Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit

• Citation: 304 N.W.2d 455,410 Mich. 616
• Decision Date: 13 March 1981
• Docket Number: Docket No. 66294,No. 7,7
• Parties: POLETOWN NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL, a voluntary unincorporated association, Thomas Olechowski, Barbara Jean Andrews, Eddie R. Booker, Jozefa Krajewski, Lorraine R. Krajewski, Walter S. Jakubowski, Lottie G. Janiszewski, Theresa P. Tyner, Karen J. Appollaneo and Beatrice Humphrey, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The CITY OF DETROIT, a Municipal corporation, and The Detroit Economic Development Corporation, a Michigan corporation, Defendants and Appellees. Calender410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455, 19 ERC 1972, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,778
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Page 455

304 N.W.2d 455

POLETOWN NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL, a voluntary unincorporated association, Thomas Olechowski, Barbara Jean Andrews, Eddie R. Booker, Jozefa Krajewski, Lorraine R. Krajewski, Walter S. Jakubowski, Lottie G. Janiszewski, Theresa P. Tyner Karen J. Appollaneo and Beatrice Humphrey, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The CITY OF DETROIT, a Municipal corporation, and The Detroit Economic Development Corporation, a Michigan corporation, Defendants and Appellees.

Docket No. 66294.

Calender No. 7.

410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455, 19 ERC 1972,

11 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,778

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued March 3, 1981.

Decided March 13, 1981.

Reosti & Papakhian, by Ronald Reosti, Detroit, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Lewis, White, Clay & Graves, P.C. by Eric Lee Clay, Detroit, for The Detroit Economic Development Corp City of Detroit, a municipal corporation, Sylvester Delaney and Acting Corp. Counsel by Joseph N. Baltimore, Detroit, Honigman, Miller, Schwartz & Cohn, by Jason L. Honigman, William G. Christopher, Norman C. Ankers, Detroit, Sp. Counsel, to The City of Detroit.

PER CURIAM.

This case arises out of a plan by the Detroit Economic Development Corporation to acquire, by condemnation if necessary, a large tract of land to be conveyed to General Motors Corporation as a site for construction of an assembly plant. The plaintiffs, a neighborhood association and several individual residents of the affected area, brought suit in Wayne Circuit Court to challenge the project on a number of grounds, not all of which have been argued to this Court. Defendants' motions for summary judgment were denied pending trial on a single question of fact: whether, under 1980 PA 87; M.C.L. § 213.51 et seq ; M.S.A. § 8.265(1) et seq, the city abused its discretion in determining that condemnation of plaintiffs' property was necessary to complete the project.

The trial lasted 10 days and resulted in a judgment for defendants and an order on December 9, 1980, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs filed a claim of appeal with the Court of Appeals on December 12, 1980, and an application for bypass with this Court on December 15, 1980.

We granted a motion for immediate consideration and an application for leave to appeal prior to decision by the Court of Appeals to consider the following questions:

Does the use of eminent domain in this case constitute a taking of private property for private use and, therefore, contravene Const. 1963, Art. 10, § 2?

Did the court below err in ruling that cultural, social and historical institutions were not protected by the Michigan Environmental Protection Act?

We conclude that these questions must be answered in the negative and affirm the trial court's decision.

I

This case raises a question of paramount importance to the future welfare of this state and its residents: Can a municipality use the power of eminent domain granted to it by the Economic Development Corporations Act, M.C.L. § 125.1601 et seq ; M.S.A. § 5.3520(1) et seq, to condemn property for transfer to a private corporation to build a plant to promote industry and commerce, thereby adding jobs and taxes to the economic base of the municipality and state?

Const. 1963, Art. 10, § 2, states in pertinent part that "(p)rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation therefor being first made or secured in a manner prescribed by law." Art. 10, § 2 has been interpreted as requiring that the power of eminent domain not be invoked except to further a public use or purpose. ¹ Plaintiffs-appellants urge us to distinguish between the terms "use" and "purpose", asserting they are not synonymous and have been distinguished in the law of eminent domain. We are persuaded the terms have been used interchangeably in Michigan statutes and decisions in an effort to describe the protean concept of public benefit. The term "public use" has not received a narrow or inelastic definition by this Court in prior cases. ² Indeed, this Court has stated that " '(a) public use changes with changing conditions of society' " and that " '(t)he right of the public to receive and enjoy the benefit of the use determines whether the use is public or private' ". ³ The Economic Development Corporations Act is a part of the comprehensive legislation dealing with planning, housing and zoning whereby the State of Michigan is attempting to provide for the general health, safety, and welfare through alleviating unemployment, providing economic assistance to industry, assisting the rehabilitation of blighted areas, and fostering urban redevelopment.

Section 2 of the act provides:

"There exists in this state the continuing need for programs to alleviate and prevent conditions of unemployment, and that it is accordingly necessary to assist and retain local industries and commercial enterprises to strengthen and revitalize the economy of this state and its municipalities; that accordingly it is necessary to provide means and methods for the encouragement and assistance of industrial and commercial enterprises in locating, purchasing, constructing, reconstructing, modernizing, improving, maintaining, repairing, furnishing, equipping, and expanding in this state and in its municipalities; and that it is also necessary to encourage the location and expansion of commercial enterprises to more conveniently provide needed services and facilities of the commercial enterprises to municipalities and the residents thereof. Therefore, the powers granted in this act constitute the performance of essential public purposes and functions for this state and its municipalities." M.C.L. § 125.1602; M.S.A. § 5.3520(2). (Emphasis added.)

To further the objectives of this act, the legislature has authorized municipalities to acquire property by condemnation in order to provide industrial and commercial sites and the means of transfer from the municipality to private users. M.C.L. § 125.1622; M.S.A. § 5.3520(22).

Plaintiffs-appellants do not challenge the declaration of the legislature that programs to alleviate and prevent conditions of unemployment and to preserve and develop industry and commerce are essential public purposes. Nor do they challenge the proposition that legislation to accomplish this purpose falls within the Constitutional grant of general legislative power to the legislature in Const. 1963, Art. 4, § 51, which reads as follows:

"The public health and general welfare of the people of the state are hereby declared to be matters of primary public concern. The legislature shall pass suitable laws for the protection and promotion of the public health."

What plaintiffs-appellants do challenge is the constitutionality of using the power of eminent domain to condemn one person's property to convey it to another private person in order to bolster the economy. They argue that whatever incidental benefit may accrue to the public, assembling land to General Motors' specifications for conveyance to General Motors for its uncontrolled use in profit making is really a taking for private use and not a public use because General Motors is the primary beneficiary of the condemnation.

The defendants-appellees contend, on the other hand, that the controlling public purpose in taking this land is to create an industrial site which will be used to alleviate and prevent conditions of unemployment and fiscal distress. The fact that it will be conveyed to and ultimately used by a private manufacturer does not defeat this predominant public purpose.

There is no dispute about the law. All agree that condemnation for a public use or purpose is permitted. All agree that condemnation for a private use or purpose is forbidden. Similarly, condemnation for a private use cannot be authorized whatever its incidental public benefit and condemnation for a public purpose cannot be forbidden whatever the incidental private gain. The heart of this dispute is whether the proposed condemnation is for the primary benefit of the public or the private user.

The Legislature has determined that governmental action of the type contemplated here meets a public need and serves an essential public purpose. The Court's role after such a determination is made is limited.

" 'The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a legislative function, subject to review by the courts when abused, and the determination of the legislative body of that matter should not be reversed except in instances where such determination is palpable and manifestly arbitrary and incorrect.' " Gregory Marina, Inc. v. Detroit, 378 Mich. 364, 396, 144 N.W.2d 503 (1966).

The United States Supreme Court has held that when a legislature speaks, the public interest has been declared in terms "well-nigh conclusive." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32, 75 S.Ct. 98, 102, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954).

The Legislature has delegated the authority to determine whether a particular project constitutes a public purpose to the governing body of the municipality involved. ⁴ The plaintiffs concede that this project is the type contemplated by the Legislature ⁵ and that the procedures set forth in the Economic Development Corporations Act have been followed. ⁶ This further limits our review.

In the court below, the plaintiffs-appellants challenged the necessity for the taking of the land for the proposed project. In this regard the city presented substantial evidence of the severe economic conditions facing the residents of the city and state, the need for new industrial development to revitalize local industries, the economic boost the proposed project would provide, and the lack of other adequate available sites to implement the project.

As Justice Cooley stated over a hundred years ago "the most important consideration in the case of eminent domain is the necessity of accomplishing some public good which is otherwise impracticable, and * * * the law does not so much regard the...