Ponce v. Children's Home Soc. of Fla.

• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: DREW; HOBSON, Acting Chief Justice, and THORNAL and O'CONNELL, JJ., and WIGGINTON
• Citation: Ponce v. Children's Home Soc. of Fla., 97 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1957)
• Decision Date: 25 September 1957
• Parties: Mariano PONCE and Florence Ponce, Husband and wife, Appellants, v. CHILDREN'S HOME SOCIETY OF FLORIDA, a non-profit corporation, Appellee.

Page 194

97 So.2d 194

Mariano PONCE and Florence Ponce, Husband and wife, Appellants, v. CHILDREN'S HOME SOCIETY OF FLORIDA, a non-profit corporation, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 25, 1957.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 17, 1957.

Herman T. Isis, Miami, for appellants.

M. L. Mershon, Ray M. Earnest and Alfred E. Sapp, Miami, for appellee

DREW, Justice.

An infant child was adjudged dependent within the meaning of Chapter 39 Florida Statutes 1953, F.S.A. by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Judge of Dade County, Florida on March 11, 1955 and committed temporarily to the Children's Home Society of Florida, a licensed child placing agency. The commitment order retained jurisdiction to make such orders for the welfare of the child as might be found necessary. See Sec. 39.11(2), Florida Statutes 1953, F.S.A.

The Society placed the child with the appellants as their agents and employees and paid appellants for taking care of the said child. During the month of December, 1956, the Society removed the child from appellants' custody. Shortly thereafter appellants filed a petition for adoption of said child in the Circuit Court of Dade County naming therein the Children's Home Society as the sole defendant. On motion to dismiss made by the Society and upon consideration of the petition and the sworn answer and exhibits, the Circuit Judge dismissed the petition. It is from this order that this appeal has been prosecuted.

The Circuit Judge gave three reasons for dismissing the petition. First, he said that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Dage County has the 'sole, exclusive jurisdiction of the dependent infant.' Second, he held 'plaintiffs are not in position to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court over said child or over said Petition for Adoption,' and third, 'that this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain said Petition for Adoption.' The first and third reasons of the learned trial judge present the same question, that is, whether the Circuit Court, in view of the prior order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of said County Committing the child temporarily to the Children's Home Society, had jurisdiction in a suit for the adoption of this infant. The other question is whether the petitioners seeking adoption were barred from maintaining the action because of the agency relationship between them and the child placement agency.

The appellants are not prohibited from seeking the adoption of the child merely because they were the agents of the Children's Home Society during the period the child was in their custody. There is nothing in the adoption statute itself which creates such a disability, and the cases cited by appellee which hold that an agent cannot, without his principal's consent, acquire an interest in the subject matter of the agency adverse to the principal, are wholly inapplicable to the facts here. Whether a contractual agreement prohibiting adoption in situations such as that involved in this case would be enforceable is not raised here and, therefore, requires no further comment on our part.

Chapter 39 applies to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Dade County, but protects any expanded jurisdiction and certain other matters not relevant to the case at bar conferred on that court by other statutes. See Secs. 39.02(7); 39.181; and Chapter 26880, Sec. 3, Laws of Florida 1951, F.S.A. § 39.01 note. The acts which apply to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Dade County (Chapter 19597, Laws of 1939; Chapter 21094, Laws of 1941; and Chapter 27000, Laws of 1951) purport to give that court concurrent jurisdiction with circuit courts over adoption. Appellants assert that Article III, Sec. 20 of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A. prohibits the legislative grant of adoption jurisdiction by the above 'population' acts, and cite State ex rel. York v. Beckham, 1948, 160 Fla. 810, 811, 36 So.2d 769 as authority. ¹ The assertion is irrelevant to the immediate case, because the record does not reveal any attempt by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court to exercise adoption jurisdiction. For this reason we will not decide the constitutional question.

The disposition of the jurisdictional question does not require us to consider the intricate problems of conflicts in jurisdiction which were presented to and decided by us in State ex rel. Hendricks v. Hunt, Fla.1954, 70 So.2d 301 and State ex rel. Watson v. Rogers, Fla.1956, 86 So.2d 645; and which are discussed in the Annotations in 11 A.L.R. 148, 78 A.L.R. 317 and 146 A.L.R. 1153. The Hendricks and Watson cases, supra, involved the determination of whether a juvenile court had jurisdiction to enter orders affecting the custody of children, since a circuit court had previously retained jurisdiction after making orders concerning custody of the children in connection with divorce actions. In each case two courts attempted to award custody of the same children, which resulted in a direct conflict. ² In the case at bar, the statute clearly contemplates...