Poitra v. Demarrias

• Decision Date: 28 August 1974
• Docket Number: No. 74-1025,74-1025
• Parties: Mary POITRA, as mother and surviving parent of Richard A. Primeaux, Appellant, v. Donald DEMARRIAS, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 23

502 F.2d 23

Mary POITRA, as mother and surviving parent of Richard A Primeaux, Appellant, v. Donald DEMARRIAS, Appellee.

No. 74-1025.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted April 19, 1974.

Decided Aug. 28, 1974.

Marvin J. Sonosky, Washington, D.C., for appellant.

John M. Olson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Bismarck, N.D., for appellee.

Before HEANEY and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges, and TALBOT SMITH, Senior District Judge. ^*

STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge.

In this wrongful death action brought by one Indian against another Indian, the primary issue raised on appeal is whether diversity jurisdiction in the federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) (1970) is precluded by reason of the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction in the courts of the State of North Dakota over civil causes of action arising in Indian country. Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D.1973). ¹

Plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee are both enrolled Indians residing within the exterior boundaries of the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation. Appellant, a citizen of North Dakota, brought this action against appellee, a citizen of South Dakota, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 32-21 of the North Dakota Century Code for the wrongful death of her minor son. Appellant's son, Richard A. Primeaux, died from injuries sustained in an automobile accident which occurred on the Standing Rock Reservation, near Selfridge, North Dakota. The automobile in which Primeaux was a passenger was struck from the rear by an automobile driven by appellee.

Appellant filed her complaint on June 15, 1972. Service was made upon the defendant by serving the North Dakota State Highway Commissioner on June 16, 1972, pursuant to the provisions of the North Dakota non-resident motorist statute, N.D.C.C. 39-01-11. No responsive pleading was filed, and on August 22, 1973, appellant filed a notice of application for default judgment which was served on the North Dakota Unsatisfied Judgment Fund pursuant to N.D.C.C. 39-17-03 (1972). On September 11, 1973, a Special Assistant Attorney General for North Dakota, representing the Fund, ² moved on behalf of appellee to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

On October 27, 1973, the district court dismissed the action. Poitra v. Demarrias, 369 F.Supp. 257 (D.N.D.1973). In its memorandum and order it stated that in a diversity action it could not 'entertain any action not maintainable in a North Dakota Court.' Id. at 258 citing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). The district court further stated that:

In Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-109, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 1469, 89 L.Ed. 2079, the Supreme Court said: '* * * But since a federal court adjudicating a state-created right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in effect, only another Court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is made unavailable by the State * * *.'

In this case, a Federal Court, by reason of diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy, is asked to adjudicate a right created by the State. The plaintiff's exercise of that right is subject to the laws of North Dakota as interpreted by the Courts of North Dakota.

By its decision in Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256, the North Dakota Supreme Court conclusively and effectively closed the State Courthouse door to the plaintiff in this case. Id.

We reverse that determination. As noted by the Supreme Court in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-468, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 1141-1142 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965), the Erie rule is based in part upon 'a realization that it would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation materially to differ because suit had been brought in a federal court' rather than in state court, and that it is 'also in part a reaction to the practice of 'forum shopping' which had grown up in response to the rule of Swift v. Tyson.' ³ The Court then characterized the twig aims of Erie as: 'discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.' Id. at 468, 85 S.Ct. at 1142.

Clearly, Hanna established a subtle retreat from prior decisions which had led to an overconcern with conformity to state law in diversity actions. Compare Hanna v. Plumer, supra, with Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Woods v. Interstate realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 69 S.Ct. 1235, 93 L.Ed. 1524 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 69 S.Ct. 1233, 93 L.Ed. 1520 (1949); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 67 S.Ct. 657, 91 L.Ed. 832 (1947); ⁴ Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945).

Erie, of course, teaches that federal courts in diversity actions must give deference to the 'definition of state-created rights and obligations by the state courts,' whether substantive, procedural or quasi-procedural where the state rule of law is 'bound up' with a state-created right or obligation. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 535-536, 78 S.Ct. 893, 899, 2 L.Ed.2d 953 (1958). The thrust of Erie however, cannot be interpreted to allow in every instance the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts to be wholly controlled and dependent upon state law. As this court recently pointed out in Prashar v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 480 F.2d 947, 952-953 (8th Cir. 1973), the primary concerns in Erie were with providing equal protection to citizen-defendants and with 'the vital recognition of the necessary bridling of encroaching federalism in areas of state policy.' In addition, we noted that 'federal diversity actions can never be identic to those carried out in state form,' and concluded that no state policy would be violated by application of federal procedure that differed from the state rule. Id.

Similar views were expressed by the Fourth Circuit in a case in which that court grappled with the Erie problem. In Atkins v. Schmutz Manufacturing Co., 435 F.2d 527, 536 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932, 91 S.Ct. 1526, 28 L.Ed.2d 867 (1971), the court stated:

* * * Erie and its progeny may be seen as an attempt to formulate a workable doctrine governing choice of law in diversity actions which would prevent impermissible federal court interference with state rules reflecting policy considerations lying within the realm of state law-making competence. * * *

It is, of course, neither possible nor necessary for federal courts to be totally neutral in the adjudication of state-created rights. * * * Some adoption of state court prodedures by federal courts sitting in diversity may be feasible, but it may also be in conflict with the fundamental interests of the federal courts in the conduct of their own business and maintenance of the integrity of their own procedures, the legitimate interests of a federal forum, qua forum.

The Prashar and Atkins decisions indicate that the scope of the Erie doctrine has been narrowed significantly since its earliest applications. It now seems clear that a federal court sitting in diversity need not mirror in every regard the state courts. The interest of the federal court in its own procedures and policies dominates in the absence of identifiable state interests which are inextricably linked with the underlying substantive right.

Furthermore, it is also clear that federal courts have an affirmative responsibility to guard their own jurisdiction. This point has been made primarily in the context of attempts by states to proscribe accessibility to the courts of those states to a particular class of litigants with respect to state-created substantive rights. Such efforts cannot a priori limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Davis v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 139 F.2d 624, 626 (8th Cir. 1944); Stephenson v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 110 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1940); State of Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F.Supp. 391, 395-396 (S.D.Iowa 1968); Monroe v. Pape, 221 F.Supp. 635, 649 & n. 39 (N.D.Ill.1963); Martineau v. Eastern Airlines, 64 F.Supp. 235 (N.D.Ill.1946).

As explained by the Fourth Circuit in Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 713-716 (4th Cir. 1961):

In determining its own jurisdiction, a District Court of the United States must look to the sources of its power and not to acts of states which have no power to enlarge or to contract the federal jurisdiction. However extensive the power of the state to deal with the substantive right, it has no power to defeat the jurisdiction of the federal courts. * * * (A) court, in determining its own jurisdiction, must look to the constitution and laws of the sovereignty which created it. The laws of a state cannot enlarge or restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts or those of any other state. It necessarily follows that whenever a state provides a substantive right and a remedy for its enforcement in a judicial proceeding in any state court, a judicial controversy involving the right may be adjudicated by a United States District Court if it has jurisdiction under the Constitution and laws of the United States.

This language lends strong support to the precept that federal courts have an obligation to exercise jurisdiction, when the statutory requisites are satisfied. See First National Bank v. United Airlines, 342 U.S. 396, 399-400, 72 S.Ct. 421, 96 L.Ed. 441 (1952). Cf. Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. filed this date).

Against this background we turn to the problem. State assumption of civil jurisdiction over Indians is the subject matter of 25 U.S.C. 1322(a) (1970). ⁵ It states, in effect, that until an Indian reservation consents to the jurisdiction of the state courts, such jurisdiction may not be assumed by the state courts of any cause of action involving Indians and arising within the boundaries of the Indian reservation. Although the state ...