movant "must demonstrate trial errors which constitute prejudicial error," White v. Conoco, Inc., 710 F.2d 1442, 1443 (10th Cir.1983), and the court must "ignore errors that do not affect the essential fairness of the trial." McDonough Power Equip. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553, 104 S.Ct. 845, 848-49, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984).
Santa Fe raises a myriad of issues in its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. The contentions include: (1) Poindexter does not have a disability as defined under the ADA; (2) Poindexter did not prove that she was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job in Kansas City; (3) granting the requested accommodation created an undue hardship on Santa Fe; (4) even if Poindexter is covered under the ADA, Santa Fe reasonably accommodated her disability. Santa Fe raised these same arguments in its motions for summary judgment and for judgment as a matter of law at the close of evidence. Before discussing each of these issues, the court briefly will address the legal requirements for an ADA claim.
The ADA prohibits employment discrimination "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual...." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Covered employment activities include "job application procedures, the hiring, advance, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Id. To establish disability discrimination, a plaintiff must prove (1) that she is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that she is otherwise qualified, that is, she can perform the essential functions of the job with or without accommodation; and (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action based on her disability. White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360-61 (10th Cir.1995).
The Tenth Circuit has construed 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), the statute defining disability, to require two elements: (1) "that the [plaintiff] has, has a record of having, or is regarded as having a physical or mental impairment"; and (2) that her impairment "substantially limits one or more major life activities." Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1417 (10th Cir.1992).
Santa Fe argues that Poindexter failed to prove that her impairment substantially limits her major life activities. Three factors must be considered in determining whether a substantial limitation is present: "(i) [t]he nature and severity of the impairment; (ii)[t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii)[t]he permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment." Bolton v. Scrivner, 36 F.3d 939, 943 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(2)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1152, 115 S.Ct. 1104, 130 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1995); see Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir.1996)(plaintiff's temporary psychological four-month impairment, related to diagnosis of cancer, had no lasting residual effects and "was not of sufficient duration to fall within the protections of the ADA as a disability"), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1247, 137 L.Ed.2d 329 (1997); Rakestraw v. Carpenter Co., 898 F.Supp. 386, 390 (N.D.Miss.1995)("Temporary injuries with no permanent effects are typically not considered disabilities under the ADA."); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (1996)("temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities"). Santa Fe contends that Poindexter's impairment is temporary because she has not suffered any panic attacks since July 1, 1994.
The evidence supports a finding of permanent impairment. Dr. David Sternberg, Poindexter's treating psychiatrist, testified that Poindexter will have to remain on medication even as she improves and that she always will be vulnerable to panic attacks. Additionally, another witness, Mary Burkin, testified about a panic attack Poindexter had in November 1994. Furthermore, Dr. Raja K. Khuri, Santa Fe's Medical Director and Chairman of its ADA Committee, testified that medically speaking, he regarded Poindexter as disabled.
Santa Fe next argues that, as a matter of law, commuting to work is not a major life activity.2 The court disagrees, reaffirming its previous ruling that the evidence was sufficient to submit the issue to the jury. The jury, which was instructed that major life activities include "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working," 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1996), concluded that Poindexter's impairment substantially limited her major. life activities. From the evidence presented, the jury could have found that Poindexter's panic attacks and depression affected more aspects of her life than commuting.
Santa Fe declares that Poindexter failed to prove she was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job in Kansas City. Sante Fe maintains that an essential function of that position, as required under the applicable collective bargaining agreement, was the ability to type sixty words per minute and Poindexter could type only forty-five words per minute. Additionally, Santa Fe insists that the requested transfer violated its collective bargaining agreement with Poindexter's union.
The Tenth Circuit has endorsed a two-part test to determine if an individual is qualified under the ADA:
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