Pooley v. Dutton
| Decision Date | 12 May 1914 |
| Docket Number | No. 29,065.,29,065. |
| Citation | 165 Iowa 745,147 N.W. 154 |
| Parties | POOLEY v. DUTTON ET AL. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Greene County; M. E. Hutchinson, Judge.
Action at law to recover damages on account of the alleged wrongful acts of the defendants in conspiring to alienate from the plaintiff the affections of his wife. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant O. J. Dutton appeals. The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. Reversed.W. W. Turner, of Grand Junction, and Wilson & Albert, of Jefferson, for appellant.
A. D. Howard and Church & McCully, all of Jefferson, for appellee.
Plaintiff and Pauline Dutton were married on July 30, 1910. Pauline is the daughter of the defendants, O. J. Dutton and wife, and up to the time of her marriage lived with her parents at their home in Grand Junction, Iowa. Plaintiff began paying some attention to Pauline in the year 1909, and at first her parents do not seem to have opposed it, but later, apparently becoming convinced that he was not a suitable person, they discouraged the intimacy between the young people, and used their influence with their daughter to dissuade her from marriage. As usual in such cases, this advice seems to have had little effect, and on the date named plaintiff and Pauline clandestinely met in Des Moines, where the marriage ceremony was performed. On the evening of that day they called up the Dutton home by telephone and reported their marriage. The precise conversation thus had between plaintiff and his wife, on the one hand and defendants, on the other, are a matter of dispute, but it is reasonably clear that Mrs. Dutton became much excited, upbraided the young people for their conduct, and probably demanded that her daughter come home, but she declined to do so. Plaintiff and Pauline spent several weeks in various hotels at different places, after which Pauline returned to her parents. Plaintiff also soon came back to Grand Junction or vicinity, calling frequently on his wife. They went out together and visited various towns, plaintiff's ostensible purpose being to find suitable employment or to find a location for establishing himself in business as a pharmacist, an object he did not succeed in accomplishing. From an early date in their married life differences arose between the young husband and wife, and these gradually assumed greater proportions, until the separation became complete, and on April 27, 1911, a little less than nine months after their marriage, this action was begun against the wife's parents.
The petition is unnecessarily prolix, much of the matter set out being allegations of evidence, rather than ultimate facts. The substance of the complaint is that defendants, father and mother of Pauline, conspired together to alienate her affections from her husband, and to that end they misrepresented and villified him to her and in her presence, and in various ways brought to bear upon her their influence and powers of persuasion to induce her to repudiate him, and did, in fact, thereby lead and induce her to withdraw from him her affection and confidence and to refuse to live with him.
The defendants answered separately denying all plaintiff's allegations of wrong on their part, and saying that, if plaintiff's wife had ceased to love and care for him, it was because of his own misconduct and maltreatment of her.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $11,000, of which sum he was required by the trial court to remit one-half, or $5,500, as a condition of avoiding a new trial. The defendant O. J. Dutton alone appeals.
The record of testimony is voluminous, and we shall make no attempt at its recital, except so far as it may appear necessary for the proper disposal of the principal assignments of error on which a reversal is sought. Of these the following appear to be the most material:
[1][2] I. It is the essence of plaintiff's complaint that his wife has become alienated from him, and has ceased to love and respect him, and that this condition is the result of the wrongful interference of the appellant. This is denied by the appellant, who further says that, if there be any alienation, it is due to the plaintiff's own fault in the treatment of his wife. The mental and emotional attitude of the wife toward her husband and the cause thereof were therefore legitimate subjects of inquiry before the jury. They could be established by evidence either direct or circumstantial. Probably the only person who could give direct testimony as to the actual state of the wife's affections or explain the real cause of their alienation from her husband was the wife herself. In support of defendant's theory that, if plaintiff had lost the affection and regard of his wife, it was chargeable to his mistreatment of her, the wife testified that within a very short time after their marriage plaintiff began falsely accusing her of flirting with other men, declared to her that her mother was not a good woman, falsely charged her with murdering his child, wrote her a letter reiterating his charges, and saying that he hated her, and, with reference to these matters, she was asked, in substance, to state the effect thereof upon her affection for her husband. All testimony of this nature was excluded, upon the objection of plaintiff, as being incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, and calling for a conclusion, rather than a fact, and asking the witness “to pass upon a jury question.” So also, plaintiff having testified that his wife received numerous letters from her mother, in which he was referred to in contemptuous and abusive terms, and that these communications appeared to make her discontented and and unhappy and caused her to weep, the wife, being examined upon part of defendants, denied the truth of most of these statements. Pursuing their inquiry concerning the correspondence between her and her mother, she was asked by counsel for defendant whether the letters so received by her did, in fact, affect her feelings toward her husband. Answer to this question was also excluded, as being a conclusion merely, and not a material fact to which the witness could be permitted to testify.
All these exceptions may be considered together. We are of the opinion that all the testimony thus excluded was both competent and material. Indeed, the rule making it admissible is too well settled to admit of serious doubt. It has not often arisen in this state upon precisely similar facts, but the principle here approved has been often recognized. Stated generally, the rule is that, whenever it becomes material, in determining rights involved in litigation, to show the motive, intent, or other mental operation of any person, or to ascertain the reasons or influences which have induced certain action or conduct on his part, such person may testify directly thereto, even though such testimony may partake in some degree of the nature of a conclusion. City Bank v. Jordan, 139 Iowa, 499, 117 N. W. 758; 1 Wigmore on Evidence, § 581; 2 Elliott's Evidence, § 825; Heap v. Parrish, 104 Ind. 39, 3 N. E. 549;Flam v. Lee, 116 Iowa, 289, 90 N. W. 70, 93 Am. St. Rep. 242; Watson v. Cheshire, 18 Iowa, 211, 87 Am. Dec. 382; Frost v. Rosecrans, 66 Iowa, 405, 23 N. W. 895;Bartlett v. Falk, 110 Iowa, 346, 81 N. W. 602;Spalding v. Lowe, 56 Mich. 374, 23 N. W. 46;McCormick v. Hiatt, 4 Neb. (Unof.) 587, 95 N. W. 627;Gout v. Stewart, 96 Minn. 230, 104 N. W. 966. Directly in point is the case of Millspaugh v. Potter, 62 Misc. Rep. 521, 71 N. Y. Supp. 134. See, also, Childs v. Muckler, 105 Iowa, 281, 75 N. W. 100;Tasker v. Stanley, 153 Mass. 148, 26 N. E. 417, 10 L. R. A. 468.
It is true the intent or motive or the reasons influencing a person to any given act may be, and often are, shown by the circumstances attending and characterizing the act itself; but, if the fact be material upon the issues joined, it may also be established by the direct testimony of such person. He alone knows the truth with respect to such matter, and to refuse his testimony is to reject the only direct proof available, and decide the fact solely as a matter of inference from extraneous circumstances. The excluded testimony was not only competent, but very material also. That plaintiff's wife had ceased to hold him in affectionate regard is quite evident, but proof of this fact alone is manifestly insufficient to entitle him to a verdict. The defendants can be made liable only upon a showing that this result has been caused by wrongful and malicious interference on their part. It was their right in defense to show, if they could, not only that plaintiff had ill-used his wife, but also that such treatment had caused a withdrawal of her trust, confidence and love. The effect of the ruling complained of was to admit evidence of the alleged facts of ill treatment, but to exclude proof of the more important fact as to the effect of such treatment upon the attitude of the wife toward her husband. The error must be presumed to have been prejudicial to the defense.
[3] II. Over the objection of the defendant, plaintiff was permitted to introduce...
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