Polk County v. Sofka
| Decision Date | 04 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 88407,88407 |
| Citation | 702 So.2d 1243 |
| Parties | 22 Fla. L. Weekly S529 POLK COUNTY, Petitioner, v. Donna M. SOFKA, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Wofford H. Stidham, Hank B. Campbell and Edwin A. Scales, III of Lane, Trohn, Clarke, Bertrand, Vreeland & Jacobsen, P.A., Bartow, for Petitioner.
John W. Frost, II, Neal L. O'Toole and Mark A. Sessums of Frost, O'Toole & Saunders, P.A., Bartow, for Respondent.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Louis F. Hubener, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Department of Insurance, Division of Risk Management, Amicus Curiae.
Susan H. Churuti, County Attorney and John E. Schaefer, Assistant County Attorney, Clearwater, for Pinellas County, Amicus Curiae.
Jorge L. Fernandez, President, Florida Association of County Attorneys, Inc., Sarasota, and Rosemary E. Perfit, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Hillsborough County, Tampa, for Florida Association of County Attorney's, Amicus Curiae.
Ronald K. McRae, Assistant County Attorney, West Palm Beach, for Palm Beach County, Amicus Curiae.
Roy D. Wasson and Barbara Green, P.A., Miami, for Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Amicus Curiae.
Steven F. Lengauer and Ernest H. Eubanks of Eubanks, Hilyard, Rumbley, Meier & Lengauer, P.A., Orlando, for Orange County, Amicus Curiae.
This case is before us on a question certified by the district court as one of great public importance. Polk County v. Sofka 675 So.2d 615 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). However, because we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, we do not address the certified question. Instead, we quash the decision of the district court, and remand with directions that the district court dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent, Donna M. Sofka, sued petitioner, Polk County, in tort, to recover for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. She alleged that the County had created a dangerous intersection, tantamount to a hidden trap of which she was unaware, but of which the County was (or should have been) aware, yet failed to warn. A jury trial resulted in a verdict for Sofka.
The County filed a motion requesting a new trial, which was granted. The parties subsequently executed a settlement agreement by which they agreed, among other things, that a final judgment would be entered in favor of Sofka, following which the County might seek appellate review of two issues:
The Trial Court's refusal to grant POLK COUNTY'S Motion to Dismiss, to enter summary judgment for POLK COUNTY, or to direct a verdict against SOFKA, by virtue of POLK COUNTY'S sovereign immunity, which POLK COUNTY asserts immunizes it from any liability for the accident....
The Trial Court's refusal to direct a verdict against SOFKA, by virtue of POLK COUNTY'S assertion that SOFKA failed to adduce sufficient evidence showing any alleged fault of POLK COUNTY was the proximate cause of the accident or any of SOFKA'S damages stemming therefrom.
The agreement provided, further, "that the intermediate appellate court has jurisdiction to hear POLK COUNTY'S appeal of the Stipulated Final Judgment"; that "[t]he record on appeal shall be the record as it exists at the time of the entry of the Stipulated Final Judgment"; and that, "if the intermediate appellate court, for any reason, determines there is no jurisdiction or standing, or if the appeal is not dispositive of the issue of POLK COUNTY'S liability for the accident, ... the Stipulated Final Judgment shall be void," and "the parties shall be entitled to again proceed to trial" pursuant to the order granting the County's motion for a new trial. The trial court entered the judgment contemplated by the agreement, incorporating by reference all of the terms of that agreement.
After oral argument in this Court, the parties were asked to brief the following question:
Whether the District Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear Polk County's appeal from rulings made before its motion for new trial had been granted because it had entered into a stipulated final judgment permitting it to seek such review, notwithstanding that the order granting the motion for new trial had not been vacated and that one is generally deemed to have waived the right to review of rulings made prior to, or during, a previous trial by moving for and receiving a new trial.
The parties responded with a joint brief in which they asserted that the district court had jurisdiction because (1) the stipulated final judgment incorporated the settlement agreement, which expressly provided "that the intermediate appellate court has jurisdiction over the appeal"; (2) the parties had agreed to waive any "procedural hurdles" to appellate review; (3) the stipulated final judgment "nullifies or makes the issue of the new trial moot"; and (4) a contrary conclusion "will result in a waste of judicial resources."
By their settlement agreement, the terms of which were incorporated into the judgment, the parties stipulated that "[t]he record on appeal shall be the record as it exists at the time of the entry of" the judgment. Prior to the entry of the...
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...in the lower tribunal may be challenged on appeal, even where the jurisdictional defect was not raised below. Polk Cty. v. Sofka, 702 So.2d 1243, 1245 (Fla.1997) (" ‘[C]ourts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authority and if want of jurisdiction appears at any stage of the pr......
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...lacked standing to pursue its claims against the attorney if it were inclined to follow the minority position. See Polk County v. Sofka, 702 So.2d 1243, 1245 (Fla.1997) (quoting West 132 Feet v. City of Orlando, 80 Fla. 233, 239, 86 So. 197, 198-99 (1920)) ("[C]ourts are bound to take notic......
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