Pollard v. Com., 790629
| Decision Date | 11 January 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 790629,790629 |
| Citation | 220 Va. 723,261 S.E.2d 328 |
| Parties | John Wesley POLLARD v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. Record |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Andrew W. Wood, Richmond (White & Wood, P. C., Richmond, on brief), for appellant.
Jim L. Chin, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Marshall Coleman, Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.
Before CARRICO, HARRISON, COCHRAN, HARMAN, POFF and COMPTON, JJ.
Indicted for larceny of an air hammer, defendant John Wesley Pollard was convicted in a bench trial of receiving stolen property. The sole issue we decide is whether the Commonwealth proved that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court below.
The evidence showed that on May 19, 1978, defendant was under surveillance by several Virginia State Police officers in connection with an investigation into the suspected theft of air hammers, or paving breakers, belonging to the City of Richmond. The investigators watched defendant, then employed by the City's Department of Public Works as a Landfill Supervisor, leave his home in Henrico County driving a pickup truck and proceed to an equipment rental store in Charlottesville. After defendant had "backed (the vehicle) up to the door at the rental place," Investigator L. W. Burchett observed "light tools, air hammers, chains, water coolers and this type of thing laying on the back of the truck." Burchett then interviewed defendant who denied he was carrying stolen property.
In the course of the initial interview, defendant denied having previously sold similar items to the particular rental store. Later, when confronted with information obtained by the police from the store manager, defendant admitted selling similar equipment there on prior occasions. Defendant told Burchett that he had acquired some of the items by picking them "up off the (City of Richmond) dump" and by purchasing other items from drivers of City trash trucks. Testimony showed that defendant had stated in the past to the store manager that the air hammers he was selling "came from . . . bankruptcy sale(s) and going out of business sales."
On that day, May 19, Burchett seized numerous items from the store, which the manager identified as articles sold him by defendant. The officer also seized the items in defendant's truck. The air hammer specified in the instant August 1978 indictment was among the former group.
Other evidence offered by the Commonwealth defendant presented none showed that the air hammer in issue had been assigned, on some date not fixed by the evidence, to a City truck driven by one W. R. Baldwin. The City employee generally "responsible for" the custody of such equipment testified that the hammer had never been assigned to defendant. Baldwin did not testify. The custodian stated that he discovered during the period between December of 1977 and January of 1978 that the air hammer was not on Baldwin's truck. The custodian testified he looked "everywhere," but the piece of equipment could not be found. He further stated he had not seen the hammer since at least April of 1977.
Defendant contends the Commonwealth failed to prove the offense occurred within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Division I, citing Code § 17-116.1(b). The Attorney General, admitting that "the record is sparse" on proof of venue, says "it is arguable that the defendant did receive the stolen property within the City limits." Stating that this court has never specifically ruled on the issue of where the crime of receiving stolen property occurs, the Commonwealth asserts the general rule elsewhere is that venue for such crime is where the property was received. The Attorney General points to the evidence that the property belonged to the City of Richmond, the item was assigned to a City truck, the defendant was an employee of the City, and the defendant admitted obtaining the property from the City...
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