Pooler v. Nassau Univ. Med. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 23 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–cv–119 (JFB)(ARL).,10–cv–119 (JFB)(ARL).
• Citation: 848 F.Supp.2d 332
• Parties: Keith POOLER, Plaintiff, v. NASSAU UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

848 F.Supp.2d 332

Keith POOLER, Plaintiff,

v.NASSAU UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants.

No. 10–cv–119 (JFB)(ARL).

United States District Court,

E.D. New York.

March 23, 2012.

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, Pine City, NY.

Edward J. Troy and Alexander V. Sansone, Law Office of Edward J. Troy, Greenlawn, NY, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

Plaintiff Keith Pooler (“Pooler” or “plaintiff”) brought this action against the Nassau Health Care Corporation, sued herein as Nassau University Medical Center (“NHCC”), Dr. Bruce David (“David”) and Joseph Farhangian (“Farhangian”) (collectively, “defendants”) alleging violations of Pooler's constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that defendants showed deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's serious medical need when they denied the plaintiff medication for “anxiety and sleeping disorder” and the plaintiff subsequently suffered a “massive anxiety attack” that triggered a suicide attempt. Specifically, on December 23, 2009, plaintiff jumped from the second tier of E2A dorm, landing feet first. Plaintiff also alleges various state law claims, including negligence.

The defendants now move for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that: (1) plaintiff failed to exhaust his remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), and (2) no rational jury could find that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with defendants and grants defendants' motion for summary judgment on the federal claims in its entirety. In particular, with respect to the failure to exhaust, the uncontroverted evidence in the record establishes that (1) there is a well-established Grievance Procedure in the Inmate Handbook, which plaintiff confirmed he received, requiring a grievance to be filed within five days of the occurrence; (2) plaintiff was familiar with the grievance procedure because he had filed at least two prior grievances regarding his medical care (unrelated to the issues in this lawsuit); (3) plaintiff did not file a grievance with respect to the alleged lack of medical care that is the subject of this lawsuit; and (4) no special circumstances prevented plaintiff from filing such a grievance, nor is there any other exception to the exhaustion requirement that applies here. Thus, summary judgment is warranted in defendants' favor based upon plaintiff's failure to exhaust his remedies under the PLRA regarding the medical care at issue in this lawsuit.

In any event, even assuming arguendo that plaintiff had properly exhausted his claims, summary judgment would still be warranted on the medical indifference claims because, based upon the uncontrovertedevidence, no rational factfinder could conclude that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. First, with respect to defendant David, it is uncontroverted that (1) David saw plaintiff only once (over six months prior to the December 23rd incident); (2) plaintiff's counselor at the drug treatment program reported that plaintiff was “extremely manipulative”; (3) plaintiff reported no history of psychiatric hospitalization, and did not claim to have current thoughts of suicide (although he had in the past); and (4) David offered plaintiff mental health services and counseling to help with coping skills (which plaintiff received). Given these uncontroverted facts, no rational jury could find David to have been deliberately indifferent to a serious medical condition or to a threat to plaintiff's health and safety. Second, with respect to defendant Farhangian, there are no specific allegations against him in the complaint. In any event, to the extent that plaintiff is claiming that Farhangian should have provided him with medication, it is uncontroverted that (1) Farhangian, as a social worker, cannot prescribe medication; (2) during the December 3, 2009 interview, plaintiff denied making any statement that he had threatened to kill himself, and Farhangian scheduled him for further counseling the next day; (3) Farhangian saw plaintiff again on December 18, 2009 and found him to be cooperative and future oriented; (4) Farahangian was aware of a history of plaintiff making suicide threats to get what he wanted; (5) on December 23, 2009 although plaintiff stated he was “going to kill himself,” he did not have a plan, and Farhangian did not believe plaintiff was suicidal, but rather was concerned about his housing situation; and (6) Farhangian offered to place plaintiff in protective custody, and reported his housing issues to Corrections. As with defendant David, no rational jury could conclude, given these uncontroverted facts, that Farhangian was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical condition. Finally, the Monell claim against the NHCC cannot survive summary judgment because there is no underlying Eighth Amendment violation against the individual defendants and, in any event, because there is no evidence of a policy, practice, or custom at the NHCC that deprived plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Given that the federal claims cannot survive summary judgment, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and, thus, dismisses them without prejudice.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The Court has taken the facts set forth below from the parties' depositions, affidavits, and exhibits, and from the parties' respective Rule 56.1 Statements of Facts. Upon consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the Court shall construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir.2005). Unless otherwise noted, where a party's 56.1 Statement is cited, that fact is undisputed or the opposing party has pointed to no evidence in the record to contradict it.¹ Specifically, the Court notes that plaintiff often disputes a factual statement, but provides no explanation for why he is disputing it (because he lacks personal knowledge of the fact) and does not cite to any evidence in the record to contradict the fact.

Plaintiff entered Nassau County Correctional Center (“NCCC”) on June 13, 2009, and remained there until April 18, 2011, when he was transferred to State custody. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 1.) Upon admission to NCCC, the plaintiff was examined at Medical Intake. He reported a history of hypertension, borderline diabetes mellitus, anxiety and depression, with a prior suicide attempt in 2006. ( Id. at ¶ 2.) Plaintiff had recently been released from State custody, and was attending a drug treatment program referred to as “EDNY,” as part of his parole. ( Id. at ¶ 3.) He reported that his counselor at EDNY was named Angela, but could not recall the name of his medication. ( Id.)

Defendants state that plaintiff threatened suicide while in state custody prior to entering NCCC. ( Id.) Plaintiff confirmed this at his deposition, explaining that he had attempted suicide by hanging himself “from the bunk” while he was in state custody in 2007. (Plaintiff's Deposition, Defs.' Mot. for Summary Judgment, Ex. H (“Pl.'s Dep.”) at 24.) In his 56.1 statement, however, plaintiff denies threatening suicide while in state custody. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 3.) While in state custody, plaintiff received counseling, but was not medicated. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 3.)

On June 13, 2009, plaintiff was interviewed by Felice Barasch, a psychiatric social worker. (Defs.' 56.1 at ¶ 5.) During this interview, plaintiff reported his treatment at EDNY for anxiety and sleep problems, and related that in the past he had had thoughts of suicide and had made suicidal gestures. ( Id.) Plaintiff confirmed a history of substance of abuse. ( Id.)

On June 15, 2009, David interviewed plaintiff as part of plaintiff's mental health evaluation. ( Id. at ¶ 6.) In performing this assessment, David contacted Angela Rainey, plaintiff's counselor at EDNY, and reviewed Barasch's intake notes. ( Id.) Rainey advised David that the plaintiff was receiving Seroquel at bedtime, and Celexa for anxiety. ( Id. at ¶ 7.) ² During the interview with David, plaintiff related that he had a serious history of drug abuse, including cannabis and crack cocaine. ( Id.) Plaintiff reported no history of psychiatric hospitalization. ( Id.)

Following the interview, David found that plaintiff was neither depressed nor suicidal, and concluded that he was not in need of medication. ³ ( Id. at ¶ 8.) Instead, David offered the plaintiff mental health services and counseling to help with his coping skills. ( Id.) David had no further interactions with plaintiff. ( Id.) Plaintiff's mental health chart reveals that plaintiff was subsequently seen for regularly scheduled counseling visits through September 2009, and thereafter on request. ( Id.)

Although plaintiff was seen primarily by Laura Luzi, a licensed clinical social worker in the department, plaintiff was also interviewed on a number of occasions by Joseph Farhangian, another licensed clinical social worker who was responsible for supervising the staff of social workers in NCCC. ( Id. at ¶ 9.) On December 3, 2009, Farhangian saw plaintiff at the request of staff at NCCC (“Corrections”) after it was reported that plaintiff was considering killing himself. ( Id. at ¶ 10.) At the interview, plaintiff denied that he was suicidal, relating that he “just wanted to see someone.” ( Id.) Farhangian next saw plaintiff on December 18, 2009 for a scheduled appointment. ( Id. at ¶ 11.) ⁴

On December 23, 2009, Farhangian again interviewed the plaintiff. ( Id. at ¶ 12.) Defendants state that Corrections requested that Farhangian interview the plaintiff because the plaintiff had said he was “going to kill himself.” ( Id.) Plaintiff, however, states that he never said he was “going to kill himself,” and in fact said he was “harmful...