Polglaise v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 16 January 1913 |
| Citation | 76 S.E. 897,114 Va. 850 |
| Parties | POLGLAISE. v. COMMONWEALTH. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Const. § 65 (Code 1904, p. ccxxiv) provides that the General Assembly may confer upon county boards of supervisors such powers of local and special legislation as it may deem expedient, not inconsistent with constitutional limitations. Act approved March 12, 1904 (Laws 1904, c. 106 [Code 1904, § 944a]), as amended by act approved March 14, 1906 (Laws 1906. c. 212), and further amended by act approved March 15, 1910 (Laws 1910, c. 226) enacted pursuant to this constitutional provision, empowers boards of supervisors to make such directions as they may deem best for working, keeping in order, and repairing of the roads and bridges of the county. While election proceedings were pending, and before there had been a vote of the people authorizing the board to make any regulation, the board of supervisors of a county coming within the provisions of such statutes adopted a regulation merely to protect highways being constructed and repaired at great cost to the public from being cut up and damaged by hauling excessive loads over them, which regulation put certain limits on the width of tires, but did not attempt to regulate the width of tires on vehicles used on "improved" highways. Held, that such regulation was not violative of a further provision of the amendatory act of 1910 that the board of supervisors shall not fix the width of tires until the question shall have been submitted to the qualified voters.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Highways, Cent. Dig. §§ 4-57; Dec. Dig. § 166.*]
In the construction, maintenance, and care of public roads, the county boards of supervisors are a co-ordinate branch of the state government, as fully as are the common councils of the several cities and towns within the state; and the validity of the regulations of such boards is determined by the rules applicable to ordinances passed to protect municipal streets and highways.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Highways, Cent. Dig. §§ 4-57; Dec. Dig. § 166.*]
A regulation of a county board of supervisors as to the use of highways was not invalid as denying the persons to whom it applied the equal protection of the law, or as class legislation and unreasonable, because, in its application, it classified the haulers of lumber, ties, and wood in a class separate from other persons hauling over the road.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Constitutional Law Cent. Dig. §§ 649-677, 683; Dec. Dig. §§ 208, 235.*]
The equal protection clause of Const. U. S. Amend. 14 does not take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, provided the classification is made on a reasonable basis, though not with mathematical nicety.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 684, 705; Dec. Dig. § 212.*]
Appeal from Circuit Court, Spottsylvania County.
Benjamin Polglaise was convicted of vio lating the road law of Spottsylvania county, and he appeals. Affirmed.
A. T. Embrey and F. W. Coleman, both of Fredericksburg, for plaintiff in error.
The Attorney General and T. S. Coleman, of Spottsylvania, for the Commonwealth.
CARDWELL, J. Benjamin Polglaise was tried and convicted in a justice's court of a violation of the road law of Spottsylvania county, in that he "did haul with a narrow-tire wagon over the permanent roads of Spottsylvania county over six hundred feet of lumber, contrary to the resolution of the board of supervisors of Spottsylvania county, passed, pursuant to law, on the 21st day of February, 1912."
Ten warrants were issued against the accused for like offenses, all to be tried at the same time, but by agreement only one was tried, and like judgments were to be entered in the other nine cases. Upon his conviction in the case tried, the accused appealed to the circuit court, where he was tried before a jury, which found him guilty and fixed his punishment at a fine of $15, upon which verdict judgment was entered by the court, and to that judgment this writ of error was allowed.
At the trial in the circuit court plaintiff in error duly excepted to the introduction of certain evidence, which exception is made a part of the record by bill of exceptions, but by agreement in writing filed with the record he waives said exception and submits his case for decision by this court upon the single question whether the regulation for hauling over the permanent roads of the county, adopted by the board of supervisors, is a valid and legal regulation; in other words, "whether the order of the board of supervisors of said county, of February 21, 1912, Exhibit 4 with bill of exceptions No. 2, was a valid order."
It is admitted by plaintiff in error that he did haul lumber over the permanent roads of the county in violation of the regulation adopted by the board of supervisors, so that the concrete question to be determined by this court is whether or not, under any circumstances, the regulation of the board of supervisors complained of would be a proper exercise of the power delegated to them by the Constitution and laws of this state.
The record does not disclose the facts and circumstances existing at the time the regulation in question was made, nor the special reasons therefor which actuated the beard of supervisors in adopting it.
It is beyond question that the Legislature of the state has absolute power to make any reasonable provisions that it may deem necessary with reference to the public highways of the counties or cities and towns within the state, regulating the uses that may be made of them. Prior to the adoptionof the present Constitution, the control and regulation of the uses to be made of the public roads of the commonwealth in the several counties was vested in the county courts; but by section 65 of the present Constitution (Code 1904, p. ccxxiv) it is provided that "the General Assembly may, by general laws, confer upon the boards of supervisors of counties, and the councils of cities and towns, such powers of local and special legislation as it may from time to time deem expedient, not inconsistent with the limitations contained in this Constitution."
Pursuant to this provision of the Constitution, the Legislature, by an act approved March 12, 1904, entitled "An act to provide for the establishment, proper construction aud permanent improvement of the public roads and landings, for building and keeping in good order and repair of all public roads, bridges, causeways and wharves in the several counties of this state, and to repeal chapter 43 of the Code of Virginia" (Acts 1904, p. 191), delegated to the boards of supervisors of the several counties the power to establish, construct, and permanently improve the public roads, landings, etc., and to keep the same in good order and repair. The first section of said act is as follows: "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia, that the board of supervisors of their respective counties shall have the control, supervision, management and jurisdiction over all county roads, causeways and bridges, landings and wharves erected or repaired within the state." The act then proceeds to confer large powers of taxation and expenditure of the money so raised by the boards of supervisors, and in other matters of detail in which the several boards were to be called upon to act. Sections 1 and 13 of the act were thereafter amended; but we do not deem it necessary to make special reference to those amendments, or to set them out here.
By an act of the Legislature, approved March 14, 1906 (Acts 1906, p. 352), section 834h was added to chapter 36 of the Code of 1904, relating to boards of supervisors, which added section is as follows:
The statute was further amended by an act approved March 15, 1910 (Acts 1910, p. 339), by adding to the second paragraph of section 1 of the amendatory act just referred to these words: "And this power shall extend to and be exercised over turnpike roads, the control of which has been given to said boards of supervisors, and whether tolls be taken therefrom or not; provided the board of supervisors shall not enact a law fixing the width of tires to be used on vehicles until after the question shall have been submitted to the qualified voters of the county at a general or special election, and a majority of said voters shall have voted in favor of the proposed law fixing the width of tires."
There was no application of the original statute (act of March 12, 1904, supra), nor of the amendments of that statute which followed, to a county in the state having a special road law; and there being no special road law in force in the county of Spottsylvania the general power of the board of supervisors of that county in...
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Hopkins v. City Of Richmond
...no more reasonable, or less oppressive, ordinance could be devised than the one under consideration. "In Polglaise v. Commonwealth, 114 Va. 850, at page 860, 76 S. E. at page 900, a case in which the question of the reasonableness of a resolution of the board of supervisors of the county of......
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Anthony v. Commonwealth
...it, that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. (5th Ed.) § 146; Polglaise v. Commonwealth, 114 Va. 850, 865, 76 S. E. 897." The same or similar principles are laid down in Commonwealth v. United Cigarette Machine Co., 120 Va. 835, 92 S. E. 901; C......
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Anthony v. Commonwealth
...it, that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. (5th ed.), section 146; Polglaise Commonwealth, 114 Va. 850, 865, 76 S.E. 897." The same or similar principles are laid down in Commonwealth United Cigarette Machine Co., 120 Va. 835, 92 S.E. 901; Co......
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