Pompey v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 27 August 1971
• Docket Number: No. 21,A,21
• Citation: 189 N.W.2d 243,385 Mich. 537
• Parties: , 3 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 913, 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8326, 66 Lab.Cas. P 52,621 Jesse James POMPEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Defendant and Appellee. pril Term.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 243

189 N.W.2d 243

385 Mich. 537, 3 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 913,

3 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8326, 66 Lab.Cas. P 52,621

Jesse James POMPEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Defendant

and Appellee.

No. 21, April Term.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Aug. 27, 1971.

C. Robert Beltz, Flint, for plaintiff-appellant

Eugene L. Hartwig, Detroit, for defendant-appellee; Ross L. Malone, Gen. Counsel, General Motors Corporation, Harry S. Benjamin, Jr., Edmond J. Dilworth, Jr., Detroit, of counsel.

Before the Entire Bench.

BRENNAN, Justice.

THE CASE

Plaintiff commenced this action on November 17, 1965, against General Motors Corporation and UAW-CIO, Local 1292. The complaint alleged four separate causes of action in four counts. Counts I and III were directed against General Motors and sought $20,000 in damages from defendant corporation on each count; Counts II and IV were directed against UAW-CIO, and sought $20,000 in damages from defendant labor union on each count. Counts II and IV were disposed of by the circuit court's order of December 21, 1967, dismissing plaintiff's suit as to defendant UAW-CIO, Local 1292, and the intervenor-defendant, International Union, UAW. ¹

In Count I of the complaint, plaintiff alleges that on or about May 27, 1964, when he was employed as a crane operator at a General Motors Plant, he accidentally dropped a die and thereafter General Motors 'unjustly and prejudicially suspended the Plaintiff from his employment and demoted him to the lesser paying classification of crane hooker in which capacity he is currently employed.' Count I further alleges that,

'6. The Plaintiff is a member of the Negro race.

'7. That just prior to and shortly after the above described suspension and demotion, a number of employees of the Defendant corporation employed at the same plant and in the same capacity as crane operators were disciplined and suspended because of the severe infractions of company rules and unsafe work habits. Several had been charged with unsafe work habits before and at least one was charged with operating a crane while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. None of these individuals, all members of the Caucasian race, were demoted because of the infractions.

'8. The Plaintiff herein had received no previous reprimands or discipline while working as a crane operator.

'9. The Defendant herein, General Motors Corporation owed a duty to the Plaintiff to refrain from, because of race, discriminating against him with respect to tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, pursuant to M.S.A. 17.458(3)(a).

'10. That the Michigan Constitution Article I, Section 2, prohibits the denial to any person of the enjoyment of his civil rights because of race. The Defendant, General Motors Corporation, was under a duty to refrain from denying the civil rights of the plaintiff herein, which includes equal opportunity and treatment in the field of employment.

'11. But the Defendant, General Motors Corporation, did breach the duties owed the Plaintiff under Michigan Fair Employment Practices Act and the Michigan Constitution by discriminating against him in the exercise of his civil rights to equal employment and for discriminating against him because of his race, color, national origin or ancestry by failing to accord him the same rights In Count III, plaintiff re-alleges the factual allegations set forth in Count I, and further asserts that his alleged demotion from the crane operator classification constituted a violation of 'an employment contract (which) existed between Plaintiff and Defendant General Motors Corporation, which was negotiated on his behalf by his union, bearing the date of September 20, 1961, which provided it to be 'applied to all employees without regard to race, color, creed or national origin." He also alleged violation of a letter dated September 18, 1961, signed by a vice-president of General Motors which provides in pertinent part that General Motors extends equal employment opportunities to all employes on a nondiscriminatory basis.

and privileges as an employee of the Caucasian race.'

On December 8, 1965, General Motors filed a motion for accelerated judgment of dismissal in the circuit court pursuant to Rule 116 of the Michigan General Court Rules. The motion asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of Counts I and III of the suit; that Count I was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in the Michigan State Fair Employment Practices Act, and was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Michigan Civil Rights Commission; that Count III was barred by reason of the disposition made by plaintiff's exclusive bargaining representative prior to commencement of the action in withdrawing plaintiff's grievance from the contractual grievance procedure.

Attached to the motion were two affidavits. One of them, by the plant director of industrial relations, Ray Finley, set forth that on May 27, 1964, plaintiff filed a grievance through his bargaining representative which stated:

"Protest management removing me from the crane operator group. Demand that I be returned to the crane operator group at once."

The Finley affidavit further stated that the grievance which plaintiff did file was withdrawn from the grievance procedure by his collective bargaining representative on September 3, 1964. A second affidavit by Eugene Hartwig, counsel for General Motors, said:

'On January 15, 1965, plaintiff filed an application for the issuance of a complaint against defendant Corporation * * * with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission alleging in substance that his removal by defendant Corporation from the 'crane operator' classification * * * constituted discrimination against him because of his race in violation of the Constitution of the State of Michigan.

'On April 27, 1965, the Civil Rights Commission entered its order dismissing plaintiff's claim. * * *

'* * * that plaintiff did not within fifteen (15) days from the date of mailing of said order on April 28, 1965, request in writing of the commission a reconsideration of its refusal to issue a complaint.

'* * * that plaintiff has not brought any action or proceeding against the Commission in any circuit court in the State of Michigan wherein he claims to be aggrieved by the order of said Commission entered on April 27, 1965.'

Plaintiff filed two affidavits in opposition to the defendant corporation's and defendant local union's simultaneously filed motions for accelerated judgment. The first affidavit stated, in pertinent part:

'7. On numerous occasions, I attempted to get UAW-CIO, Local No. 1292 to process my grievance against the corporation and exhaust all of the avenues open to have me return to the classification of crane operator. The union refused to do this, and on their own, dismissed my grievance for the reasons set out in my Complaint filed in this cause.

'8. As soon as it became clear that my union was not going to back me up '9. My failure to timely file a claim with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission was due to the fact that the union representatives indicated that they would take care of this matter for me in a fair fashion. I was advised and had every reason to believe that my grievance would be proceeded and that I would be returned to my classification of crane operator, from which I was wrongfully demoted, without further affirmative action on my part.

in this matter and that the General Motors Corporation would not reinstate me in my proper classification, I notified the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, but was informed that the jurisdictional period of 180 days from the date of the offense had elapsed and, therefore, the commission was without jurisdiction to proceed with the matter.

'10. That many white men and employees of the defendant corporation with much worse work records than mine are now employed by the Defendant corporation as crane operators. Many of these men have been suspended for times, but none have been demoted, and in every instance where the union has stepped in and filed a grievance, the man has been reinstated.'

The second affidavit filed by plaintiff, in response to the international union's motion for accelerated judgment, specially dealt with the steps plaintiff went through in an attempt to appeal the union's allegedly wrongful dismissal of his grievance and the reasons for not pursuing those steps expeditiously. ²

On May 3, 1967, the court entered its order denying General Motors' motion, but at the same time 'FURTHER ORDERED On December 10, 1968, the case came on for trial with General Motors as the sole defendant. The factual and legal issues had been limited to those set forth in Counts I and III of plaintiff's complaint as a result of the December 21, 1967, order dismissing Counts II and IV, and by the circuit court's final pre-trial conference order of April 1, 1968. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case on December 12, 1968, General Motors renewed its motion for accelerated judgment of dismissal in accordance with the right reserved to it by the circuit court's order of May 3, 1967.

that the questions raised and issues posed in said motion may again be raised at the conclusion of the Plaintiff's proofs upon trial.'

The trial judge based his ruling in part on Section 13 of Article 32 of the International Union constitution, which provides as follows:

'It shall be the duty of any member or subordinate body who feels aggrieved by any action, decision or penalty imposed upon him or it to exhaust his or its remedies and all appeals therefrom under the laws of this International Union prior to appealing to a civil court or governmental agency for redress.'

and also on Section 16 of Article 6, which provides that:

'The International Union and the local union to which the member belongs and each of them are by this irrevocably designated, authorized and empowered exclusively to...