Poleon v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands
| Decision Date | 08 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 2013-024 |
| Parties | ANDERSON B. POLEON and BEATRICE POLEON v. GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, CHRISTOPHER HOWELL, STEPHEN BROWN, ARTHUR JOSEPH, FRANKIE ORTIZ, MELISSA P. ORTIZ and WARREN T. SEDAR |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
Anderson Poleon, a Virgin Islands police officer, brings this § 1983 civil rights action against the Government of the Virgin Islands (GVI), two Assistant Attorneys General, and four members of the Virgin Islands Police Department (VIPD), claiming they conspired to unlawfully arrest, imprison, and prosecute him. He contends that, acting in concert, they violated his constitutional rights in retaliation for his speaking out against VIPD's policy of "sharing arrests," which entailed officers falsely attesting that they had witnessed facts to establish probable cause for an arrest. He also claims that the defendants conspired to falsely blame him for the dismissal of a criminal case for spoliation of evidence. He asserts territorial claims against the individual defendants for defamation, abuse of process, false arrest, false imprisonment, loss of consortium, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
His voluminous ten-count complaint includes two counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, one against the GVI and the other against the individual defendants. The § 1983 claim against the GVI alleges that the VIPD policy of sharing arrests violated the Fourth Amendment rights of Virgin Islands citizens. Poleon also asserts that the GVI acquiesced in his being targeted and demoted in violation of his First Amendment right to speak out against the unlawful practice of arrest sharing.1 The remaining counts against the GVI are territorial claims for negligent hiring, loss of consortium, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Moving to dismiss the complaint, the GVI argues that Poleon lacks standing to bring a Fourth Amendment claim on behalf of the residents of the Virgin Islands, and that his speech was not protected under the First Amendment.2 The GVI also asserts that because Poleon failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act (VITCA), his claims of negligent hiring, loss of consortium, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are barred.3
We hold that Poleon lacks standing to bring his civil rights claim against the GVI for violating the Fourth Amendment rights of Virgin Islands citizens. Because he failed to comply with the VITCA's notice requirements, the territorial claims against the GVI must be dismissed. Thus, all claims against the GVI will be dismissed.
The other § 1983 claim is against the individual defendants, Assistant Attorney General Warren Sedar, Assistant Attorney General Melissa Ortiz, St. Croix Police Chief Christopher Howell, Officer Arthur Joseph, Officer Stephen Brown, and Officer Frankie Ortiz, for conspiring to unlawfully seize, arrest, imprison, and prosecute Poleon in violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.4 Poleon also assertsterritorial claims of defamation, false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, loss of consortium, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against various individual defendants.5
In their motions to dismiss, AAGs Ortiz and Sedar argue that the plaintiffs failed to state a violation of the United States Constitution or federal law to support a federal cause of action.6 They also invoke absolute and qualified immunity, claiming they were acting within the scope of their authority as prosecutors.7 They maintain that even if they are not immune, they cannot be held liable for the § 1983 claim because they did not personally participate in the unconstitutional conduct.8 They further contend that Poleon fails to plead sufficient facts to support the claims because they did not personally arrest or detain him.9
We conclude that AAGs Sedar and Ortiz enjoy absolute immunity. It is not necessary to decide their other arguments. Thus, we shall grant their motions to dismiss.
After filing his answer, Joseph filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), arguing that Poleon has not pleaded sufficient facts.10 Brownfiled neither an answer nor a Rule 12 motion.11 Nevertheless, we shall consider whether the rulings regarding other defendants should be applied to Brown. If the court grants another defendant's motion to dismiss, the court may, on its own initiative, dismiss claims as to non-moving defendants if the claims against the non-moving defendants suffer from the same defects raised in the moving parties' motions. Minnesota Lawyers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ahrens, 432 F. App'x 143, 148 (3d Cir. 2011) (); see also McPherson v. United States, 392 F. App'x 938, 942-43 (3d Cir. 2010) (). A claim against a non-moving party may be dismissed if the claims against all defendants are "integrally related" or where the non-moving defendants are in a similar position to the moving defendants. Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 162 (7th Cir. 1993). Therefore, to the extent the deficiencies cited in other defendants' motions to dismiss also apply to Brown, we shall review them.
Poleon has sufficiently alleged that Joseph and Brown conspired to violate his Fourth Amendment rights by falsely arresting and imprisoning him. He has also stated territorial claims for false arrest and false imprisonment against Brown. Because it appears Poleon may be able to cure the deficiencies we have identified as to the defamation claim against Joseph, we shall give Poleon leave to amend the complaint. The claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress survives against Joseph andBrown because if proven, their conduct—as it affects Poleon, not his wife—could reasonably be regarded as extreme and outrageous.
According to the complaint, Anderson Poleon's ordeal began when he refused to go along with the VIPD's "arrest sharing" scheme and then complained about it.12 On March 16, 2012, Poleon and Roberts, a fellow officer, questioned two individuals about their suspicious activity.13 Roberts handcuffed and transported one of the individuals to the police station.14 Upon his return to the station, an unnamed officer asked Poleon to claim that he had arrested the man and to draft a probable cause affidavit containing facts he had not witnessed. After declining to prepare the affidavit, Poleon filed an internal complaint with the Special Operations Bureau.15
The unnamed officer's request was part of an arrest sharing scheme. The directive to engage in arrest sharing came from Howell, Poleon's supervising officer.16 Poleon claims that after he filed the internal complaint, Howell continually harassed him and was "out to get him."17 The day after he complained of arrest sharing, he was demoted from master K-9 trainer to the bike patrol unit.18 He then filed an internalcomplaint against Howell with the VIPD Internal Affairs Unit.19 Howell then demoted him to foot patrol and took away any duty vehicles assigned to him.20 Several months later on July 11, 2012, Poleon was arrested for unlawfully disposing of evidence in a pending criminal prosecution, specifically a wrecked vehicle impounded at the VIPD.
In 2010, two years before his arrest, Poleon had expressed interest in purchasing a vehicle that had been seized and impounded at the VIPD.21 The vehicle was evidence in the negligent vehicular homicide case against Kenneth Milligan. Joseph, the lead investigator in the Milligan case, informed Poleon that the vehicle could not be purchased until the prosecutor in the case, AAG Ortiz, authorized its release.22 Poleon obtained a letter, dated July 21, 2010, from AAG Ortiz addressed to both the VIPD and Joseph authorizing the release of the vehicle.23 Poleon then purchased the vehicle from Milligan's insurance company and resold it to fellow officer Roberts, who later removed it from the impound lot.24
Almost two years later, on June 4, 2012, defense counsel in the Milligan case filed a motion to dismiss for spoliation of evidence.25 At some point after the motion wasfiled, AAG Sedar appeared as the lead prosecutor.26 At a hearing on the motion, Joseph denied knowing how the vehicle had been removed from the impound lot and did not mention the release letter.27 Poleon contends that AAG Ortiz, AAG Sedar and Joseph blamed him for the vehicle's premature release and unauthorized removal to cover up their spoliation of the evidence.28
On June 15, 2012, Brown called him to set up a meeting to discuss how he had obtained the Milligan vehicle.29 Poleon informed Brown that either AAG Ortiz or her colleague, AAG Evans, provided him a release letter.30 After the meeting, Poleon called both Ortiz and Evans to request a copy of the release letter. Neither prosecutor returned his calls.31
On July 11, 2012, Poleon was summoned to a meeting with AAG Sedar, Howell, and other officers.32 Before going to the meeting, Poleon called AAG Ortiz to again request a copy of the release letter. She told him she could not discuss the letter, but he should attend the meeting.33
At the meeting, AAG Sedar accused him of removing the vehicle from the lot because he was "politically connected" with the defendant in the Milligan case.34 Poleon was then presented with a warrant for his arrest. He was handcuffed and taken into custody.35
After spending the night in jail in his underwear and under suicide watch, Poleon was charged with extortion, embezzlement, destruction of evidence, and interfering with property in custody of an officer.36 The probable cause affidavit prepared by Brown did not mention the release letter....
To continue reading
Request your trial