MEMORANDUM–DECISION and ORDER
LAWRENCE E. KAHN, District Judge.
I. |
INTRODUCTION |
308 |
II. |
LEGAL STANDARD |
309 |
A. |
Voting Rights Act |
309 |
B. |
Gingles Framework |
310 |
III. |
FINDINGS OF FACT |
311 |
1. |
Parties |
311 |
2. |
County Redistricting Process |
311 |
3. |
Prior Section 2 Litigation |
311 |
a. |
1991 Litigation |
311 |
b. |
2003 Litigation (“Arbor Hill” Litigation) |
312 |
4. |
2010 Census |
313 |
5. |
2011 County Redistricting |
314 |
a. |
The Commission |
314 |
b. |
Definition of Minority Used in Redistricting |
315 |
c. |
Draft Maps |
316 |
d. |
Public Involvement in Redistricting Process |
316 |
e. |
Local Law C |
316 |
a. |
Arbor Hill Environmental Justice (“AHEJ”) Plan |
318 |
b. |
Plaintiffs' Illustrative Plans |
318 |
7. |
City Redistricting Process |
319 |
B. |
First Gingles Precondition: Compactness and Numerosity of Minority Community |
319 |
C. |
Statistical Methods Used to Determine Voter Behavior |
319 |
D. |
Second Gingles Precondition: Political Cohesion |
320 |
1. |
Expert Reports and Testimony |
320 |
2. |
Anecdotal Evidence |
321 |
E. |
Third Gingles Precondition: Racial Bloc Voting that Usually Defeats Minority's Preferred Candidate |
321 |
1. |
Expert Reports and Testimony |
321 |
2. |
Additional Relevant Elections |
323 |
F. |
Totality of the Circumstances |
325 |
1. |
History of Voting–Related Discrimination |
325 |
2. |
Racially Polarized Voting |
325 |
3. |
Dilution–Enhancing Voting Practices an d Procedures |
325 |
4. |
Access to Slating Process |
325 |
5. |
Effects of Past Discrimination |
326 |
6. |
Racial Appeals in Campaigns |
327 |
7. |
Past Election of Minority Group Members |
327 |
8. |
Responsiveness to Minority Needs |
327 |
IV. |
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW |
329 |
A. |
Expert Testimony |
329 |
B. |
Spoliation |
331 |
C. |
Vote Dilution Claim |
332 |
1. |
Probative Elections |
332 |
2. |
Political Cohesion |
333 |
a. |
Statistical Evidence of Cohesion |
333 |
b. |
Anecdotal Evidence of Cohesion |
334 |
3. |
Racial Bloc Voting that Usually Defeats the Minority–Preferred Candidate |
335 |
a. |
Racial Bloc Voting |
336 |
b. |
Minority–Preferred Candidate “Usually” Defeated |
336 |
4. |
Totality of the Circumstances |
341 |
a. |
History of Voting–Related Discrimination |
341 |
b. |
Racially Polarized Voting |
342 |
c. |
Dilution–Enhancing Voting Practices and Procedures |
343 |
d. |
Access to Slating Process |
343 |
e. |
Effects of Past Discrimination |
344 |
f. |
Racial Appeals in Campaigns |
345 |
g. |
Past Election of Minority Group Members |
345 |
h. |
Responsiveness to Minority Needs |
347 |
i. |
Tenuousness Underlying Redistricting Policy |
347 |
j. |
Effective MMDs |
349 |
k. |
Proportionality |
350 |
A. |
Remedial Plan |
351 |
B. |
Attorney's Fees |
351 |
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Anne Pope, Wanda Willingham, Geraldine Bell, Samuel Coleman, Lee Pinckney, Vicente Alfonso, and Elaine Frazier (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) commenced this action against Defendants County of Albany (the “County”) and Albany County Board of Elections (collectively, “Defendants”), challenging the 2011 redistricting of the Albany County Legislature (“Legislature”) under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”), 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (“Section 2”). See Dkt. No. 254 (“Second Amended Complaint”).1 Plaintiffs allege that the VRA requires the creation of an additional majority-minority district (“MMD”) in the County Legislature following population shifts reflected in the 2010 Census.
This matter was tried at an eleven-day bench trial before the Court between November 6, 2014 and January 13, 2015.2 See generally Dkt. Nos. 406–16 (collectively, “Trial Transcript”); see also Dkt. No. 336. At issue in the trial was whether: (1) the County's redistricting plan dilutes the voting strength of black voters under Section 2; (2) the County's plan dilutes the voting strength of a combined minority population of black and Hispanic voters under Section 2 (“coalition claim”); and (3) Plaintiffs are entitled to an adverse inference based on Defendants' spoliation of evidence. Prior to trial, the parties submitted a joint pre-trial stipulation. Dkt. No. 321 (“JPS”). In lieu of closing arguments, the parties submitted post-trial briefs, and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Dkt. Nos. 421 (“Plaintiffs' Trial Brief”); 422; 424–1 (“Defendants' Trial Brief”).3 Both parties also filed Replies. Dkt. Nos. 425 (“Defendants' Reply Brief”); 426 (“Plaintiffs' Reply Brief”).
Based on the testimony at trial and evidence submitted, the Court finds that while laudable progress to address racial disparities in the County has been made, the County's redistricting plan diluted the voting strength of black voters in Albany County in violation of the VRA. This conclusion renders it unnecessary for the Court to reach the issue of Plaintiffs' coalition claim. The Court's specific findings of fact and conclusions of law follow.4
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The VRA was enacted “to help effectuate the Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee that no citizen's right to vote shall ‘be denied or abridged ... on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.’ ” Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 152, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 122 L.Ed.2d 500 (1993) (citing U.S. Constitution, Amdt. 15 and NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 350, 93 S.Ct. 2591, 37 L.Ed.2d 648 (1973) ). “Congress enacted Section 2 of the [VRA] to eliminate discrimination in voting present since the end of the Reconstruction period in the 1870's.” Reed v. Town of Babylon, 914 F.Supp. 843, 861 (E.D.N.Y.1996). Section 2 provides that “[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). Section 2 is violated if:
based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
Id. § 10301(b).
Courts assess the merits of Section 2 vote dilution claims under the three-step framework established in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). To prevail on a claim under Section 2, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the alleged minority group is sufficiently numerous and geographically compact to compose a majority of a single-member district; (2) members of the minority group are politically cohesive; and (3) white bloc voting is usually sufficient to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. See generally id. at 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752 ; see also Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–41, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 122 L.Ed.2d 388 (1993) (holding that Gingles applies to single-member districting schemes). To prevail, a plaintiff must “prove each of these preconditions by a preponderance of the evidence.” Reed, 914 F.Supp. at 863 (citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50, 106 S.Ct. 2752 ).
Though Plaintiffs must satisfy the three Gingles preconditions in order to prevail on their claim, the preconditions alone “are not sufficient to prove a § 2 violation.” NAACP, Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls, N.Y., 65 F.3d 1002, 1019 (2d Cir.1995) (citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994) ). Although it would be “a very unusual case” where a plaintiff establishes the Gingles factors and fails to establish a Section 2 violation, courts still must consider the totality of the circumstances—additional indicia that tend to show a pattern and history of discrimination and a need for redress. Id. at 1019 n. 21 (quoting Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1135 (3d Cir.1993) ). This inquiry focuses on the following factors as “typically relevant to a vote dilution inquiry:”
the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision; the extent to which voting in the elections of the State or political subdivision is racially polarized; the extent to which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting; the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes; the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
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