Pond v. Hoffler

• Decision Date: 24 February 1961
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 3056.
• Citation: 191 F. Supp. 469
• Parties: Grace Short POND, Plaintiff, v. Jimmy HOFFLER and Bernard Hoffler, Defendants and Third-Party-Plaintiffs, v. Richard T. SHORT, Third-Party-Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

191 F. Supp. 469

Grace Short POND, Plaintiff, v. Jimmy HOFFLER and Bernard Hoffler, Defendants and Third-Party-Plaintiffs, v. Richard T. SHORT, Third-Party-Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 3056.

United States District Court E. D. Virginia, Norfolk Division.

February 24, 1961.

J. Edward Moyler and J. Edward Moyler, Jr., Franklin, Va., Willcox, Cooke, Savage & Lawrence, Norfolk, Va. (Richard B. Spindle, III), Norfolk, Va., for plaintiff.

Rixey & Rixey, John F. Rixey, Norfolk, Va., for defendants and third party plaintiffs.

White, Ryan & Reynolds, Allen S. Reynolds, Norfolk, Va., for third party defendant.

WALTER E. HOFFMAN, District Judge.

During the daylight hours of January 23, 1959, at approximately 12:40 p. m., Grace Short Pond was riding as a guest passenger in an automobile driven by her nephew, Richard T. Short, the third-party defendant, when the automobile collided with the left front tire of the tandem wheels of a trailer attached to a tractor being operated by Elton W. Saunders, the agent, servant and employee of the defendants and third-party plaintiffs, Jimmy Hoffler and Bernard Hoffler. Grace Short Pond was seriously and permanently injured. She thereafter instituted an action in this Court against the two Hofflers by reason of diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy. By appropriate third-party proceedings the defendants, as third-party plaintiffs, instituted their action by way of contribution against Richard T. Short, alleging that, if any liability existed as to the Hofflers, Short was guilty of gross negligence which proximately contributed to the accident and resulting injuries. It is, of course, fundamental that the rights of the third-party plaintiffs can rise no higher than the rights of the original plaintiff and, as Grace Short Pond was required, under the laws of Virginia, to prove gross negligence in any action she may have instituted against her nephew, Richard T. Short, it was incumbent upon the third-party plaintiff to allege and prove gross negligence on the part of Richard T. Short before there can be any recovery by way of contribution.

The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment in the sum of $50,000 in favor of Grace Short Pond against the Hofflers. As to the third-party action, the Court submitted an inquiry to the jury, the answer being dependent upon the jury's action in the suit of Pond v. Hoffler. On this inquiry the jury found in favor of the Hofflers, thus concluding that Short was guilty of gross negligence. Under the Virginia law, joint tortfeasors are equally liable for the amount paid.

Appropriate motions were made for directed verdicts in favor of Short, both at the conclusion of the evidence presented by the third-party plaintiffs and at the termination of all of the evidence in the case. The Court reserved its rulings on these motions and submitted the case to the jury. One exception to the Court's charge as noted by the third-party defendant is pertinent to the case and will be hereafter discussed. Following the jury verdict, the third-party defendant moved to set aside the verdict and to enter judgment in favor of Short, notwithstanding same.

The Court was advised at the time of argument on the motions of the third-party defendant that the judgment in the sum of $50,000 had been compromised and satisfied by the payment of $41,500, including interest and costs. Thus, if the third-party plaintiffs are to prevail, the amount due by way of contribution would be, subject to some adjustment for costs, $20,750, plus interest from the date of payment by the original defendants and third-party plaintiffs.

Treating the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the third-party plaintiffs, as required by law, the Court has reached the conclusion that the motion for a directed verdict, made at the conclusion of all of the evidence by the third-party defendant, should have been granted. Accordingly, an order will be entered, upon presentation by counsel, granting said motion, setting aside the verdict of the jury, and entering final judgment in favor of the third-party defendant.

The accident occurred at what is frequently designated as a "Y" intersection at the outskirts of Franklin, Virginia. Because of the difficulties in describing the nature of the intersection, pertinent portions of a survey or chart are exhibited in this memorandum.

Route 58 is the main road connecting Suffolk and Franklin, and it was on this highway that Saunders, the driver for the Hofflers, was proceeding in a westwardly direction immediately prior to the accident. Saunders was intent on making a left turn off Route 58 to enter the easternmost angle or leg of the "Y" intersection, and then to proceed southerly along Route 691, up an incline to a railroad overpass, and hence onto the property of Union-Camp Manufacturing Company which was his destination.

Route 58, as it approaches the "Y" intersection of Route 691, is a three-lane highway, appropriately divided by white lines or markings. Each lane is 12 feet in width. The center lane is clearly the proper lane to enter when contemplating a left turn into the eastern leg of the "Y". Saunders was driving his tractor-trailer in the center lane but, when reaching a point approximately 38 feet east of the end of the double white line indicating that traffic should not cross same, Saunders veered his tractor-trailer across the line and commenced his left turn into the eastern leg of the "Y" on Route 691. To describe it otherwise would be to say that Saunders "cut the curve or corner short".

Short was proceeding northwardly on Route 691, which is 23 feet in width but widens considerably at the northernmost leg of the "Y" where it bisects with an extension of the southern line of Route 58. After clearing the overpass, Short faced a sign indicating "Stop Ahead" at the peak of the "Y". Had he contemplated going to Franklin, he would have then veered to his left and entered the western leg of the "Y". As he was planning to go in the direction of Suffolk, he took the eastern leg of the "Y" and proceeded downgrade in the direction of intersecting Route 58 and, assuming that he had remained in his proper lane of travel, Short would then have proceeded out of the "Y" intersection and taken the southernmost lane on Route 58 headed easterly in the direction of Suffolk.

At the time of the accident there were no traffic lights controlling the intersection. With the exception of one small photograph taken shortly after the accident, the presence of a Stop sign is not revealed. However, the jurors were advised, and counsel agreed, that a Stop sign was present on January 23, 1959, and that no traffic control lights had been erected. The larger photographs and the survey show traffic control lights, with the Stop sign removed, but, of course, we must visualize conditions as they existed on the day of the accident. The attached chart fairly denotes the intersection, corrected to reveal the physical facts as they were at the time of the collision. The Stop sign was located at a point designated on the survey as "white wood post." The legal effect of the presence of this Stop sign is perhaps the crux of this case. If it was intended to command a stop as to vehicles making a right turn off Route 691 into Route 58, when the only other traffic possibly affected was a vehicle making a left turn off Route 58 into the eastern leg of the "Y" intersection of Route 691, then, accepting all reasonable inferences in favor of the third-party plaintiffs, the question of gross negligence on the part of Short may have been properly a matter for jury determination. On this issue the Court, over objection of Short, charged the jury as follows:

"If you believe from the evidence in this case that, as Saunders made his left turn into Route 691, he saw the Short vehicle approaching the intersection and approaching the stop sign that was facing Mr. Short, then Saunders had a right to assume that Short would obey the stop sign and stop his vehicle at a point from which, in the exercise of ordinary care, Short could see traffic moving on the highway he proposed to enter; and you are further instructed that Saunders had a right to rely upon this assumption until the contrary appeared, or should have appeared, to him in the exercise of reasonable care on his part.

"The stop sign, of course, was notice to Mr. Short that danger was ahead and that he must stop his vehicle at a point from which, in the exercise of ordinary care, he could see traffic moving on Route 58 and could, in the exercise of reasonable care, take prudent action to avoid any danger which an effective lookout would disclose.

"Now, I do not suggest to you that the law requires a person to stop right at a particular stop sign. I think you are entitled to some explanation of the reasoning back of the Legislature, the purpose of the section which provides for stopping at stop signs. The purpose of the statute is to require the operator to bring his motor vehicle to a timely stop before entering the travel portion of the other highway. It has sometimes been said that it is to assure a proper lookout by the operator of the emerging vehicle. Now, of course, if a person stops at a stop sign, I think it is reasonable to say that he could never be convicted of a crime because he has a right to assume that the Highway Commission has erected the sign at a proper place for him to stop, but he is not, per se, required to stop exactly at that stop sign.

"If you believe by a preponderance of the evidence in this case that Short failed to stop at the stop sign at the proper time and place as I have just explained to you, that Mr. Short operated his automobile at a speed in excess of the normal safe speed under the circumstances and conditions then existing, and that Mr. Short did not exercise reasonable care to maintain a proper lookout or to keep his motor vehicle under proper

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