Polmatier v. Russ

• Decision Date: 09 February 1988
• Docket Number: No. 12926,12926
• Citation: 537 A.2d 468,206 Conn. 229
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Dorothy B. POLMATIER, Executrix (Estate of Arthur R. Polmatier) v. Norman RUSS.

Page 468

537 A.2d 468

206 Conn. 229

Dorothy B. POLMATIER, Executrix (Estate of Arthur R. Polmatier) v.Norman RUSS.

No. 12926.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 2, 1987.

Decided Feb. 9, 1988.

Marcia A. Winn, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, were Cindy A. O'Connor, Cheryl Sladicki and Robin A. Forshaw, Legal Interns, for appellant(defendant).

Thomas P. Heslin, with whom, on the brief, were Richard P. Lawlor and Thomas J. Egan, Hartford, for appellee(plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, CALLAHAN, GLASS and HULL, JJ.

GLASS, Associate Justice.

The principal issue on this appeal is whether an insane person is liable for an intentional tort.The plaintiff, Dorothy Polmatier, executrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Arthur R. Polmatier, brought this action against the defendant, Norman Russ, seeking to recover damages for wrongful death.The state trial referee, exercising the power of the Superior Court, rendered judgment for the plaintiff.The defendant has appealed from that judgment.We find no error.

The trial court's memorandum of decision and the record reveal the following undisputed facts.On the afternoon of November 20, 1976, the defendant and his two month old daughter visited the home of Arthur Polmatier, his father-in-law.Polmatier lived in East Windsor with his wife, Dorothy, the plaintiff, and their eleven year old son, Robert.During the early evening Robert noticed a disturbance in the living room where he saw the defendant astride Polmatier on a couch beating him on the head with a beer bottle.Robert heard Polmatier exclaim, "Norm, you're killing me!" and ran to get help.Thereafter, the defendant went into Polmatier's bedroom where he took a box of 30-30 caliber ammunition from the bottom drawer of a dresser and went to his brother-in-laws's bedroom where he took a 30-30 caliber Winchester rifle from the closet.He then returned to the living room and shot Polmatier twice, causing his death.

About five hours later, the defendant was found sitting on a stump in a wooded area approximately one half mile from the Polmatier home.The defendant was naked and his daughter was in his arms wrapped in his clothes, and was crying.Blood was found on his clothes, and he had with him the Winchester rifle, later determined to be the murder weapon.

The defendant was taken to a local hospital and was later transferred to Norwich Hospital.While in custody he was confined in Norwich Hospital or the Whiting Forensic Institute.The defendant was charged with the crime of murder pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-54a(a), ¹ but was found not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-13.²Dr. Walter Borden, a psychiatrist, testified at both the criminal and this civil proceeding regarding the defendant's sanity.In the present civil case Borden testified that, at the time of the homicide, the defendant was suffering from a severe case of paranoid schizophrenia that involved delusions of persecution, grandeur, influence and reference, and also involved auditory hallucinations.He concluded that the defendant was legally insane and could not form a rational choice but that he could make a schizophrenic or crazy choice.He was not in a fugue state.The trial court found that at the time of the homicide the defendant was insane.

The substitute complaint for the wrongful death of Polmatier alleged in the first count that the death resulted from an assault, beating and shooting by the defendant, and included a second count for exemplary damages and a third count based on negligence.The defendant filed a substitute answer denying all material allegations of the plaintiff's substitute complaint and asserted three special defenses: (1) as to all counts, the defendant was non compos mentis at the time of the alleged assault and, therefore, not capable of forming the intent necessary for tort liability; (2) the third count was barred by General Statutes § 52-584, the statute of limitations; and (3) as to all counts, the plaintiff or the plaintiff's decedent was comparatively or contributorily negligent.The trial court determined that the first and second special defenses were inapplicable to this case and that the third special defense had not been proven.

After a trial to the court, the court found for the plaintiff on the first count and awarded compensatory damages.³On appeal the defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to apply the following two-pronged analysis to his claim: first, whether the defendant intended the act which produced the injury; and second, whether he intended the resulting injury.We find no error.

I

Connecticut has never directly addressed the issue of whether an insane person is civilly liable for an intentional tort.⁴The majority of jurisdictions that have considered this issue have held insane persons liable for their intentional torts.See4 Restatement (Second), Torts§ 895J.This rule is reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 283B, which provides: "Unless the actor is a child, his insanity or other mental deficiency does not relieve the actor from liability for conduct which does not conform to the standard of a reasonable man under like circumstances."⁵The majority rule has been applied to cases involving intentional homicide.SeeAetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Porter, 181 F.Supp. 81(D.D.C.1960);Parke v. Dennard, 218 Ala. 209, 118 So. 396(1928);McIntyre v. Sholty, 121 Ill. 660, 13 N.E. 239(1887);Vosnos v. Perry, 43 Ill.App.3d 834, 2 Ill.Dec. 447, 357 N.E.2d 614(1976);Seals v. Snow, 123 Kan. 88, 254 P. 348(1927);Bolen v. Howard, 452 S.W.2d 401(Ky.1970);Jewell v. Colby, 66 N.H. 399, 24 A. 902(1890);Shapiro v. Tchernowitz, 3 Misc.2d 617, 155 N.Y.S.2d 1011(1956);Ballinger v. Rader, 153 N.C. 488, 69 S.E. 497(1910);Ross v. York, 233 S.W.2d 347(Tex.Civ.App.1950).

Commentators trace the majority rule back to the dictum of a seventeenth century English case.⁶The majority rule is not, however, without criticism.For example, Professor Bohlen has stated: "[W]here a liability, like that for the impairment of the physical condition of another's body or property, is imposed upon persons capable of fault only if they have been guilty of fault, immaturity of age or mental deficiency, which destroys the capacity for fault, should preclude the possibility of liability....But so long as it is accepted as a general principle that liability for injuries to certain interests are to be imposed only upon those guilty of fault in causing them, it should be applied consistently and no liability should be imposed upon those for any reason incapable of fault."F. Bohlen, "Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons,"23 Mich.L.Rev. 9, 31-32(1924-25).For a similar view, see R.Ague, "The Liability of Insane Persons in Tort Actions,"60 Dick.L.Rev. 211(1956).Nonetheless, we are persuaded by the proponents of the majority rule, especially when the cases in which it has been applied are examined.

A leading case is Seals v. Snow, 123 Kan. 88, 254 P. 348(1927).In Seals, the widow of Arthur Seals brought a civil action against Martin Snow to recover damages for the death of her husband.Several interrogatories were submitted to the jury, including: "Was Martin Snow insane when he shot Arthur Seals?A.Yes.If you answer the last question in the affirmative, was Martin Snow at the time he shot Arthur Seals able to distinguish right from wrong?A.No."Id., at 89, 254 P. 348.The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.In upholding the ensuing judgment, the Kansas Supreme Court stated: "The defendant challenges the doctrine generally sustained by the courts that an insane person is liable to make compensation for his torts.It is conceded that the great weight of authority is that an insane person is civilly liable for his torts.This liability has been based on a number of grounds, one that where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss, it should be borne by the one who occasioned it.Another, that public policy requires the enforcement of such liability in order that relatives of the insane person shall be led to restrain him and that tort-feasors shall not simulate or pretend insanity to defend their wrongful acts causing damage to others, and that if he was not liable there would be no redress for injuries, and we might have the anomaly of an insane person having abundant wealth depriving another of his rights without compensation."Id., 90, 254 P. 348.

Like Seals, another homicide case applying the majority rule is McIntyre v. Sholty, 121 Ill. 660, 13 N.E. 239(1887), where recovery was allowed against an insane person's estate for the wrongful killing of the plaintiff's wife.The court reasoned: "There is, to be sure, an appearance of hardship in compelling one to respond for that which he is unable to avoid for want of the control of reason.But the question of liability in these cases is one of public policy.If an insane person is not held liable for his torts, those interested in his estate, as relatives or otherwise, might not have a sufficient motive to so take care of him as to deprive him of opportunities for inflicting injuries upon others.There is more injustice in denying to the injured party the recovery of damages for the wrong suffered by him, than there is in calling upon the relatives or friends of the lunatic to pay the expense of his confinement, if he has an estate ample enough for that purpose.The liability of lunatics for their torts tends to secure a more efficient custody and guardianship of their persons.Again, if parties can escape the consequences of their injurious acts upon the plea of lunacy, there will be a strong temptation to simulate insanity with a view of masking the malice and revenge of an evil heart."Id., at 664-65, 13 N.E. 239.

Our adoption of the majority rule holding insane persons civilly liable, in appropriate...