Poole v. Country Club of Columbus, Inc., 96-8164

Citation129 F.3d 551
Decision Date17 November 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-8164,96-8164
Parties75 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 609, 72 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,063, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 788 Carol L. POOLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The COUNTRY CLUB OF COLUMBUS, INC., Vafa Ghalahgir, individually and as General Manager, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Dolly H. Todd, B. Seth Harp, Harp & Johnson, P.C., Columbus, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Deron R. Hicks, Richard A. Marchetti, Self, Mullins, Robinson, Marchetti & Kamensky, P.C., Columbus, GA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.

Before COX and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and HUNT *, District Judge.

HUNT, District Judge:

Plaintiff Carol L. Poole appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendant The Country Club of Columbus ("CCC") on plaintiff's age discrimination claims and dismissing plaintiff's pendent state law claims. Poole brought suit claiming defendants CCC and Vafa Ghalahgir impermissibly discriminated against her because of her age, retaliated against her for engaging in a statutorily protected activity, and committed various state law torts. In support of her age discrimination claim, Poole alleges that she was constructively discharged from CCC. Because we find that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Poole was constructively discharged, we reverse the district court and remand this action for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

After working as Ghalahgir's executive secretary for almost two years, plaintiff Carol L. Poole, who was fifty-six years old at the time, was told that her duties and responsibilities Beginning in April 1992, Poole began taking anti-depressant medication after contacting her regular physician complaining of stress related disorders. This was Poole's fourth episode of seeking medical advice for stress since 1989. In August 1992, Poole's physician recommended to CCC that Poole take a five day vacation, a request which CCC granted, and that CCC enact provisions to reduce Poole's stress. Poole returned to work on a Tuesday, and that day, as well as the two following days, Poole was not allowed to use her desk or computer, which were occupied by Ghalahgir's wife. Instead, Poole was sent to the business office, and spent three days stuffing envelopes and correcting two letters that had already been entered into a word processor. On Friday of that week, Ghalahgir told Poole that she was being relieved of all existing responsibilities and that she was being transferred to the business office, but that her pay and benefits would not decrease. Plaintiff alleges that Ghalahgir instructed other employees not to speak to her, that once in the business office she was given only a chair with no desk, that she was not allowed to pack her belongings herself, and that, because Poole had no place to store her belongings, they were placed next to her chair in boxes. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that no duties or responsibilities attached to her new position. Poole spent only a few days in her new job before resigning.

would be reduced to virtually nothing. Until this, Poole's duties to Ghalahgir, the General Manager of CCC, included typing correspondence, taking minutes at board meetings, supervising receptionists, and purchasing office supplies. The change in the relationship between Ghalahgir and Poole was not an abrupt shift; tensions between the two had been mounting for some time. In early 1992, Ghalahgir's wife routinely displaced Poole from her desk and computer, and began performing many of the typing duties previously handled by Poole. In July 1992, Poole gave an unsworn statement in support of six former employees who were suing CCC and Ghalahgir for age discrimination. Four days later, Ghalahgir sent a security guard to Poole's home at night to retrieve her key to Ghalahgir's office. The security guard stated that Ghalahgir had lost his key, but Poole's key was never returned to her. About this same time, Poole injured her right eye while at work, but Ghalahgir refused to submit Poole's worker's compensation claim to the insurance carrier, instead waiting almost a year and then forcing Poole to submit it herself. Plaintiff offers evidence that Ghalahgir also made remarks to her and to others regarding Poole's age. For example, Ghalahgir allegedly said to Poole that "you're as old as my mother," and said to others that he was "too fast paced for an elderly secretary" and that Poole "was too old, had too many lines in her face, and too many gray hairs."

After filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, plaintiff brought suit against defendants in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Plaintiff's complaint seeks damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) and (d) ("ADEA"), and for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, and negligent retention under laws of the State of Georgia. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims as to defendant Ghalahgir, relying on Eleventh Circuit law that holds that only the employer, and not the individual wrongdoer, is liable for ADEA violations. 1 The district court granted defendant CCC's motion for summary judgment on the ADEA claim and dismissed without prejudice the supplemental state law claims. Without reaching the issue of whether defendant CCC was motivated by impermissible discriminatory intent, the district court found that, as a matter of law, plaintiff voluntarily resigned, and thus was not constructively discharged. In light of this finding, the district court held that plaintiff could not succeed on her ADEA claim, since plaintiff suffered no adverse employment decision, an element of a successful claim.

DISCUSSION

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the The movant has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and a court, in deciding whether the burden has been satisfied, must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997). Once the movant has satisfied its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence sufficient to make a "showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party." Allen, 121 F.3d at 646 (citations omitted).

same standard the district court applied. Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 198 (11th Cir.1997); Walls v. Button...

To continue reading

Request your trial
184 cases
  • Bryant v. Jones
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • November 21, 2006
    ...1363 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Kilgore v. Thompson & Brock Mgmt., Inc., 93 F.3d 752, 754 (11th Cir.1996); Poole v. Country Club of Columbus, Inc., 129 F.3d 551, 553 (11th Cir. 1997). "[F]or a constructive discharge claim to present a jury issue and thereby survive summary judgment, the pla......
  • Richio v. Miami-Dade County
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
    • June 4, 2001
    ...in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598; Poole v. Country Club of Columbus, Inc., 129 F.3d 551, 553 (11th Cir.1997) (citing Adickes). The party opposing the motion may not simply rest upon mere allegations or denials of the p......
  • London v. Chase Manhattan Bank Usa, N.A.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
    • March 30, 2001
    ...most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598. See also Poole v. Country Club of Columbus, Inc., 129 F.3d 551, 553 (11th Cir.1997) (citing Adickes). The party opposing the motion may not simply rest upon mere allegations or denials of the plead......
  • In re Tousa, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of Florida
    • June 17, 2009
    ...and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Poole v. Country Club of Columbus, Inc., 129 F.3d 551, 553 (11th Cir.1997). If the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide them; it must deny the motion and proceed to......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT