Polk v. Dent
| Decision Date | 05 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 13 CV 9321,13 CV 9321 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | HIWANA POLK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SHEROD DENT, et al., Defendants. |
Hon. Marvin E. Aspen
Presently before us are two motions: Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider our decision on Defendants' motion to dismiss and vacate judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b), and Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. For the reasons stated below Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider is granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiffs' motion to further amend their complaint is denied.
We detailed the facts of this case in our order granting in part Defendants' motion to dismiss, Polk v. Dent, No. 13 C 9321, 2014 WL 4269081, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2014), and thus do not fully repeat them here. Briefly, Plaintiffs Hiwana Polk, Individually ("Polk") and as Administrator of the Estate of Bejian Booker, Deceased ("Booker"), and Cornel Dawson, Jr., by Parent Sherrice Rainey ("Dawson"), filed a ten-count complaint against Defendants, alleging violations of state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According to Plaintiffs' amended complaint, on the evening of December 31, 2011, a number of unidentified police officers stopped Polk's vehicle in traffic, forced Plaintiffs out of the car, and conducted an illegal search of the vehicleand their persons. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' first amended complaint in its entirety. We granted Defendants' motion with the exception of three state claims against Unknown Officers, which we remanded to state court.
The court's power to reconsider its judgments "should be exercised only in the rarest of circumstances and where there is a compelling reason . . ." Marmi E. Graniti D'Italia Sicilmarmi S .p.A. v. Universal Granite & Marble, 757 F. Supp. 2d 773, 782 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (citing Solis v. Current Dev. Corp., 557 F.3d 772, 780 (7th Cir. 2009)). A litigant may challenge the merits of the district court's decision through either Rule 59(a) or Rule 60(b). U.S. v. Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 300 (7th Cir. 1992). A motion under Rule 59(e) is "only appropriate where a court has misunderstood a party, where the court has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the court by the parties, where the court has made an error of apprehension (not of reasoning), where a significant change in the law has occurred, or where significant new facts have been discovered." Broaddus v. Shields, 665 F.3d 846, 860 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990). The motion for reconsideration should be granted if doing so would "enable 'the court to correct its own errors and thus avoid unnecessary appellate procedures.'" Divane v. Krull Elec. Co., 194 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Moro v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 1996)). Here, Plaintiff argues that we misapprehended the fact and law in this case. (Mot. at 2.) When a party seeks reconsideration based on a misapprehension of the case law, it must show a "wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent." Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000); Ammons v. Cook Co., Ill., No. 11 C 5010, 2012 WL 2368320, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2012).
Rule 60(b) is "considerably narrower" than Rule 59(e) and is limited to the six specific situations identified in the Rule. Maldonado v. Stinar, No. 8 C 1954, 2011 WL 2470124, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2011) (quoting United States v. Manville Sales Corp., No. 88 C 630, 2005 WL 526695, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2005)). Relief from judgment under Rule 60 is "an extraordinary remedy and is granted only in exceptional circumstances." Thurner v. C.I.R., 255 F. App'x 90, 92 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Harrington v. City of Chi., 433 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2006)).
We previously dismissed Plaintiffs' federal and state claims against Dent without prejudice because the complaint failed to assert that Dent was personally involved in the alleged misconduct. (Op. at 6.) To survive Defendants' motion to dismiss, each claim against Dent required an allegation of proximate cause. We previously explained that proximate cause necessitates "some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged," and "links that are too remote, purely contingent, or indirect" are insufficient. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1192 (2011) (citing Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9, 130 S. Ct. 983, 989 (2010)). After reviewing Plaintiffs' complaint and the additional facts asserted in their response, we held that the facts alleged were too remote and speculative to sufficiently claim Dent's personal involvement.
Plaintiffs dispute this ruling, arguing that the complaint alleged sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish a causal connection under Iqbal pleading standards. (Mot. at 3-4, 7-8; Reply at 3, 6-7.) Plaintiffs, however, already made this argument in response to Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Resp. to MTD at 8-10.) Motions to reconsider "do not provide an opportunity to litigate previously rejected arguments." Thomas v. Johnston, 215 F.3d 1330, 2000 WL 518100, at *3 (7th Cir. 2000) (unpublished); see Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996) (); Ammons v. Cook Cnty., Ill., No. 11 C 5010, 2012 WL 2368320, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2012) (). That Plaintiffs simply disagree with our holding is not a proper basis for reconsideration under Rules 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Moreover, we find that our previous ruling was correct. Therefore, we deny Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration on their claims against Dent.
We also previously dismissed all of Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against the Unknown Officers as time-barred. (Op. at 5.) Plaintiffs concede that Polk's claims against the Unknown Officers are time barred, but argue that the statute of limitations should have been tolled as to the minors' claims. (Mot. at 3.) We will first discuss Dawson's claims.
Plaintiffs are correct that, in Illinois, the statute of limitations is tolled for minors until two years after the person reaches of the age of eighteen. 735 ILCS 5/13-211; see Wallace v. City of Chi., 440 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2006); Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d 603, 607-08, 727 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ill. 2000). Although Dawson's exact age is unclear, Plaintiffs allege that he was a minor when the offending traffic stop occurred and when Plaintiffs filed their original complaint. (Resp. to Dent MTD at 2.) Thus, at the earliest, the statute of limitations on Dawson's § 1983 expires two years after the original complaint was filed in this action, which is December 31, 2015. Accordingly, we agree with Plaintiffs that it was error to dismiss Dawson's § 1983 claims against Unknown Officers as time-barred. See Minikon v. Escobedo, 324 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1077, 756 N.E.2d 302, 307 (1st Dist. 2001) ().
Although Defendants seem to concede that the § 1983 statute of limitations is tolled until Dawson reaches eighteen, they argue that the claims were nonetheless properly dismissed because Dawson failed to state a claim against the Unknown Defendants. (Resp. at 6-7.) We did not, however, make that holding in our original decision and decline to do so now.
In their motion to dismiss, Defendants asserted that all of Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), but their argument focused almost exclusively on Plaintiffs' claims against Dent. (Dent MTD at 7-9.) Defendants offered no analysis to explain how the complaint was deficient as to the claims against Unknown Officers.1 Now, Defendants contend that the claims against Unknown Officers were inadequately plead because they were brought against unknown persons. (Resp. at 6.) It is true that claims against unknown persons should be dismissed after the statute of limitations expires, but plaintiffs are free to name unknown persons as placeholders before that time. Hines v. City of Chi., 91 F. App'x 501, 502 (7th Cir. 2004); Hall v. City of Chi., No. 00 C 5490, 2003 WL 22232912, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2003); Copeland v. Nw. Mem'l Hosp., 964 F. Supp. 1225, 1232 (N.D. Ill. 1997); see Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1257 (7th Cir. 1993)). Since Dawson's claims are not yet time barred, he may continue to pursue his complaint against the Unknown Officers.
Turning to Booker, we must treat his claims differently because he is now deceased. Booker was a minor when the alleged traffic stop occurred, and would still be a minor today if he were living. Sadly, he died on August 12, 2013, before this action commenced. (Compl. ¶ 6.) Under the Illinois Survival Act, the administrator of a decedent's estate may bring a cause ofaction that survives the person's death either before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations for the claim, or one year after the decedent's death, whichever is later.2 735 ILCS 5/13-209. Plaintiffs argue that because the statute of limitations on Booker's claims would have been tolled until he turned eighteen if he were alive, his...
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