Ponciroli v. Wyrick, 39476
| Decision Date | 31 October 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 39476,39476 |
| Citation | 573 S.W.2d 731 |
| Parties | Charles PONCIROLI and Standard Refrigeration Service, Inc., Respondents, v. Ruth WYRICK, Appellant. . Louis District, Division Three |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Robert H. Burns, John H. Marshall, Clayton, for appellant.
Robert A. Wulff, Amelung, Wulff & Willenbrock, St. Louis, for respondents.
On June 27, 1974, while driving a company van in his capacity as sole proprietor of Standard Refrigeration Service, Inc., plaintiff-respondent Charles Ponciroli was involved in an automobile accident. Defendant-appellant Ruth Wyrick, proceeding south on Gravois Avenue, allegedly made an illegal left turn without yielding the right of way to the north-bound plaintiff. In the resulting collision, Ponciroli sustained a fracture of the right wrist and respondent Standard Refrigeration suffered property damage both to the van and to the equipment that it carried. On September 20, 1974, only two weeks after the plaster cast was removed from his first injury, plaintiff broke the wrist again, this time one inch below the original fracture. As he was driving his van across rough railroad tracks, plaintiff claimed that he lost his grip on the steering wheel and caught his right wrist between the gearshift lever and the steering wheel's rapidly rotating cross-spoke. He attributed the mishap to a weakness in grip strength following weeks of immobility in a cast. On Ponciroli's request for damages suffered in both the June 27th and September 20th incidents, the jury returned a verdict of $15,000 in his favor. $1,306 was awarded to Standard Refrigeration for the damage to the van. Defendant appeals from the verdict for personal injuries, alleging essentially that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a causal connection between the two accidents and that the trial court erred: (1) when it sustained respondent's objection to defendant's hypothetical question regarding the causal connection; (2) when it submitted plaintiff's verdict director; and (3) when it refused defendant's submitted instruction seeking to withdraw the September 20 incident from jury consideration. We affirm.
Missouri follows the general rule that a person who has been injured due to the negligence of another is entitled to recover all damages proximately traceable to the initial negligent act, including any subsequent aggravation of the injury which follows as the natural consequence of the original harm. Recovery is available in the latter circumstances even though some intervening agent may have aided in the result. Chaussard v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., 536 S.W.2d 822 (Mo.App.1976). Defendant does not challenge the jury's finding that her negligence and the concomitant automobile collision were the proximate cause of plaintiff's first fracture. Rather, she maintains that plaintiff failed to adduce the medical expert testimony needed to establish a causal connection between the June 27, 1974 accident and the September 20th fracture. She complains that laypersons or the jury panel could not have been sufficiently knowledgeable in the fields of physiology and medicine so as to determine, without pure speculation or guesswork, whether the fracture of September 20 was the proximate consequence of her negligence. Further, she argues that the trial court erred in sustaining plaintiff's objection to a hypothetical question regarding causality which was presented to the defense expert. Thereby, she argues that the jury was deprived of at least one doctor's opinion as to whether the second fracture was proximately caused by the first.
The objectionable hypothetical question consisted largely of a recitation of uncontroverted facts: that plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident on June 27, 1974; that his injury was diagnosed as a fracture of the right wrist, and was treated by applying a cast; that he was essentially asymptomatic when the cast was removed; that on September 20, 1974 he caught his wrist between the steering wheel spoke and the gearshift lever; that the result was a second fracture of the wrist one inch below the site of the initial break. The ultimate question elicited an objection, however:
Q. (Defendant's attorney) . . . Doctor, can you state with reasonable medical certainty as to whether that first fracture had any bearing upon the occurrence of that second fracture?
(Plaintiff's attorney): I'll object to that question on the basis that that is a question of fact and so that is within the province of this jury and not something based strictly on medical testimony, and therefore it does not call upon any opinion by an expert witness, and is something that should be decided by a jury.
The court sustained the objection on the ground stated by and for the use of the word "bearing." Defendant's attorney tried again:
Q. Doctor, let me rephrase that last question. Would the second fracture in any way be caused by the first fracture?
Counsel for the plaintiff objected on the same grounds and was sustained. Defendant's attorney attempted to present the hypothetical a third time:
Q. Doctor, with the first fracture having good healing at the time of the removal of the cast by Dr. Miranda, and with the same question which I have previously asked regarding this hypothetical, and the man is asymptomatic at the time the cast was removed, and on September 20th he has this second accident, would the first fracture which this man suffered in any way play a part, would it have any effect upon this second fracture, or could it in any way help to cause this second fracture?
Counsel for the plaintiff objected again, this time complaining additionally that the use of the word "asymptomatic" was misleading, as evidence had been presented to establish that the plaintiff still complained of tenderness in the wrist at the time that the cast was removed. Again, the objection was sustained. Finally abandoning the hypothetical, defendant's attorney asked the doctor whether he would have expected the second fracture to occur at the same site as the first, assuming there was still a weakness at the point of the initial injury. The doctor affirmed the...
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Stone v. Mo. Dep't of Health
...expert testimony is “necessary” and, therefore, required. Housman v. Fiddyment, 421 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Mo. banc 1967); Ponciroli v. Wyrick, 573 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Mo.App.1978). For example, expert testimony has been required to explain the results of medical tests and blood work, State v. Endic......
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State v. White, 51065
...the left turn signal. It is within the trial court's discretion whether to accept or reject expert testimony. Ponciroli v. Wyrick, 573 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Mo.App.1978). Admission of expert testimony by the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.......
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Disbrow v. Boehmer
...vested with substantial discretion in determining whether to accept or reject the testimony and opinions of experts. Ponciroli v. Wyrick, 573 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Mo.App.1978). Moreover, a practicing physician, although not a psychiatrist, is qualified to give an opinion as to the mental condit......
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Essman v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 52970
...its discretion, based upon Mr. Gronemeyer's own testimony, to reject his testimony as an expert on plaintiff's fire. Ponciroli v. Wyrick, 573 S.W.2d 731,735 (Mo.App.1978). Plaintiff's last claim of error is that the court erred in permitting defendant to introduce a lengthy statement given ......
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Section 21 Aggravation of a Preexisting Injury
...any subsequent aggravation of the injury that follows as the natural consequence of the original harm. Thus, in Ponciroli v. Wyrick, 573 S.W.2d 731, 733–35 (Mo. App. E.D. 1978), an injured motorist was allowed to recover for the pain and suffering from two broken wrists, the first broken in......