Poorman v. Muncy & Bartle Painting, AO-258

• Decision Date: 13 July 1983
• Docket Number: No. AO-258,AO-258
• Citation: 433 So.2d 1371
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Parties: Wayne POORMAN, Appellant, v. MUNCY & BARTLE PAINTING and Reliance Insurance Company, Appellees.

Page 1371

433 So.2d 1371

Wayne POORMAN, Appellant, v. MUNCY & BARTLE PAINTING and Reliance Insurance Company, Appellees.

No. AO-258.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

July 13, 1983.

David B. Kesler, St. Petersburg, for appellant.

John H. Thompson, IV, of Earle & Thompson, St. Petersburg, for appellees.

SHIVERS, Judge.

In this workers' compensation case, Poorman appeals the order of the deputy commissioner which denies compensability for an injury to claimant's right knee. We agree with appellant that the findings of the deputy commissioner are not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Therefore, we reverse and remand.

Poorman is 52 years old and has been a painter for 26 years. He has been employed with appellee employer for the great majority of that time, and he is now employed with the employer in a supervisory capacity. On March 26, 1979, while employed as a painter, claimant testified that he and a coworker were moving a coffee table. They lifted the table and claimant started to pivot to the right when pain hit. Claimant testified that the pain went from his shoulder down to his back, his hip, leg and right knee. He testified that his right knee "locked up."

Poorman first saw Dr. Stephens, a chiropractor, on March 27, 1979, the day after the industrial accident. Dr. Stephens' office notes from March 27, 1979, state: "Moving furniture to be able to paint--felt knee & back give way. Continued to work." Dr. Stephens treated claimant initially for the low back problem, and eventually began treating claimant for the right knee problem. Poorman also saw Dr. Wallace, an orthopedic surgeon, during June and July 1979. Dr. Wallace testified that claimant failed to give a history of knee injury and at no time made complaints relative to a knee injury resulting from the industrial accident of March 26, 1979. Dr. Wallace testified that in his opinion claimant's knee injury was not consistent with the injuries sustained in the industrial accident. Claimant also saw Dr. O'Connor, an orthopedic surgeon, in August 1979. Dr. O'Connor opined that there was a causal connection between the right knee injury and the industrial accident based on his belief that claimant began complaining of the knee symptoms within a few months of the industrial accident.

The claimant was paid permanent partial disability benefits for his injury to the low back, but the employer/carrier contended that the right knee injury was not compensable due to no causal connection with the industrial accident. Poorman made a claim for Dr. O'Connor to do an arthroscopic examination of the right knee and a partial meniscectomy and for attorney's fees and costs. The deputy commissioner denied the claim, finding that the right knee injury was not causally related to the industrial accident.

The only live testimony taken by the deputy commissioner was that of claimant. Since claimant testified that his right knee "locked up" during the industrial accident, it is clear that the deputy commissioner would have found the right knee injury compensable if he had believed claimant. Although the deputy commissioner found the claimant to be a sincere, honest person, he also found claimant to be confused. Therefore, the deputy commissioner based his decision totally on the medical depositions. We note that the vantage point of this court is not inferior to that of the deputy commissioner in interpreting deposition evidence. Kelly v. Florida Atlantic University, 413 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). We find that the medical evidence sub judice leads to a conclusion of compensability.

Where an injury is shown, and the evidence presents a sufficiently logical explanation of a causal relationship between the accident and the subsequent injury, the burden shifts to the employer/carrier to show a more logical cause. Looney v. W. & J. Construction Co., 289 So.2d 723 (Fla.1974); Sanford v. A.P. Clark Motors, 45 So.2d 185 (Fla.1950); McNew v. Southern Intermodal Logistics, 380 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The evidence in the instant case demonstrates that claimant's industrial accident was such a logical cause and that the employer/carrier failed to show any more logical cause. The deputy commissioner's legal conclusion of non-compensability relies heavily on two of his factual findings. First, the deputy commissioner states: "Dr. O'Connor said that in order for the knee condition to have been caused by the accident, that the claimant's knee problems should have begun within two months of the date of the accident." In fact, however, Dr. O'Connor's testimony was that "[h]e could have had the symptoms anytime from a few weeks afterwards to a few months afterwards." ¹ Second, the deputy commissioner's order states: "Dr. Stephens' office notes do not reflect an actual entry as to a complaint about the knee until July 10, 1979, approximately three and one-half months after the accident." The deputy commissioner apparently overlooked the handwritten office note of Dr. Stephens executed on March 27, 1979, the day after the accident, which states: "Moving furniture to be able to paint--felt knee & back give way. Continued to work." The deputy commissioner also apparently overlooked the testimony of Dr. Stephens that "[h]e complained of the knee from the beginning and I really associated it more with the nerve in his back, but as we went on, my recollection is that we started treating both the back and the knee."

The only evidence which...