Poole v. United States
| Decision Date | 30 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. CR12-3003-MWB,No. C15-3134-MWB,C15-3134-MWB,CR12-3003-MWB |
| Parties | JAMES EDWARD POOLE, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
A. Criminal Case Proceedings .......................................................................... 2
B. The Petitioner's 2255 Motion ...................................................................... 3
A. Standards For § 2255 Relief ........................................................................ 3
B. Standards For Motions To Dismiss ............................................................. 5
C. Timeliness Of § 2255 Motion ....................................................................... 6
D. Retroactive Application of Rodriguez .......................................................... 7
E. Equitable Tolling Doctrine ........................................................................ 10
F. Certificate of Appealability ........................................................................ 14
This case is before me on respondent's Motion to Dismiss petitioner James Edward Poole's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 To Vacate, Set Aside, Or Correct Sentence By A Person In Federal Custody (civ. docket no. 6), in which the respondent seeks dismissal of Poole's § 2255 motion as untimely pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Poole resists respondent's motion. He contends that his § 2255 motion is timely because he is entitled to relief under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015), in which the Supreme Court held that "a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures." Poole argues that Rodriguez is retroactive because it announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law. Poole alternatively contends that the statute of limitations on his § 2255 motion should be equitably tolled, owing to the death of his wife, which prevented him from timely filing his § 2255 motion.
A. Criminal Case Proceedings
On January 13, 2013, an Indictment was returned against Poole, charging him with conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a substance or mixture containing methamphetamine which contained 50 grams or more of pure methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A) and 846 (Count 1), possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a substance or mixture containing methamphetamine which contained 5 grams or more of pure methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B) (Count 2), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 3).
On August 13, 2013, Poole entered guilty pleas to Counts 1 and 3 of the Indictment. On January 30, 2014, I sentenced Poole to a total of 126 months' incarceration. Judgmentwas entered accordingly on January 31, 2014. Poole did not appeal his conviction or sentence.
B. The Petitioner's 2255 Motion
On July 30, 2015, Poole filed his Motion Under § 2255 To Vacate, Set Aside, Or Correct Sentence By A Person In Federal Custody (civ. docket no. 1). In his § 2255 motion, Poole alleges that (1) a search of his automobile during a traffic stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights pursuant to Rodriguez because the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged, without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, in order to conduct a dog sniff of his automobile, and (2) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, by failing to present an expert witness concerning the cause of marks on his wife's arm. Respondent argues that Poole's § 2255 motion should be dismissed as untimely.
A. Standards For § 2255 Relief
Section 2255 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides as follows:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground [1] that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or [2] that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or [3] that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or [4] is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255; see Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2007) (); Bear Stops v. United States, 339 F.3d 777, 781 (8th Cir. 2003) (). Thus, a motion pursuant to § 2255 "is 'intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal Habeas corpus.'" United States v. Wilson, 997 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974)); accord Auman v. United States, 67 F.3d 157, 161 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Wilson).
One "well established principle" of § 2255 law is that "'[i]ssues raised and decided on direct appeal cannot ordinarily be relitigated in a collateral proceeding based on 28 U.S.C. § 2255.'" Theus v. United States, 611 F.3d 441, 449 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Wiley, 245 F.3d 750, 752 (8th Cir. 2001)); Bear Stops, 339 F.3d at 780. One exception to that principle arises when there is a "miscarriage of justice," although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has "recognized such an exception only when petitioners have produced convincing new evidence of actual innocence," and the Supreme Court has not extended the exception beyond situations involving actual innocence. Wiley, 245 F.3d at 752 . Just as § 2255 may not be used to relitigate issues raised and decided on direct appeal, it also ordinarily "is not available to correct errors which could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal." Ramey v. United States, 8 F.3d 1313, 1314 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). "Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review, the claim may be raised in Habeas only if the defendant can first demonstrate either cause and actual prejudice, or that he is actually innocent." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
"Cause and prejudice" to resuscitate a procedurally defaulted claim may include ineffective assistance of counsel, as defined by the Strickland test, discussed below. Theus,611 F.3d at 449. Indeed, Strickland claims are not procedurally defaulted when brought for the first time pursuant to § 2255, because of the advantages of that form of proceeding for hearing such claims. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003). Otherwise, "[t]he Supreme Court recognized in Bousley that 'a claim that "is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel" may constitute cause for a procedural default.'" United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622, in turn quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984)). The "actual innocence" that may overcome either procedural default or allow relitigation of a claim that was raised and rejected on direct appeal is a demonstration "'that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [the petitioner].'" Johnson v. United States, 278 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623); see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006). "'This is a strict standard; generally, a petitioner cannot show actual innocence where the evidence is sufficient to support a [conviction on the challenged offense].'" Id. (quoting McNeal v. United States, 249 F.3d 747, 749-50 (8th Cir. 2001)).
B. Standards For Motions To Dismiss
Section 2255 proceedings are civil in nature and, therefore, governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see, e.g., Mandacina v. United States, 328 F.3d 995, 1000 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2003), including Rule 12(b), which provides for a pre-answer motion to dismiss on various grounds. Although factual "plausibility" is ordinarily the central focus of Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss under the Twom-bal standard, various federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have expressly recognized, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested, that the Twom-bal standard still permits dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of a claim that lacks a cognizable legal theory, in addition to permitting dismissal for factual implausibility. See, e.g., Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013); Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 469 (3d Cir. 2013) (); Commonwealth Property Advocates, L.L. C. v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Cir. 2011) ();...
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