Polk v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.
| Decision Date | 31 May 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-2076,87-2076 |
| Citation | 876 F.2d 527 |
| Parties | 49 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1708, 50 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,079, 28 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 462 Sonsearaharay POLK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
F.R. Damn, Damn & Smith, P.C., Michael J. Tauscher, Detroit, Mich., Ronald E. Sandhaus, argued, Overland Park, Kan., for defendant-appellant.
Michael Pitt, argued, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before MERRITT and BOGGS, Circuit Judges, and CONTIE, Senior Circuit Judge.
Defendant Yellow Freight System, Inc. (YFS) appeals the denial of its motion for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict for the plaintiff in this action for unlawful discharge. This is the second appeal in this case. For the reasons set forth, we affirm the judgment below.
Sonsearaharay Polk ("Polk" or "Plaintiff") is a black female who was employed continually at YFS from June 28, 1972, until May 10, 1979. On October 2, 1978, Sheila Evans, a white female, was promoted to the post of office manager. In this position, Ms. Evans had direct supervisory control over plaintiff. Many of the office workers were apparently unhappy with the selection of Ms. Evans for this position and there was much tension at the office at this time. Shortly after Evans's promotion, Evans filed a report in plaintiff's personnel file claiming that she refused to follow instructions.
Evans reprimanded the plaintiff on May 3, 1979, for selling raffle tickets at the office, and again filed a report in the plaintiff's personnel file. On May 4, 1979, plaintiff was disciplined by Ivan Waterbury, the terminal manager, for discussing internal company business with a customer. Apparently, Polk had begun crying over the phone when speaking with Henry Johnson, a representative of Vispak, a client of YFS.
On May 8, 1979, plaintiff visited the Michigan Department of Civil Rights (MDCR) to inquire about possible rights violations. The next day, plaintiff requested access to her personnel file in accordance with the Bullard-Plawecki Employee Right to Know Act, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. Sec. 423.501 et seq. During that same day, Sheila Evans allegedly informed plaintiff that she "knew where [Polk] had been."
On May 10, 1979, Evans, apparently suspicious of whether plaintiff was working on company business, asked plaintiff what she was typing. Plaintiff became agitated and refused to show Evans the paper. An argument ensued, and Waterbury came over to investigate. He then asked to see the paper and plaintiff refused to show it to him. He informed plaintiff that she was suspended and that he was going to recommend that she be discharged for insubordination. YFS's Employee Review Committee then reviewed the matter and approved plaintiff's discharge, effective May 19, 1979. Plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint with the MDCR alleging discharge on the basis of racial discrimination.
Plaintiff also filed for unemployment benefits with the Michigan Employment Security Commission (MESC). On June 18, 1979, the MESC disqualified her for full unemployment benefits on the ground that her discharge was for "misconduct." This ruling was upheld in a redetermination on July 30, 1979. Plaintiff appealed, and a full evidentiary hearing was held on September 4, 1979. The referee issued findings and an order rejecting plaintiff's claim on January 4, 1980, finding that plaintiff's discharge was caused by her own misconduct in refusing instructions from Evans and Waterbury. The Employment Security Board of Review affirmed this decision on April 15, 1981.
Plaintiff instituted the present action in Wayne County Circuit Court on December 14, 1981, and the action was removed by YFS to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiff's complaint alleged wrongful discharge generally and pursued five different theories specifically: 1) unlawful discharge because of plaintiff's race, 2) unlawful discharge in retaliation for pursuing rights under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act 3) unlawful discharge in retaliation for her request to review her personnel file, 4) discharge without just cause in violation of her contractual rights, and 5) extreme emotional distress due to the outrageous conduct of YFS concerning the incident.
The first trial lasted from November 15, 1983 until November 23, 1983. A special verdict form was submitted to the jury to allow them to decide on each of plaintiff's claims if necessary. The jury found in favor of plaintiff on each of her separate claims with the exception of race discrimination. The jury then awarded damages of $121,300 in lost earnings and benefits, $25,000 in non-economic compensatory damages for actions occurring before plaintiff's discharge, and $50,000 in non-economic compensatory damages for actions occurring after plaintiff's discharge.
After trial, the plaintiff requested reinstatement, attorney fees, and "front pay" (an amount of money to compensate for the time before plaintiff can be rehired). On August 2, 1984, the court awarded plaintiff reinstatement, front pay of $3,000 and attorney fees of $14,250. YFS filed an emergency motion before this court in order to stay the reinstatement order. This motion was denied by order dated September 28, 1984. Plaintiff was thus reinstated in September 1984, and is now working at YFS in the same department as before her discharge. YFS then appealed the decision to this court. Plaintiff did not cross-appeal on her racial discrimination claim.
On September 11, 1986, this court reversed the district court's failure to grant a judgment NOV with respect to plaintiff's claims of severe emotional distress, unlawful discharge in retaliation for her request to see her personnel file, and discharge without just cause. This court then remanded to the district court for a new trial regarding plaintiff's claims of retaliation for her discussion with the MDCR. See Polk v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 801 F.2d 190 (6th Cir.1986) (Polk I). Specifically, this court directed the district court to provide instructions on retaliatory firing such that retaliation could be found if the protected activity was a "significant factor" in the decision to fire, but not if there was only a "causal link" between the two.
On remand, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on her claim that she was discharged in retaliation for her visit to the MDCR. The jury found damages in the nature of lost wages and benefits in the amount of $136,000 and awarded compensation for non-economic losses, in the amount of $50,000. Immediately after the jury returned its verdict, YFS moved for a judgment NOV. This motion was denied and judgment for plaintiff was entered on October 9, 1987.
YFS subsequently filed this appeal, claiming that the district court should have entered judgment NOV, that the district court allowed prejudicial and irrelevant evidence to go before the jury, and that the district court wrongly instructed the jury regarding plaintiff's non-economic damages.
I
YFS claims that the district court should have granted a judgment NOV because of its claim that no set of facts presented at trial could support the theory that Polk's dismissal was in retaliation for visiting the MDCR.
Under Michigan law, a court is to grant a judgment NOV if the non-moving party offered no evidence under which a reasonable person could find in that party's favor. Perry v. Hazel Park Harness, 123 Mich.App. 542, 332 N.W.2d 601, 604 (1983); Chappell v. G.T.E. Products Corp., 803 F.2d 261, 265 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919, 107 S.Ct. 1375, 94 L.Ed.2d 690 (1987). A court should be particularly careful if the case is a discrimination case where the jury might be motivated by sympathy for the alleged victim rather than the facts of the case. Ibid. Under Michigan law, in a case of retaliatory firing, as in other protected activity or category cases, a Burdine-type analysis applies. Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 826 F.2d 452, 456 (6th Cir.1987). See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).
Under Burdine, the plaintiff has the initial burden of presenting a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge which the employer can rebut by a showing that there were valid reasons for the discharge. At this point, in order to defeat the employer's proferred reason, the plaintiff must show that it was pretextual. Taylor, 826 F.2d at 456. However, the ultimate burden of proof rests with the plaintiff at all times. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-94.
YFS first argues that Polk did not make out a prima facie claim of retaliatory discharge. In Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 500 (6th Cir.1987), a case decided using the Burdine analysis, this circuit determined that in order to make out a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, the plaintiff had to prove that 1) plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, 2) that this was known by the defendant, 3) that the defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff, and 4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
In the present case, YFS contends that plaintiff has made no showing that YFS knew of her visit to the MDCR. However, plaintiff presented evidence that Sheila Evans knew that she had gone to the MDCR because of her comment to plaintiff that "I know where you've been." A reasonable jury could also infer from the timing of plaintiff's discharge, one day after her visit to the MDCR, that there was a causal connection between the two. Therefore, a reasonable person could have found that plaintiff made out her prima facie case of retaliatory discharge.
YFS then contends that even if the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, she was not...
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