Poland v. Arizona Poland v. Arizona
| Decision Date | 05 May 1986 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 85-5023,85-5024,s. 85-5023 |
| Citation | 476 U.S. 147,106 S.Ct. 1749,90 L.Ed.2d 123 |
| Parties | Patrick Gene POLAND, Petitioner, v. ARIZONA. Michael Kent POLAND v. ARIZONA |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Petitioners robbed a bank van of $281,000 in cash and killed the guards by dumping them into a lake in sacks weighted with rocks. Petitioners were convicted of first-degree murder in an Arizona state court. At a separate hearing, while finding that the statutory aggravating circumstance that the offense was committed for "pecuniary gain" was not present because it applied only to contract killings, the trial judge sentenced petitioners to death upon finding that the statutory aggravating circumstance that the offense was committed in "an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner" was present. The Arizona Supreme Court, while reversing and remanding for a retrial on other grounds, held that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of the "especially heinous" circumstance, but that the trial judge erred in finding the "pecuniary gain" circumstance limited to contract killings, and that if petitioners were again convicted the judge might find this circumstance present. On remand, petitioners were again convicted of first-degree murder and the trial judge again sentenced them to death, finding that both the "pecuniary gain" and "especially heinous" circumstances were present. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting petitioners' argument that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred reimposition of the death penalty. The court found the evidence still insufficient to support the "especially heinous" circumstance but sufficient to support the "pecuniary gain" circumstance.
Held: Reimposing the death penalty on petitioners did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Pp. 152-157.
(a) When a conviction is reversed on appeal, it is nullified and " 'the slate wiped clean,' " so that if the defendant is convicted again, he may constitutionally be subjected to whatever punishment is lawful. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 442, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 1860, 68 L.Ed.2d 270. This rationale is, however, inapplicable where a jury agrees or an appellate court decides that the prosecution "has not proved its case." Id., at 443, 101 S.Ct., at 1860. Therefore, the relevant inquiry in these cases is whether the sentencing judge or the reviewing court has "decided that the prosecution has not proved its case" for the death penalty and hence has "acquitted" petitioners. Bullington v. Missouri, supra; Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164. Pp. 152-154.
(b) The trial judge's rejection of the "pecuniary gain" aggravating circumstance was not an "acquittal" of that circumstance for double jeopardy purposes, and did not foreclose its consideration by the reviewing court. Moreover, because the reviewing court did not find the evidence legally insufficient to justify imposition of the death penalty, there was no death penalty "acquittal" by that court. The Double Jeopardy Clause, therefore, did not foreclose a second sentencing hearing at which the "clean slate" rule applied. Pp. 154-157.
144 Ariz. 388, 698 P.2d 183, and 144 Ariz. 412, 698 P.2d 207 (1985), affirmed.
W.K. Wilhelmsen, for petitioner in each case.
Gerald R. Grant, Phoenix, Ariz., for respondent in each case.
The question presented is whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a further capital sentencing proceeding when, on appeal from a sentence of death, the reviewing court finds the evidence insufficient to support the only aggravating factor on which the sentencing judge relied, but does not find the evidence insufficient to support the death penalty.
In 1977 petitioners Patrick and Michael Poland, disguised as police officers, stopped a Purolator van that was making cash deliveries to various banks in northern Arizona. After removing some $281,000 in cash from the van, petitioners took the two Purolator guards to a lake and dumped them into the water in sacks weighted with rocks. Autopsies indi- cated that the most probable cause of the guards' death was drowning, although one may have died of a heart attack. It was not possible to determine if the guards were drugged, but there was no evidence of a struggle.
The jury disbelieved petitioners' alibi defense and convicted them of first-degree murder. Pursuant to former Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-454(A) (Supp.1973), the trial judge then sat as sentencer in a separate proceeding. At the hearing, the prosecution, relying on the evidence presented at trial, argued that two statutory aggravating circumstances were present: (1) that petitioners had "committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of [something] of pecuniary value," former Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-454(E)(5) (Supp.1973); and (2) that petitioners had "committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner," former Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-454(E)(6) (Supp.1973). The trial judge made the following finding with respect to the "pecuniary gain" aggravating circumstance:
"This, then, would be an aggravating circumstance." App. 15-16.
The judge found that the "especially heinous, cruel, [or] depraved" aggravating circumstance was present, stating that the murders were "shockingly evil, insensate, and marked by debasement." Id., at 16. Finding that this aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating evidence, the judge sentenced petitioners to death. Id., at 14.
On appeal, petitioners argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the judge's finding of the "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved" aggravating circumstance. They also argued that the jury's verdict was tainted by a jury-room discussion of evidence not admitted at trial. The Arizona Supreme Court agreed that the jury's verdict was tainted, necessitating reversal and retrial. State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 283-285, 645 P.2d 784, 798-800 (1982). The court next held that the evidence on which the State relied at the first sentencing hearing was insufficient to support a finding of the "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved" aggravating circumstance. Id., at 285, 645 P.2d, at 800. Finally, the court stated that the trial court "mistook the law when it did not find that the defendants 'committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.' " Ibid. The court explained that this aggravating circumstance is not limited to situations involving contract killings, see State v. Clark, 126 Ariz. 428, 616 P.2d 888 (1980), and added that "[u]pon retrial, if the defendants are again convicted of first degree murder, the court may find the existence of this aggravating circumstance." 132 Ariz., at 286, 645 P.2d, at 801.
On remand, petitioners were again convicted of first-degree murder. At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution, relying on the evidence presented at the second trial and also presenting additional evidence, argued that the "pecuniary gain" and "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved" aggravating factors were present in each petitioner's case. The prosecution alleged a third aggravating circumstance in petitioner Patrick Poland's case: previous conviction of "a felony . . . involving the use or threat of violence on another person," Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-454(E)(2) (Supp.1973).1 The trial judge found all of the aggravating circumstances alleged by the prosecution, and again sentenced both petitioners to death.
Petitioners argued on appeal, as they had at their second sentencing hearing, that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred reimposition of the death penalty. Their theory was that the Arizona Supreme Court's decision on their first appeal that the evidence failed to support the "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved" aggravating circumstance amounted to an "acquittal" of the death penalty. Cf. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984). A majority of the Arizona Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating:
State v. Poland (Patrick), 144 Ariz. 388, 404, 698 P.2d 183, 199 (1985). Accord, State v. Poland (Michael), 144 Ariz. 412, 698 P.2d 207 (1985).
The court found the evidence still insufficient to support the "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved" aggravating circumstance, but sufficient to support the "pecuniary gain" aggravating circumstance with respect to both defendants and the "prior conviction involving violence" circumstance with respect to Patrick Poland. State v. Poland (Patrick), supra, at 404-406, 698 P.2d, at 199-201; accord, State v. Poland (Michael), supra. After again reviewing and independently weighing the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the court concluded that the death penalty was appropriate in each petitioner's case. We granted certiorari to consider whether reimposing the death penalties on petitioners violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. 474 U.S. 816, 106 S.Ct. 60, 88 L.Ed.2d 49 (1985). We hold that it did not.
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