Pomponio v. State

• Decision Date: 30 April 1965
• Citation: 106 N.H. 273,209 A.2d 733
• Parties: Domenico POMPONIO v. The STATE of New Hampshire et al.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 733

209 A.2d 733

106 N.H. 273

Domenico POMPONIO v. The STATE of New Hampshire et al.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued March 3, 1965.

Decided April 30, 1965.

William D. Tribble and David J. KillKelley, Jaffrey, for plaintiff.

James M. Riley, Jr., and Edward F. Smith, Concord, for defendants.

BLANDIN, Justice.

The plaintiff first takes the position that the decision by a duly authorized representative of the defendant Commissioner of the Department of Employment Security involved a judicial function and that the plaintiff therefore 'has an unqualified right to have the matter determined by the court.' His claim rests upon the proposition that Pt. I, Art. 37 of the New Hampshire Constitution, providing for the separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government, forbids the defendant to decide the issue of the wilful making of false statements and the concealment of material facts charged against the plaintiff here. He concedes that he has found no authorities in point which would support his argument in the existing circumstances.

RSA 282:14, subd. D (supp.) provides, so far as relevant, that any applicant for benefits who wilfully makes a false statement or knowingly fails to disclose a material fact in order to gain benefits, may, within the discretion of the Commissioner or his authorized representative, be disqualified from receiving benefits for certain periods of time. The Commissioner also may order the claimant to make restitution of overpayments which he has received as a result of his falsehood or failure to disclose material facts.

It is well established that the Unemployment Security Act is purely statutory, that the rights of applicants thereunder depend entirely upon the statute, and that certain constitutional provisions as, for example, the right to trial by jury (New Hampshire Constitution, Pt. I, Art. 20), have no application. This subject was fully discussed in the case of Hallahan v. Riley, 94 N.H. 338, 53 A.2d 431, so that it seems unnecessary to advert to it further here. In that case also, it was said that the administrative procedures set up by the Act were 'comprehensive and designed to facilitate a simple and speedy determination of benefit claims.' Id., 340, 53 A.2d 432. In all jurisdictions having such legislation, there appears the common feature of providing that 'administrative appeals shall be simple, prompt and non-legalistic.' Id., 340, 53 A.2d 433.

In Hewett v. Riley, 94 N.H. 460, 55 A.2d 470, a situation similar to the one before us arose and it seems to have been assumed by the parties and the Court that the Department of Employment Security acted within constitutional limitations in deciding disputed questions of fact. The Court says that '[t]here is no claim that the fact finding body acted without jurisdiction or authority.' Id., 462, 55 A.2d 471. Decisions upon questions of fact by various administrative bodies have long been an integral and accepted procedure in our governmental system. Boody v. Watson, 64 N.H. 162, 9 A. 794; Attorney General v. Littlefield, 78 N.H. 185, 198, 98 A. 38; see also our zoning law, RSA 31, ss. 60-76, as amended. In cases where Pt. I, Art. 37 of our Constitution has been invoked to challenge the authority of administrative boards to determine factual issues, we have repeatedly emphasized that '[t]he constitutional division of governmental powers contemplates some overlapping and duality in the division as a matter of practical and essential expediency.' Cloutier v. State Milk Control Board, 92 N.H. 199, 203, 28 A.2d 554, 557. We noted in Opinion of the Justices, 102 N.H. 195, 197, 152 A.2d 878, 880, that Art. 37 'has continued to receive a practical construction.' See also Opinion of the Justices, 85 N.H. 562, 567, 154 A. 217. It has been pointed out by eminent authorities that without a sensible interpretation of such provisions there would have been little, if any, development of administrative boards. 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, s. 1.09 (1958). Dean Roscoe Pound expressed a like view in his Jurisprudence, pp. 330, 331 (1959).

Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H. 492, 179 A. 344, 357, 110 A.L.R. 819, relied upon by the plaintiff, wherein we held unconstitutional a proposed bill which would have empowered a commission to decide motor vehicle negligence claims pursuant to the common law at the option of the plaintiff, is clearly distinguishable from the present case. It does not support the plaintiff in the case before us.

We think we need not labor the point that were the defendant department to be stripped of its powers to continue such elementary and essential procedures as are here involved, its practical utility would approach the vanishing point. In the light of our previous treatment of Art. 37 and the absence of authority or persuasive considerations supporting the plaintiff's view, we reject his claim that he had an unqualified right to have the factual questions involved in the decision made by the Commissioner decided by the Court.

The plaintiff also argues that the department is attempting 'to collect a debt' due from him and that 'such powers should not be granted to administrative decision.' In view of what we have already decided, we do not believe that this contention requires extended consideration. The department has merely determined under the statute, RSA 282:14, subd. D (supp.), as a matter of accounting, the amount which the defendant has wrongfully collected and should therefore return. We find no violation of Art. 37 existing in this procedure.

The plaintiff further urges that even if section 14, subd. D (supp.), supra, be found constitutional, his appeal was timely. To resolve this issue requires an examination of the facts. The record discloses that due notice of the hearing to determine whether the plaintiff had violated Section 14, subd. D (supp.), supra, was sent to him. He acknowledged receipt of this and advised the department that he did not plan to attend the hearing, which was held in accordance with the notice on February 14, 1964. The plaintiff failed to appear. Three days later, on the seventeenth, the decision of a duly authorized representative of the Commissioner was mailed to the plaintiff. The decision stated that the...