Poole v. Gen. Motors Corp. (In re Gen. Motors of Canada Ltd.)
Decision Date | 22 November 2013 |
Docket Number | 1120629. |
Parties | Ex parte GENERAL MOTORS OF CANADA LIMITED (In re Gerardo Poole v. General Motors Corporation et al.). |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
M. Christian King and Nikaa Jordan of Lightfoot, Franklin & White LLC, Birmingham; Franklin P. Brannen, Jr., of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia; and Steven K. Winters of Thompson, Thompson & Winters, Butler, for petitioner.
Christopher D. Glover of Beasley Allen Crow Methvin Portis & Miles, P.C., Montgomery, for respondent.
General Motors of Canada Limited (“GM Canada”) petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Choctaw Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in its favor on the ground that the plaintiff's substitution of GM Canada for a fictitiously named defendant was made after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations and does not relate back to the filing of the original petition. We grant the petition and issue the writ.
The complaint in the underlying action was filed on April 6, 2009. It alleged that the plaintiff, Gerardo Poole, was injured in a motor-vehicle accident that occurred on April 11, 2007. Poole sought damages on a products-liability claim against General Motors Corporation n/k/a Motors Liquidation Company (“MLC”), the company that allegedly designed, tested, made parts of, and distributed the 2004 Chevrolet Impala automobile that Poole was operating at the time of the accident, and Stewart Motor Company, the dealership that sold the vehicle to Poole's mother.1 Poole's complaint also included fictitiously named defendants.2
On June 10, 2009—two months after the expiration of the two-year statutory limitations period—Poole sought leave from the trial court to amend his original complaint to substitute GM Canada for the fictitiously named defendants. In support of that request, Poole's counsel submitted affidavit testimony indicating that he had been diligently investigating in order to identify all potentially responsible parties and had, on June 10, 2009, learned for the first time that the vehicle had been manufactured by GM Canada. 3 The trial court granted Poole's motion, and, on June 15, 2009, Poole filed an amendment substituting GM Canada for the fictitiously named defendants.
GM Canada filed an answer and raised as an affirmative defense that Poole's claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Thereafter, GM Canada sought a summary judgment in its favor on that ground. Specifically, it argued that it was added as a party after the two-year statute of limitations had expired and that its substitution as a party did not “relate back” to the date the original complaint was filed. Following a hearing, the trial court denied GM Canada's motion. GM Canada then petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus.
This Court will issue a writ of mandamus when the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.” Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So.2d 1270, 1272 (Ala.2001). This Court generally does not review by writ of mandamus a trial court's decision denying a motion for a summary judgment; however, an exception exists in situations like the one before us:
“ ‘...
“Ex parte Jackson, 780 So.2d 681, [684] (Ala.2000).”
Ex parte Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 74 So.3d 424, 427–28 (Ala.2011).
The parties do not dispute that Poole's claims are covered by the two-year statute of limitations found in Ala.Code 1975, § 6–2–38( l ). 4 Poole was injured on April 11, 2007, and his original complaint was timely filed on April 6, 2009. It is undisputed that on June 10, 2009, when Poole sought leave to add GM Canada, the two-year limitations period had expired.
Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides a mechanism by which a party who is “ignorant of the name of an opposing party” may designate that party by a fictitious name. When the opposing party's true name is later discovered, the party may amend the pleadings to substitute that true name.5 Under Rule 15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., such an amendment “relates back to the date of the original pleading when ... relation back is permitted by principles applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to Rule 9(h).” However, the relation-back principle applies only when the plaintiff “is ignorant of the name of an opposing party.” Rule 9(h); Harmon v. Blackwood, 623 So.2d 726, 727 (Ala.1993) (); Marsh v. Wenzel, 732 So.2d 985 (Ala.1998).
“ ‘[i]f the plaintiff knows the identity of the fictitiously named parties or possesses sufficient facts to lead to the discovery of their identity at the time of the filing of the complaint, relation back under fictitious party practice is not permitted and the running of the limitations period is not tolled.’ ”
74 So.3d at 430 (quoting Clay v. Walden Joint Venture, 611 So.2d 254, 256 (Ala.1992) (emphasis added)).
GM Canada contends that Poole did not act with due diligence in attempting to discover its identity because, it argues, Poole and/or his counsel of record should have known that GM Canada manufactured and/or assembled, at least in part, the subject vehicle. Specifically, GM Canada notes that, pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations, see 49 C.F.R. § 567 (2000), it was required to affix a label to the driver's door area of the Impala stating its name as the manufacturer of the vehicle. In its summary-judgment filings below, GM Canada provided a photograph of the door of the vehicle depicting a clearly legible label that indicated that the motor vehicle was “MFD BY GENERAL MOTORS OF CANADA LTD.” GM Canada thus argues that Poole had sufficient and readily available facts—via the door label—to lead to the discovery of its identity. We agree.
In Ex parte Mobile Infirmary, supra, the plaintiff, Shaw, attempted to file a wrongful-death action against several hospitals who had treated the decedent. Shaw filed the action against an entity called Infirmary Health System, Inc. Later, after the statutory limitations period had run, Shaw attempted to substitute Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical Center (“Mobile Infirmary”) for a fictitiously named defendant. In addressing whether this substitution related back to the filing of the original complaint, we stated:
“....
“ ‘[i]f the plaintiff knows the identity of the fictitiously named parties or possesses sufficient facts to lead to the discovery of their identity at the time of the filing of the complaint, relation back under fictitious party practice is not permitted and the...
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