Ponce v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R.

• Decision Date: 05 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98 C 7976.,98 C 7976.
• Citation: 103 F.Supp.2d 1051
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
• Parties: Guillermo PONCE, Plaintiff, v. NORTHEAST ILLINOIS REGIONAL COMMUTER RAILROAD CORPORATION, d/b/a Metra/Metropolitan Rail, Defendant.

103 F.Supp.2d 1051

Guillermo PONCE, Plaintiff, v. NORTHEAST ILLINOIS REGIONAL COMMUTER RAILROAD CORPORATION, d/b/a Metra/Metropolitan Rail, Defendant.

No. 98 C 7976.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

June 5, 2000.

John Michael Dugan, J. Dillon Hoey, Richard A. Haydu, James Louis Farina, George T. Brugess, Daniel J. Downes, Robert J. Drummond, James Timothy Foley, Hoey, Farina & Downes, Chicago, IL, for Guillermo Ponce.

David R. Schmidt, Mai Lin Petrine Noffke, Lord, Bissell & Brook, Chicago, IL, Ellen Kornichuk Emery, Chicago, IL, for Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corp.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SCHENKIER, United States Magistrate Judge.

The parties in this case have filed cross motions for partial summary judgment (doc. 12-1, 18-1), which seek resolution of a single, legal issue central to this case: whether the claims raised by the plaintiff, Guillermo Ponce, for injuries he allegedly suffered on company property when, as he was leaving work, he boarded a train owned and operated by his employer, defendant Northeast Illinois Commuter Railroad Corporation ("METRA"), fall within the scope of Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA" or "the Act"), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that plaintiff's injuries fall within the scope of the FELA.¹

I.

Summary judgment is proper if the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Lexington Ins. Co. v. Rugg & Knopp, Inc., 165 F.3d 1087, 1090 (7th Cir. 1999). A genuine issue for trial exists only when the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Flip Side Prods., Inc. v. Jam Prods. Ltd., 843 F.2d 1024, 1032 (7th Cir.1988).

Local Rule 56.1(a) requires a party moving for summary judgment to file a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue. All properly supported material facts set forth in such a statement are deemed admitted unless properly controverted by the opposing party. See id.; see also Corder v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 162 F.3d 924, 927 (7th Cir.1998); Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 453 (7th Cir.1994); Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921-22 (7th Cir.1994). Mere denials of a properly supported factual statement are not sufficient to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Shermer v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 171 F.3d 475, 477 (7th Cir.1999) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Rather, a party must "come forward with appropriate evidence demonstrating that there is a pending dispute of material fact." Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 921; see also Vector-Springfield Properties, Ltd. v. Central Illinois Light Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir.1997). To meet this burden, a party contesting a motion for summary judgment must counter the affidavits and documents submitted with materials of "evidentiary quality" (e.g., depositions or affidavits) that create a genuine factual issue. Adler v. Glickman, 87 F.3d 956, 959 (7th Cir.1996). While the evidence offered need not be in a form that would be admissible at trial, see Liu v. T & H Mach., Inc., 191 F.3d 790, 796 (7th Cir. 1999), the evidence must identify a specific, genuine issue for trial. See Shermer, 171 F.3d at 477.

Where cross motions for summary judgment have been submitted, the Court is not required to grant judgment as a matter of law for one side or the other. Heublein, Inc. v. United States, 996 F.2d 1455, 1461 (2d Cir.1993). Rather, the Court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits, resolving factual uncertainties and drawing all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration. Id.; Buttitta v. City of Chicago, 803 F.Supp. 213, 217 (N.D.Ill.1992), aff'd, 9 F.3d 1198 (7th Cir.1993). Where motions involve requests for partial summary judgment on the single legal issue of subject matter jurisdiction, Rule 56(c) contemplates that if subject matter jurisdiction is found to exist, the rest of the case will go forward. See U.S.EEOC v. Warshawsky and Co., 768 F.Supp. 647, 657 (N.D.Ill.1991) (in case involving cross motions for partial summary judgment, court found subject matter jurisdiction existed and denied defendant's motion). See also Capitol Records, Inc. v. Progress Record Dist., Inc., 106 F.R.D. 25, 29 (N.D.Ill.1985) (Rule 56(c) allows filing of motion for summary judgment as to single claim).

Both parties have filed motions for summary judgment and, as required, both Mr. Ponce and METRA have filed statements of material, undisputed facts which properly include "references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon to support the facts set forth in that paragraph." UNITED STATES DIST. COURT, N. DIST. OF ILL. LR 56.1. After careful review, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute regarding the following material facts necessary to establish FELA coverage.

II.

A. The Parties.

Guillermo Ponce began working for the Illinois Central Railroad in 1976 as a trackman (Def.'s Facts ¶ 1). He transferred out of the track department and became a coach cleaner in 1981 (Def.'s Facts ¶ 2). Mr. Ponce worked as a coach cleaner for the Illinois Central at its 18th Street facility until the line was taken over by METRA in 1987 (Def.'s Facts ¶ 3), and he continued to work in the same job as a coach cleaner for METRA in the same location at 18th Street up to and beyond the day of his accident on January 8, 1997 (Def.'s Facts ¶¶ 4, 59).

B. The 18th Street Facility.

METRA owns and operates the 18th Street facility where Mr. Ponce worked (Def.'s Facts ¶ 3). The coach cleaners work in the buildings shown in Exhibits 1G and 1H (Def.'s Facts ¶ 5). On January 8, 1997, Mr. Ponce worked the 8:15 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. shift cleaning coaches at the 18th Street facility. Mr. Ponce punched out on the time clock in the building at the left side of Exhibit 1G (Def.'s Facts ¶ 20), prior to the scheduled end of his shift at 4:15 p.m.; METRA had a practice of setting its clocks ahead, so that employees who wished to utilize the train could arrive early and punch out early (Pl.'s Add'l Facts ¶ 75), and Mr. Ponce made use of this practice on the day of the alleged accident.²

After he punched out on the clock, Mr. Ponce went outside to wait for a METRA train he used to travel to and from work (Def.'s Facts ¶ 21). As was his custom, Mr. Ponce walked out of the building where he was working (shown on the far left side of the picture in Exhibit 1G), walked into a parking lot area, and then came onto the blacktop, crossing the tracks (Def.'s Facts ¶ 22). Normally, he would cross over one or two sets of tracks, depending on what track the METRA train he would be riding arrived on, in order to reach the boarding area for the train (Def.'s Facts ¶ 23).

C. The METRA Train and The Boarding Area.

The blacktop area is located within the 18th Street facility; this facility is METRA property which is not open to the general commuting public, but is only accessible to METRA employees (Def.'s Facts ¶¶ 27, 30; Pl.'s Add'l Facts ¶¶ 61-64, 74). In other words, the 18th Street facility and the blacktop area within it where Mr. Ponce and other METRA employees boarded and exited the METRA train is not a regular commuter stop for the METRA Electric Line (Def.'s Facts ¶ 10; Pl.'s Add'l Facts ¶ 65), but rather is used only for the benefit of METRA employees (Def.'s Facts ¶¶ 10, 30, 31, 35, 43; Pl.'s Add'l Facts ¶ 63). As such, the means by which METRA employees boarded and exited the train at the 18th Street facility differed from the means available at regular commuter stops.

The 18th Street facility does not have a platform for employees to use when boarding the METRA train (Pl.'s Add'l Facts ¶ 67), such as those provided for commuters at regular commuter stops (Pl.'s Add'l Facts ¶¶ 70-74). Instead, employees must board the train by using steps which lead up into the vestibule of the train (Def.'s Facts ¶ 37). Those steps are located beneath a trap door which is latched to the right side of the doorway leading up into the train (Def.'s Facts ¶¶ 38, 41). The trap door performs a different function at the 18th Street facility than at regular commuter stops. When the train picks up employees at the 18th Street facility, the trap door is lifted to allow entry into the train (Def.'s Facts ¶ 39). By contrast, when the train makes stops for commuters at elevated platforms, the trap door is closed or lowered so that it is sitting over the top of the steps, and commuters can walk on top of the trap door as they enter or exit the train (Def.'s Facts ¶¶ 40, 41, 42; Pl.'s Add'l Facts ¶¶ 71-74). Thus, at a regular commuter stop, there is no need to lift the trap door (Pl.'s Add'l Facts ¶ 69).

The METRA train that arrives at the 18th Street facility is not "a special train" operated only for METRA employees, but instead is one that makes stops at regular commuter stations open to the general public (Def.'s Facts ¶¶ 7, 9, 12). However, the general commuting public does not have access to the 18th Street facility. When the train stops at the 18th Street facility in the morning and evening, it is for the sole purpose of allowing METRA employees to board and exit when reporting to or departing from work (Def.'s Facts ¶¶ 10-12). When the train stops at the 18th Street facility, the METRA employees board at the head of the train on the first car (Def.'s Facts ¶ 31). The front end of the train stops on the blacktop, so that employees can step up into the train by way of steps...