Point Properties, Inc. v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 14 June 1991
• Parties: POINT PROPERTIES, INC. v. Doris ANDERSON, et al. 1900333.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1332

584 So.2d 1332

POINT PROPERTIES, INC. v. Doris ANDERSON, et al.

1900333.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 14, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 16, 1991.

Vincent F. Kilborn III of Kilborn & Roebuck, Mobile, for appellant.

John M. Tyson, Sr. of Tyson & Tyson, James C. Wood and J. Randall Crane of Simon, Wood & Crane, Mobile, for appellees Doris Anderson, Billy Patronas, Jim Boone, Georgia Mallon, Jeff Collier, Claude Brown, Leroy Coulter and Police Chief Beasley, individually.

HOUSTON, Justice.

Point Properties, Inc., which owns beachfront property in the Town of Dauphin Island, sued the town's mayor, Doris Anderson, in her individual capacity; the town's building inspector, Leroy Coulter, in his individual capacity; the town's police chief, Terry Beasley, in his individual capacity; and the members of the town's council, Billy Patronas, Jim Boone, Georgia Mallon, Jeff Collier, and Claude Brown, in their individual capacities, alleging that the defendants had conspired to deprive it of the use and enjoyment of its property without due process of law. Point Properties sought to recover both compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants moved for a summary judgment, raising the defenses of absolute and qualified immunity. The trial court granted their motion, and Point Properties appealed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The summary judgment was proper in this case if there was no genuine issue of material fact and the defendants were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Ala.R.Civ.P. The burden was on the defendants to make a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that they were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. If that showing was made, then the burden shifted to Point Properties to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact, so as to avoid the entry of a judgment against it. In determining whether there was a genuine issue of material fact, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Point Properties and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the defendants. Knight v. Alabama Power Co., 580 So.2d 576 (Ala.1991). Because this case was not pending on June 11, 1987, the applicable standard of review is the "substantial evidence" rule. Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-12. "Substantial evidence" has been defined as "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Point Properties, shows that Point Properties, in a move designed to clear the way for it to develop its beachfront property, sought, and received, the consent of the Dauphin Island Property Owners Association ("the Association") to vacate a paved, public roadway known as Pirate's Cove Street, which divided the property owned by Point Properties and provided access to the beach from Bienville Boulevard. The roadway was subsequently vacated and became the property of Point Properties. Doris Anderson was the president of the Association at the time the roadway was vacated. When the Town of Dauphin Island was later incorporated, Anderson became its mayor. Thereafter, responding to numerous complaints from nearby property owners that trespassers were using the vacated roadway as a means of ingress to and egress from the beach and that the trespassing had become a nuisance, Point Properties agreed to excavate the roadway so that it could not be used. However, when Point Properties began making plans to excavate the roadway, its attorney, Norton Brooker, was informed by Anderson that Point Properties was taking too much time to begin the development of its property. She told Brooker that she and the town's council "wanted the street back" because Point Properties "had not built a hotel" on its property. Anderson also told Brooker that she and the council "had decided that claiming the street would be a way to put pressure on Point Properties to 'do something.' " When Brooker later contacted the town's attorney to ascertain on what basis Anderson and the council were claiming the roadway, Brooker was told that the town had considered "the idea of condemning the former street in order to get it back, but [that the town] simply did not have the money to do so, and for that reason [the town was] pursuing the question of the validity of the vacation." ¹ The official minutes of one of the council's meetings reflect that the members of the council adopted a resolution stating that the roadway should not be excavated until the question of its ownership could be resolved:

"Mayor Anderson advised that since Pirate's Cover Street has been vacated to Point Properties, Inc., there have been many complaints of the use of the street, the use of the adjoining areas and the litter left by those using the street. Town attorney ... took the floor to state that the Mobile County Commission vacated the street in 1987, but it now appears that the vacation may have been improper because of a 1980 Alabama Supreme Court ruling which held that a similar [vacation] of a street was improper since it required but did not receive approval of all the property owners of the subdivision. [The town's attorney] recommended that the Town Council impede the destruction of the street, as is currently planned by Point Properties, and attempt to get the street back into the control of the Town of Dauphin Island which is the successor to Mobile County.

"It was moved by Alderman Collier, seconded by Alderman Mallon and unanimously approved by voice vote to have the town attorney advise the legal counsel of Point Properties that the ownership of the street is in doubt and request that they withhold any action on destruction of the street pending resolution of ownership--that the town attorney further advise the counsel of Point Properties and their construction company that action to destroy the street at this time is not desired."

Representatives of Point Properties were later denied a permit by Coulter to excavate the roadway and were advised by the town's attorney, Coulter, and Beasley that any attempt to excavate the roadway could result in the arrest of the persons involved. After all attempts to resolve the problem had failed, Point Properties filed suit.

The sole issue presented in this case is whether the defendants were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law based on the defenses of absolute or qualified immunity. The defendants contend that they prevented Point Properties from excavating the roadway because, they say, a valid question existed as to whether the roadway had been legally vacated. They argue that because they were under a duty, as representatives of the Town of Dauphin Island, to prevent the unlawful destruction of the public's property, they were clothed with immunity when they undertook to prevent Point Properties from excavating the roadway. Point Properties contends, however, that the defendants had no legitimate basis upon which to question the ownership of the roadway. It argues that a fact question precluding summary judgment was presented as to whether the defendants acted out of a genuine concern that the public's property was about to be destroyed or, instead, out of dissatisfaction with its development schedule. Point Properties maintains that, under the circumstances of this case, the defendants were not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law based on the defenses of absolute or qualified immunity.

Section 1983 provides a remedy for persons alleging deprivations of their constitutional rights by government officials through action taken "under color of state law." Notwithstanding the unqualified nature of its language, however, § 1983 was not intended to abrogate the common law immunities enjoyed by persons performing certain governmental functions. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980). It is now well settled that government officials performing legislative functions at the state level are entitled to absolute immunity from suits for damages under § 1983. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). State legislators "require this protection to shield them from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability." 457 U.S. at 806, 102 S.Ct. at 2732. Likewise, in Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that the members of a "regional" land planning agency performing legislative functions were entitled to absolute immunity from the plaintiff's § 1983 action and, although expressly reserving the question for a later date, strongly suggested that government officials performing legislative functions at the municipal level are also entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 claims. Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Lake Country Estates, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir.1980), that government officials performing legislative functions at the municipal level are entitled to absolute immunity. The Court of Appeals stated in part:

"The official immunity question in this case is whether the city directors were absolutely immune with respect to their enactment of the allegedly unconstitutional zoning amendment. Building upon the district court's holding that the directors' rezoning was a legislative act we begin with the proposition that state and regional legislators have an absolute federal common law immunity from liability for damages occasioned by their legislative acts, an immunity which Congress left undisturbed with...