Polyckronos v. Polyckronos

• Decision Date: 11 September 1939
• Citation: 8 A.2d 265,17 N.J.Misc. 250
• Parties: POLYCKRONOS v. POLYCKRONOS.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

8 A.2d 265

17 N.J.Misc. 250

POLYCKRONOS

v. POLYCKRONOS.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Sept. 11, 1939.

[Copyrighted material omitted.]

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A contract valid elsewhere will not be enforced if it is inconsistent with the public policy of the jurisdiction the aid of whose tribunals is invoked for the purpose of giving it effect.

2. The laws of other governments have no force beyond their territorial limits, and if permitted to operate in other states it is upon a principle of comity, and only when neither the state nor its citizens would suffer inconvenience from the application of the foreign law.

3. No state is bound to give effect to the law of a foreign state when, to do so, will prejudice the rights of its citizens or the interests of the state; that, on the contrary, each state is bound to give its citizens the full benefit of ail the remedies and securities provided by its laws.

4. Whatever may be our opinion of the policy of legislation beyond our state, we are bound by the principles of comity to recognize its validity unless it clearly contravenes the principles of public morality or attacks the interest of the body of the citizens of our state.

5. Courts recognize the laws of other states pertaining to contracts and give them force and effect upon the principles of comity. But whatever force and obligation the laws of one state have upon another depends upon the laws and regulations of the latter; upon its own jurisprudence or policy, or upon its own express or tacit consent.

6. It belongs exclusively to each sovereignty to determine for itself whether it can enforce a foreign law without at the same time neglecting the duty it owes to its own citizens or subjects.

7. It is upon the principle of the voluntary act of comity that contracts valid where made, but invalid in the state of the forum, will be enforced in the latter state if not contrary to the established policy of that state.

S. Comity is not a rule of law but one of practice, convenience and expediency; it does not command, it persuades.

9. If a foreign-made contract violates the established policy of this state, comity will not persuade its enforcement although the contract may be valid according to the laws of the state wherein it was made.

10. The legislature of this state, by vesting in its Court of Chancery sole jurisdiction over the subject of divorce and nullity of marriage, alimony and maintenance, has declared what our policy in this regard shall be.

11. All agreements, wherever made, entered into directly between husbands and wives, and whether before or after the marriage is dissolved, which attempt to fix support and maintenance, are void per se because contrary to the public policy of this state as declared by what is commonly known as our Divorce Act, being 1 Rev.St. (1937) 2:50-1, et seq., N.J.S.A. 2:50-1 et seq., and formerly 2 Comp.St.1910, p. 2021.

12. An essential factor to be considered in determining the legal effect to be given to settlement agreements between husband and wife is that the marriage relation is a status governed by a declared state policy, and hence the state, for the conduct of the public welfare, is largely concerned in carrying out its legislative policy.

13. The obligation to support and maintain a wife does not arise out of any contract between husband and wife to that end, but out of a state policy recognized and enforced by the civil and criminal law.

14. A husband and wife cannot contract to disregard their marital obligations.

15. Inasmuch as our Divorce Act, 1 Rev. St. (1937) 2:50-1, et seq., N.J.S.A. 2:50-1 et seq., gives to Chancery jurisdiction to award alimony and from time to time to increase and diminish it, any contract between husband and wife attempting to fix alimony is contrary to the policy of the statute and therefore void.

16. Considering the fundamental principle that the matrimonial status is a matter of concern not merely to the two spouses but equally so to the state, the legislature has laid down, by statutory provisions, a definite pronouncement of the public policy of this state.

17. The purpose of our Divorce Act is to require the husband to pay to the wife, periodically, such sum as, in view of his circumstances and the necessities of the wife, will be a reasonable fulfillment of his continuing duty to support her.

18. What the court cannot admeasure as a finality the husband cannot limit by the purchase of immunity (separation agreement) from future liability should conditions arise in which justice impels a reassertion of the rights of the wife.

19. It is one thing for a wife to express her willingness to accept a certain sum in lieu of alimony and quite another for the court to ascertain and adjudge that the sum is suitable and adequate for her support.

20. An agreement between husband and wife serves merely to liquidate or admeasure the quantum of that obligation under the circumstances prevailing at the time it was made; it serves somewhat in the nature of a yardstick for the court's guidance in determining, inter alia, what the husband's faculties were at the time the agreement was entered into.

21. A support agreement between husband and wife is not a bar to her right to alimony because if she is the innocent party she may disaffirm the agreement and sue for separate maintenance.

22. The practice of entering separate maintenance decrees upon consent is well established, and there can be no valid objection to the husband's waiver of defenses in such a case.

23. The sole purpose of a consent decree for separate maintenance is to liquidate into a judicial order the husband's common law obligation to support his wife.

24. The legislature having prescribed a particular mode to be pursued in determining an abandoned wife's maintenance and a divorced wife's alimony necessarily excludes the right to resort to any other or different method.

25. Payment of a gross sum, which the wife has agreed to accept in discharge of her future claims to support, cannot be regarded as standing upon a different plane from agreements contemplating periodical installments.

26. In determining what permanent alimony a wife may be entitled to, consideration must be had for whatever portion of a settlement in gross she has not expended for her own support, such unexpended balance to be given consideration by way of offset or refund, as the circumstances may warrant.

Suit in equity for divorce by Demitros Polyckronos against Helen B. Polyckronos, who filed a counterclaim. On counterclaimant's petition to show cause why complainant should not pay petitioner permanent alimony irrespective of a lump sum payment to her under an agreement executed by the parties in New York while both were residents and living apart therein.

Petition granted.

James H. White, of Hackensack, for petitioner.

Skeffington & Walker and William J. Weliky, all of Newark, for defendant.

N. DEMAREST CAMPBELL, Advisory Master.

Demitros Polyckronos sued his wife in this court for desertion. She counterclaimed for adultery and a decree nisi was advised in her favor. This decree also provides for further appearance of the parties for the purpose of determining whether or not Mrs. Polyckronos is entitled to alimony and, if so, in what amount.

Mr. Polyckronos resists this application on the ground that he and his wife entered into a written agreement September 11, 1930, while both were residents of the state of New York, under which he paid her $3,000 in lump sum; he maintains that the agreement is valid in New York and that, consequently, this court is bound to recognize it as such because of the principle of comity. While Mrs. Polyckronos admits that the agreement is valid in New York she insists, though, that it is of no binding effect here because it is contrary to and in conflict with the declared public policy of this state and therefore the principle of comity cannot be applied. The agreement states, inter alia, that these parties were living separate at the time of its execution and that the wife "does hereby release and discharge the party of the first part of and from any and all claims both past, present and future, of every kind, nature and description, for maintenance and support, or of any other claim by way of alimony or otherwise * * *" Both parties subsequently removed to and took up their separate residences in this state.

The agreement was valid and binding upon these parties in New York and the obligation of Mr. Polyckronos to further contribute to his wife's maintenance and support, for so long as he remained resident there, was, accordingly, extinguished. Court of Appeals in Winter v. Winter, 191 N.Y. 462, 84 N.E. 382, 16 L.R.A., N.S., 710. But when, however, Mr. Polyckronos became a resident of this state his status changed; he automatically became amenable to our laws Not only that but he sought the benefit of the laws of our forum in an action to divorce his wife and with the undoubted anticipation that in the event of her counterclaiming and being awarded a decree he would, in reliance upon his foreign-made agreement, escape a possible alimony order.

A contract is construed according to the law of the place where made but the method of enforcement must be in accordance with the lex fori which, in the instant case, is the law of New Jersey. Dennison v. Dennison, 98 N.J.Eq. 230, 130 A. 463, affirmed by 99 N.J.Eq. 883, 133 A. 919; Scudder v. Union National Bank of Chicago, 91 U.S. 406, 23 L.Ed. 245.

In Thompson v. Taylor, 66 N.J.L. 253, 49 A. 544, 54 L.R.A. 585, 88 Am.St.Rep. 485, the Court of Errors and Appeals ruled that a contract valid elsewhere will not be enforced if it is inconsistent with the public policy of the jurisdiction the aid of whose tribunals is invoked for the purpose of giving it effect; that when the legislature has declared the policy of the state in relation to a given subject-matter, it is the duty of the courts to give...