Polk v. Edwards

Citation626 So.2d 1128
Decision Date20 August 1993
Docket NumberNo. 93-CA-0362,93-CA-0362
PartiesRev. Robert POLK, et al. v. Edwin W. EDWARDS, et al. H. Eustis REILY, et al. v. Edwin W. EDWARDS, Richard P. Ieyoub and The State of Louisiana.
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana

Douglas M. Schmidt, Peter R. Borstelo, for Polk.

Jack M. Alltmont, Julie A. Scheib, Michael A. Berenson, for Reily.

Richard Ieyoub, Atty. Gen., Melinda M. Tucker, E. Barton Conradi, Leon Gary, Jr., James M. Field, Davis B. Allgood, for Edwards.

Peter Butler, amicus curiae.

CALOGERO, Chief Justice. *

The Louisiana Legislature passed four statutes authorizing the licensing of gaming operations:

1) The Louisiana Economic Development & Gaming Corp. Act ("The Casino Act"), 1992 Acts 384, La.Rev.Stat.Ann. Secs. 4:601-686 and La.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 14:90(E) (West Supp.1993);

2) The Cruiseship Gaming Act, 1991 Acts 289, La.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 14:90(B) (West Supp.1993);

3) The Louisiana Riverboat Economic Development and Gaming Control Act ("The Riverboat Gaming Act"), 1991 Acts 753, La.Rev.Stat.Ann. Secs. 4:501-562 and La.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 14:90(D) (West Supp.1993), and;

4) The Video Draw Poker Devices Control Law ("The Video Poker Act"), 1991 Acts 1062, La.Rev.Stat.Ann. Secs. 33:4862.1-4862.19 (West Supp.1993).

Plaintiffs H. Eustis Reily et al. filed suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans seeking a declaratory judgment that the Casino Act was unconstitutional on various grounds. Subsequently, plaintiffs Rev. Robert Polk et al. filed their lawsuit in the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge seeking a declaratory judgment that the Casino Act, the Cruiseship Gaming Act, the Riverboat Gaming Act, and the Video Poker Act were unconstitutional. The Reily lawsuit was transferred to the 19th Judicial District Court Parish of East Baton Rouge and consolidated for trial with the Polk lawsuit.

On December 4, 1992, the trial judge heard arguments in both cases on joint motions for judgment on the pleadings. On January 11, 1993, the court signed a judgment in both proceedings holding that all four of the statutes were constitutional except for that portion of the Casino Act which provided that the employees of the casino corporation would not be subject to state civil service. 1 This provision was held to be unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that this feature of the Casino Act which excepted the employees of the Casino Corporation from state civil service was severable, and the remainder of the Casino Act was thus constitutional and unaffected.

Defendants filed a suspensive appeal directly with this Court on that portion of the judgment which declared unconstitutional the provision regarding state civil service. 2 Plaintiffs took a devolutive appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeal from that portion of the judgment declaring the remainder of the Casino Act and the other three statutes constitutional.

Originally this Court denied a motion by all parties that the appeals pending in the court of appeal be heard and decided simultaneously with the state's direct appeal in this Court. On that occasion, we desisted from consolidating the appeals pending in the court of appeal with the appeal in this Court. We determined that the appeals in the court of appeal should run their course, and that the appeal by the state lodged in this Court should be held pending a consolidated hearing, when and if the forthcoming court of appeal decision were to be brought before this court on writs.

Subsequently, it became evident that the disposition of this case in the court of appeal would likely take substantial additional time. 3 Because of the importance of the matter to the state, its citizens, and the litigants, and upon receipt of another motion that the appeal in this Court be set and the issues in the case then pending in the court of appeal treated with the appeal here, and responding to the desires of all parties in the litigation, we brought up to this Court the appeals pending in the court of appeal, consolidated those appeals with the appeal pending in this Court, and set the cases specially for oral argument. For cases of significant public interest in which this court has taken similar action to expedite the conclusion of important litigation see Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So.2d 577 (La.1975); Seegers v. Parker, 256 La. 1039, 241 So.2d 313 (1970); State ex rel. Le Blanc v. Democratic State Central Committee, 229 La. 556, 86 So.2d 192 (1956).

With minor variations, the plaintiffs in each of the consolidated lawsuits present nine distinct issues for this Court's review:

1. Plaintiffs contend that three of the four statutes violate La. Const. art. III, Sec. 12(A)(10), in that the acts constitute local or special laws defining crimes. In connection with this argument, they also contend that La. Const. art. III, Sec. 12(B) is offended by the indirect enactment of a local or special law by the partial repeal of a general law.

2. Plaintiffs also contend that three of the four statutes violate La. Const. art. III, Sec. 12(A)(7) because the acts constitute local or special laws granting to a private corporation special or exclusive rights, privileges or immunities.

3. Plaintiffs assert that the four statutes violate the admonition contained in La. Const. art. XII, Sec. 6(B) that "[g]ambling shall be defined by and suppressed by the legislature."

4. Plaintiffs contend that the Casino Act constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the Executive Branch which is offensive to La. Const. art. II, Sec. 1, a provision which divides state government into 3 separate branches; and to La. Const. art. II, Sec. 2, which prohibits one branch from exercising the power granted to another; and to La. Const. art. IV, Sec. 1 which lists the components of the executive branch.

5. Plaintiffs complain that the statutes constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power under La. Const. art. XII, Sec. 6(B), the provision which gives to the legislature alone the duty to define gambling.

6. Plaintiffs allege that the four statutes violate La. Const. art. VI, Sec. 4 by abrogating taxing powers granted to the city of New Orleans under its home rule charter.

7. Plaintiffs contend that the four statutes violate La. Const. art. VI, Sec. 17 by interfering with the authority of the city of New Orleans to regulate land use, zoning and historic preservation.

8. Plaintiffs charge that the Casino Act violates La. Const. art. VI, Sec. 14(A) by increasing the financial burden on the city of New Orleans without appropriating funds to meet the burden or authorizing the city to raise additional revenue.

9. Plaintiffs also take the position that the district court was correct in finding unconstitutional the provision of the Casino Act which required that employees of the Casino Corporation be non-civil servants but that the district court was incorrect in finding this unconstitutional provision severable. They would have us declare the Casino statute fully unconstitutional because of the unconstitutional feature regarding civil service.

For the reasons which follow, we find the judgment of the district court correct in all particulars. All four statutes are constitutional with one exception. The provision requiring employees of the Casino Corporation to be outside of civil service is indeed unconstitutional, as the district court found. And, because that provision is severable, the remainder of the casino statute is unaffected.

An elementary principle of statutory construction in constitutional law holds that all statutory enactments are presumed to be constitutional. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Guilbeau, 217 La. 160, 46 So.2d 113 (1950); State on behalf of J.A.V., 558 So.2d 214 (La.1990). Unless the fundamental rights or privileges and immunities of a person are involved, a strong presumption exists that the legislature in adopting legislation has acted within its constitutional authority. Board of Directors of Louisiana Recovery Dist. v. All Taxpayers, Property Owners, etc., 529 So.2d 384 (La.1988). This presumption is especially forceful in the case of statutes enacted to promote a public purpose, such as statutes relating to public finance. Id. at 387; See United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 369-70, 59 S.Ct. 551, 555, 83 L.Ed. 763, 768, mot. den., 306 U.S. 620, 59 S.Ct. 640, 83 L.Ed. 1026 (1939) ("the presumption that an Act of Congress is valid applies with added force and weight to a levy of public revenue").

The Louisiana Legislature, elected by the state's citizenry, may enact any legislation that the state constitution does not explicitly prohibit. Thus, in order to hold legislation invalid under the constitution, it is necessary to rely on some particular constitutional provision that limits the power of the legislature. In re American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 588 So.2d 367 (La.1991); Louisiana Recovery District, 529 So.2d 384.

This structure is unlike the federal union of the states and the federal constitution whose provisions are grants of powers. 4 The powers of the United States Congress are specifically delineated in the United States Constitution. Conversely, the Louisiana Legislature, as with the legislatures of the other states of the Union, has all powers which have not been denied it by the state constitution. In re American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 588 So.2d 367 (La.1991); Swift v. State, 342 So.2d 191, 194 (La.1977). The legislature's powers are derived from the citizens of the state who freely elect their legislative representatives. Alternatively stated, the provisions of the Louisiana Constitution serve as limitations on the otherwise plenary power exercised by the legislature, which may enact any legislation not prohibited by the Constitution. State Bond Comm'n of the State of Louisiana v. All Taxpayers, Property Owners & Citizens, 525 So.2d 521 (La.1988). The party challenging the...

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