Polaski v. Heckler, Civ. 4-84-64.

• Decision Date: 27 April 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. 4-84-64.
• Parties: Lorraine POLASKI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

585 F. Supp. 1004

Lorraine POLASKI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant.

Civ. 4-84-64.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota, Fourth Division.

April 27, 1984.

Mary G. Grau, Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiffs.

James M. Rosenbaum, U.S. Atty. by Paul W. Day, Asst. U.S. Atty., Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant.

ORDER

MILES W. LORD, Chief Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs in this class-action suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) seek a preliminary injunction which would, in essence, compel the government to use the proper standards in evaluating claims for disability insurance benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. After a hearing on April 17, 1984, this court certified a class and issued a temporary restraining order to freeze the situation pending further review. A second hearing was held on April 26, 1984, to consider whether a preliminary injunction should issue and, if so, what preliminary relief would be appropriate. The present order is based upon the evidence presented at those hearings and the extensive briefs submitted by the parties.

For several years now, the courts of this circuit have found themselves embroiled in an increasingly frustrating effort to persuade the Secretary to follow their decisions regarding certain legal standards under the disability insurance program. The Secretary, in an apparent effort to reduce the number of disability beneficiaries, has taken a more restrictive approach in recent years in determining eligibility. Often, the Secretary has stuck to this restrictive path even when it has led to direct contravention of federal court edicts. By proceeding in such a manner, the Secretary also has disregarded the fundamental policies at the heart of the disability program:

Congress enacted the social security disability insurance program in order to provide benefits to individuals who become disabled and can no longer "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment." The program is intended to aid workers who, after having contributed to the nation's workforce, are unable to continue to do so because of a disability. The underlying purpose of this program is to ease the economic dislocations and hardships that often accompany disability. The Act is a remedial one which should be broadly construed and liberally applied to effectuate its humanitarian goals.

Judge Gerald W. Heaney, Why the High Rate of Reversals in Social Security Disability Cases?, 7 Hamline Law Review 1, 2 (1984) (footnotes omitted).

In the present action, plaintiffs challenge two specific policies of the Secretary: (1) the agency policy of requiring objective medical evidence to fully corroborate all allegations of pain and other subjective complaints, and (2) the agency policy of terminating disability benefits without new evidence showing that the claimant's medical condition has improved or that the prior decision was erroneous. Plaintiffs contend that these policies violate the Social Security Act as well as the separation of powers doctrine and due process rights under the U.S. Constitution.

JURISDICTION

At the threshold, the Secretary argues that this court lacks the jurisdiction to consider this action. The Secretary's extended arguments along this line, however, ignore principles that have by now become well-established in actions of this nature. See, e.g., Mental Health Association of Minnesota v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 965, 968-71 (8th Cir.1983). This court therefore concludes that it has jurisdiction over all members of this class by virtue of both section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361.

Jurisdiction under section 205(g) imposes two requirements. The first mandates that the individual present a claim to the Secretary, which all members of this class clearly have done. The second requires that the individual exhaust his administrative remedies and receive a final decision from the Secretary before seeking relief in the courts. It is true that some members of this class have not yet proceeded through all levels of agency appeals. This second requirement is, however, waivable by either the Secretary or the courts when necessary to prevent irreparable harm or the loss of crucial collateral claims. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 75-77, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 1889-1890, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 893, 900 n. 11, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).

This court finds that such a waiver is appropriate in the present case. As set out in detail below, this class of plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if its claims are not acted upon immediately. This class does not have the resources to endure delay upon delay; the members of this class depend upon disability benefits to meet the most basic of their needs, to sustain their health and well-being. Further, it would be futile and inefficient to force these plaintiffs to pursue their claims through level after level of agency review when it appears that the agency is systematically relying upon improper standards. Mental Health Association of Minnesota, 720 F.2d at 970-71.

As for mandamus jurisdiction, it is well established that courts will assert such jurisdiction when no other adequate remedy is available and the plaintiff is owed a clear duty. United States ex rel. Girard Trust Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540, 543-44, 57 S.Ct. 855, 857, 81 L.Ed. 272 (1937). Such is the situation in the present action, in which a writ of mandamus would not supplant the Secretary's duly delegated authority to make the factual determinations upon which eligibility depends but would merely compel the Secretary to make such determinations in a lawful manner. Mental Health Association of Minnesota, 720 F.2d at 971-72 n. 17.

REVISED CLASS CERTIFICATION

Plaintiffs move for a revised class certification, apparently on the basis of newly-acquired information on the status of various class actions which have been filed but not yet certified throughout the Eighth Circuit's jurisdiction. The class as originally certified in this court's order of April 17 was defined to include disability claimants within the Eighth Circuit who have viable claims regarding the Secretary's standards on pain and medical improvement but whose claims are not already being dealt with in some other collective action.

Thus, the original certification excluded residents of Arkansas because that state had had some success on its own in convincing the agency to follow the law of the Eighth Circuit and had imposed its own moratorium on terminations under improper standards. This court is now advised, however, that the Secretary's acquiescence and the state's moratorium came as recently as December 1983. The proper standards therefore have never been applied to some applicants whose claims are still viable. Certainly, these individuals should be included in the class.

The original certification also was too narrow in that it failed to encompass individuals in Arkansas and Iowa for whom the statute of limitations had been tolled by the filing of class actions in their respective states.¹American Pipe and Construction Co. v. State of Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974). This court finds that the class appropriately encompasses these individuals.

Accordingly, this court orders that the class be redefined as follows:

All persons residing in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Missouri, Nebraska, Iowa, or Arkansas,

a) who have been or will be notified that their applications for Title II and/or Title XVI benefits have been denied or that their Title II and/or Title XVI benefits are being terminated on medical or medical vocational grounds; and

b) who allege that they are unable to work in whole or in part because of pain or other subjective complaints and/or that their medical condition has not improved; and

c) who are pursuing or will pursue timely administrative or judicial appeals, or, if not pursuing timely appeals, who have received or will receive an adverse decision at any level of the administrative review process on or after January 30, 1984, provided however that,

(1) as to those who are residents of Arkansas and who have been or will be notified that their applications for Title II and/or Title XVI benefits have been denied, the class includes only (a) those who are pursuing or will pursue timely judicial appeals and (b) those who are pursuing timely administrative appeals at the Administrative Law Judge or Appeals Council level, and (c) those who received or will receive an adverse decision at the Administrative Law Judge or Appeals Council level on or after February 20, 1984;

(2) as to those who are residents of Arkansas and who have been terminated from Title II and/or Title XVI benefits, the class also includes those who have received or will receive an adverse decision at any level of the administrative review process on or after February 12, 1983; and

(3) as to those who are residents of Iowa and who have been or will be notified that their applications for Title II and/or Title XVI benefits have been denied, the class also includes those who have received an adverse decision at any level of the administrative review process on or after November 26, 1983; and

(4) as to those who are residents of Iowa and who have been or will be terminated from Title II and/or Title XVI benefits, the class also includes those who have received or will receive an adverse decision at any level of the administrative review process on or after January 13, 1982,

d) provided, further, however, that the class of persons whom plaintiffs represent shall exclude persons who are members of class actions which have been certified in any court in the Eighth Circuit which

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