Poore v. Conagra Foods, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 September 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 11-CV-44-JHP
• Parties: AUSTIN POORE, Plaintiff, v. CONAGRA FOODS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma

AUSTIN POORE, Plaintiff,

v.CONAGRA FOODS, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 11-CV-44-JHP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

Dated: September 12, 2011

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Brief in Support (Docket No. 16), Plaintiff's Response thereto (Docket No. 18), Defendant's subsequent Reply (Docket No. 25), and Plaintiff's Surreply (Docket No. 27). Defendant's Motion to Dismiss attacks the Amended Complaint by arguing that (1) federal subject matter jurisdiction does not exist because the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 905(b) and 933(b),¹ does not apply to the facts of this case, and (2) even if LHWCA did apply to the facts of this case, the case would be barred by the statute of limitations. The court finds that the this case does not fall under admiralty jurisdiction (28U.S.C. §§ 1333), therefore LHWCA does not apply² and federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331) also does not exist.³ As the LHWCA is not applicable to this case, Plaintiff Austin Poore's cause of action is a negligence action arising under Oklahoma state law. While this court has federal subject matter jurisdiction over that claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction), Oklahoma's two-year statute of limitations for torts applies to bar the instant case. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.

FACTS

Plaintiff Austin Poore ("Poore") is a citizen of Oklahoma and was employed by Lloyd Richards Temps, located in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Amended Complaint at 1-2, Docket No. 13. Defendant ConAgra Foods, Inc. ("ConAgra") is incorporated in Delaware, with its headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska, and does business in several states including Oklahoma. Id. at 1. Poore was assigned through Lloyd Richards Temps to work for ConAgra as part of a clean-up crew on ConAgra's vessel, located at the Port of Catoosa, Oklahoma. Id. at 1-2; Response to Motion toDismiss at 5, Docket No. 18. ConAgra's manager instructed Poore to work on and/or around the vessel owned by ConAgra on January 21, 2008. Amended Complaint at 2, Docket No. 13. On that date, Poore allegedly fell approximately twenty feet from a ladder which was part of ConAgra's vessel and sustained severe injuries.⁴ Poore claims these injuries were a direct result of ConAgra's negligent maintenance and/or supervision of their vessel. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Poore's First Amended Complaint appears to allege federal subject matter jurisdiction exists under both 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (admiralty) and § 1332 (diversity), therefore both bases of jurisdiction will be discussed in this opinion. Plaintiff has argued for the existence of admiralty jurisdiction because with it comes the potential that LHWCA's longer statute of limitation applies to the case.

A. Admiralty Jurisdiction

Originally, the applicability of admiralty jurisdiction to any case depended on a strict test of locality: if an injury occurred on navigable waters, maritime law applied to the case. See Executive Jet Aviation Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S. 249, 253 (1972). In 1972, the Supreme Court held in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Ohio that "maritime locality alone is not a sufficient predicate for admiralty jurisdiction in aviation tort cases"⁵ and"[i]t is far more consistent with the history and purpose of admiralty to require also that the wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity."⁶ Thus the Executive Jet test established that, for maritime jurisdiction to exist, in addition to the incident occurring at a "maritime locality," there must be a connection between the cause of the injury and "traditional maritime activity." Together, these two requirements are referred to as the "situs" and "nexus" factors, respectively.⁷ Thus, after Executive Jet, the simple fact that an injury occurred on navigable waters is insufficient to invoke the admiralty jurisdiction. In Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, the Supreme Court expanded the applicability of the Executive Jet test, making it clear that any party asserting admiralty jurisdiction must demonstrate a nexus between the tort and traditional maritime activity.⁸

Therefore, in order to establish admiralty jurisdiction over his claim, Poore must do more than merely attempt to state a claim under LHWCA § 905(b). Courts have generally held that alleging a cause of action under a maritime law "does not automatically confer admiralty or federal question jurisdiction."⁹ Pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in Executive Jet and subsequent caselaw, any maritime claim must meet the two-prong analysis stated in Executive Jet.¹⁰ Likewise, a tort claim cannot be maintained pursuant to maritime law, such as LHWCA, ifthe Executive Jet test is not satisfied.¹¹ Thus, both the existence of admiralty jurisdiction and the applicability of § 905(b) to Poore's case hinge on whether the facts of Poore's comport with the "situs" and "nexus" factors delineated above.

1. "Situs"

Poore's claim satisfies the "situs" factor of the Executive Jet test because his injury occurred on navigable waters.¹² Poore's Amended Complaint alleges that the injury occurred while Poore was part of a clean-up crew on or around the vessel owned by ConAgra, which was "at port" in the Port of Catoosa on the date of Poore's injury.¹³ A port is "[a] harbor where ships load and unload cargo,"¹⁴ meaning the water is deep enough along the shore so a vessel can anchor.¹⁵ ConAgra's vessel, on which Poore was injured, was "at port" when Poore was injured. General knowledge of these words implies that the vessel was anchored on the waters of the Port of Catoosa when Poore was injured; therefore Poore's injury occurred on navigable waters and the "situs" factor is satisfied.

2. "Nexus"

The "nexus" factor asks whether "the wrong bear[s] a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity."¹⁶ When analyzing the issue of whether there is "a substantial relationship between the activity giving rise to the incident and traditional maritime activity," thecourt must first "define the relevant activity."¹⁷ "[T]he relevant 'activity' is defined not by the particular circumstances of the incident, but by the general conduct from which the incident arose."¹⁸ Poore asserts that his injury occurred when he fell from a ladder while cleaning ConAgra's vessel at port in the Port of Catoosa.¹⁹ Thus, for the purposes of this jurisdictional analysis, the general conduct from which the injury arose was cleaning a vessel.

Next, the court must determine whether the general conduct, in this case cleaning a vessel, is substantially related to a traditional maritime activity.²⁰ Interpreting the Supreme Court precedent found in Executive Jet, Foremost, and Sisson, the district court in Ozzello v. Peterson Builders, Inc. found that

the following factors weigh in favor of exercising maritime tort jurisdiction:

—when the accident occurs in the course of maritime service;

—when the accident occurs in the course of navigation;

—when the accident occurs in the course of promoting maritime commerce or presents a hazard to maritime commerce;

—when the conduct gives rise to the need for the application of admiralty law, particularly the uniform "rules of the road" governing navigation.²¹

In Ozzello, the plaintiff had sued under LHWCA § 905(b) after being injured while participating in the general activity of shipbuilding.²² Ozzello had been testing and inspecting equipment installed on the vessel by his employer when he stepped on a hose nozzle negligently left in his path and sprained his ankle.²³ Analyzing whether Ozzello's shipbuilding activity was a "traditional maritime activity" according to the factors set out above, the court noted:

[O]nly the location of Ozzello's injury weighs in favor of exercising admiralty jurisdiction. . . . However, the involvement of the [ship] was tangential. The ship was not in navigation at the time of the injury and the plaintiffs presented no evidence that the general conduct involved had any effect on maritime commerce. Moreover, there is no evidence that William Ozzello or any of [his employer's] personnel were performing the work of seamen or that the hazard (a hose nozzle) is a piece of equipment perculiar to ships or navigation.

Under these circumstances, the resolution of the Ozzellos' claims does not require the special expertise of a court in admiralty. The fundamental interests giving rise to the need to apply admiralty law are the protection of maritime commerce and the need for uniform rules of navigation. . . .

The conduct which forms the basis for the Ozzellos' claims is more closely related to land-based negligence than to negligence taking place in maritime commerce or navigation. Furthermore, legal issues are identical to those presented in countless other stumble and fall cases that are resolved by local tort law.²⁴

The Ozzello court concluded that "there was no substantial relationship between Ozzello's injury and traditional maritime activity."²⁵

While Ozzello involved the general activity of shipbuilding in contrast to this case's activity of cleaning a vessel, the reasoning in Ozzello is applicable. None of the factors mentioned in Supreme Court precedent favor admiralty jurisdiction in this case except that of locality. Indeed, Poore's injury occurred on navigable waters, but the connection to admiralty ends there. ConAgra's vessel was not "in navigation" at the time of the injury - it is undisputed that the vessel was "at port" at that time. Plaintiff has presented no evidence nor argued any connection to "maritime commerce" other than an unsupported and conclusive statement made in plaintiff's response brief.²⁶ If there be a connection between cleaning a vessel and maritime commerce, such...