Poirier v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction
Decision Date | 30 January 2008 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 06-10748-GAO. |
Citation | 532 F.Supp.2d 275 |
Parties | Melissa J. POIRIER, Plaintiff v. MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION and Kathleen M. Dennehy, individually and in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Lori A Jodoin, Rodgers, Powers & Schwartz LLP, Sarah M. Joss, Attorney General's Office, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.
Kathleen M. Dennehy, Harvey A. Schwartz, Rodgers, Powers & Schwartz LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendants.
The plaintiff, Melissa Poirier, brings this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Massachusetts Department of Correction ("DOC") and its Commissioner, Kathleen Dennehy, in both her individual and official capacities. Poirier, who had been employed by the DOC as a correction officer, claims that the defendants violated her constitutional right to maintain a "close, personal association" with a former inmate by terminating her employment because of that relationship pursuant to the DOC's "Rules & Regulations Governing All Employees of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections" ("Rules").
The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint. For the reasons that follow, their motion is GRANTED and the action is dismissed.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a court must ... Redondo-Borges v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 421 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2005) (citations omitted). In particular, the court is not required to accept as true legal conclusions within the complaint. See Doran v. Mass. Tpk. Auth., 348 F.3d 315, 318 (1st Cir.2003).
The complaint in this case alleges that Poirier served as a correction officer for the DOC for fifteen years, beginning in 1990, and received "excellent performance evaluations and positive feedback" from her superiors throughout that her service. Throughout the period of her employment, the DOC Rules prohibited employees from "consorting" with "any inmate or former inmate" without permission from specific supervisors. (See Compl. ¶ 9.)
In 2000 and 2001 the. DOC investigated allegations that Poirier had maintained an inappropriate relationship with a current inmate, had delivered contraband to an, inmate, and had communicated with a relative of an inmate. After investigation, the DOC sustained the third allegation, but not the first two. The DOC issued her a letter of reprimand, but it also permitted Ms. Poirier to continue the relationship." (See id. ¶ 14.)
In April 2004, the plaintiff notified her superiors, that "she would be in social contact with a former inmate, Dennis Novicki," who had been a figure in the prior investigation. The DOC did not tell her to cease association with Novicki. It was the DOC's practice not to reply to notifications such as Poirier's "unless it was to decline permission to associate." (See id. ¶¶ 15-16.)
Poirier and Novicki "developed a deep attachment, and commitment to one another." (See id. ¶ 17.) In July 2004, the plaintiff requested permission from Commissioner Dennehy for Novicki to reside in her home. The DOC thereupon reopened the 2000-2001 investigation and placed Poirier on leave pending the outcome of the investigation. On September 23, 2004, Commissioner Dennehy denied the plaintiffs request for "permission to have Novicki reside with her. The Commissioner's letter did not order the plaintiff "to cease personal contact with" Novicki. On August 11, 2005, the DOC terminated the plaintiffs employment for having unauthorized contact with Novicki. (See id. ¶¶ 18-22.)
The DOC is a state agency of Massachusetts. A suit against the agency is a suit against the State and is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Alabama a Pugh, 438 U.S. 781-82, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978) () .1 Thus, the DOC itself must be dismissed as a defendant.
However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit for prospective injunctive relief against a state official, such as the Commissioner in her official capacity. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-60, 28 S.Ct. 441; Redondo-Borges v. U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., 421 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2005).2 Moreover, such suits are authorized under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) .
Thus, Dennehy remains suable in her personal capacity under § 1983 for damages flowing from any deprivation by her of the plaintiff's rights. As to any potential personal liability, however, there is the question of whether Dennehy is entitled to qualified immunity from suit.
The plaintiff's claim is that her "right to maintain a close, personal association with Mr. Novicki was protected by both the right of association in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Due Process component of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution" (Comp.¶ 23), and that her right in this respect was violated when she was fired "because of her personal relationship with Mr. Novicki." (Id. ¶ 27.)
"[T]he freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights." Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 95 L.Ed.2d 474 (1987). While the Supreme Court has "not attempted to mark the precise boundaries of this type of constitutional protection," it has explicitly accorded such protection to the following private matters, among others:
marriage, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-386, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978); the begetting and bearing of children, Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684-686, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977); child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); and cohabitation with relatives, Moore v. East Cleveland, 503-504 [, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977)].
Id. Generally, and in each of the cases cited in the just-quoted summary, in recognizing the constitutionally protected status of such private matters the Court has invoked the guaranty of liberty contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383-85, 98 S.Ct. 673 (summarizing cases).3
The Court has also "recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State." Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). "In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty." Id. The Court in Roberts thus aligned the Fourteenth Amendment's guaranty of personal liberty with the First Amendment's guaranty of associational liberty, although it described what has come to be called a "right of Intimate association" only in general terms, The Court said:
Without precisely identifying every consideration that may underlie this type of constitutional protection, we have noted that certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs. ... Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty.
Id. at 618-19, 104 S.Ct. 3244. The Court acknowledged that there is
a broad range of human relationships that may make greater or lesser claims to constitutional protection from particular incursions by the State. Determining the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to enter into a particular association therefore unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments. ... We need not mark the potentially significant points on this terrain with any precision. We note only that factors that may be relevant include size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent.
Id. at 620, 104 S.Ct. 3244 (citation omitted).
In sum, the Court has provided three tools for recognizing the existence of a "right of intimate association" in a given case. First, principally in Roberts and Duarte, the Court has outlined a general definition, articulating in broad terms the key taxonomic criteria to be used. Second, by reference to a number of antecedent cases, the Court has identified particular "personal bonds" or "attachments" that it has historically recognized as exemplifying the right. And third, in, a series of cases beginning with Roberts, it has rejected particular claims that the...
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