Pope v. Heckscher

• Decision Date: 31 December 1934
• Citation: 266 N.Y. 114,194 N.E. 53
• Parties: POPE v. HECKSCHER.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

266 N.Y. 114

194 N.E. 53

POPE

v.HECKSCHER.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 31, 1934.

Action by Fred H. Pope, as trustee in bankruptcy, against August Heckscher. An order of Special Term denying defendant's motion to dismiss the first cause of action set forth in the complaint was affirmed by the Appellate Division (242 App. Div. 611, 271 N. Y. S. 1065), and defendant, by permission, appeals.

Orders reversed, motion to dismiss the first cause of action granted, and question certified answered. The following question was certified: ‘Do the allegations pleaded as a first cause of action in the complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action?’

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Frank A. Fritz, of New York City, for appellant.

James Marshall and Harold P. Seligson, both of New York City, for respondent.

LOUGHRAN, Judge.

The first cause of action declares upon a judgment of the superior court in bankruptcy of a province in the Dominion of Canada for the balance unpaid upon a subscription by the defendant to the stock of a Canadian corporation. This recovery, it is sufficiently alleged, was had at the suit of the plaintiff, the trustee in bankruptcy of the corporation, in full accordance with the laws of the Dominion of Canada, after service of process by mail directed to the defendant at his address in this state. It is also alleged: ‘That it is and at all times herein mentioned was the law of Canada that any person becoming a stockholder in a Canadian corporation thereby agreed to subject and did subject himself to the duties and liabilities imposed by the laws and statutes of Canada upon stockholders in such corporations, and further agreed to subject and did subject himself to the jurisdiction of the Canadian courts, and in particular to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court in Bankruptcy for the enforcement of said duties and liabilities.’ The fact of the foreign law must be taken as pleaded. Hanna v. Lichtenhein, 225 N. Y. 579, 122 N. E. 625. There is no allegation that the defendant in fact consented to be bound by the decree of any Canadian court. Cf. Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N. Y. 348, 174 N. E. 706, 73 A. L. R. 1453. Is a personal liability, so fixed, to have force and effect in our courts?

The presumption in favor of recognition of a private right acquired under foreign law (Dunstan v. Higgins, 138 N. Y. 70, 33 N. E. 729, 20 L. R. A. 668, 34 Am. St. Rep. 431; Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N. Y. 381, 152 N. E. 121, 46 A. L. R. 435) does not cover a personal judgment when the court rendering it was without jurisdiction over the defendant (Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East, 191; Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121, 8 Am. Dec. 225;McKinney v. Collins, 88 N. Y. 216;Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394, 37 S. Ct. 152, 61 L. Ed. 386). While it does not here appear that the defendant was at any time present within the Dominion of Canada, the fair inference from the face of the plaintiff's pleading is that the defendant did put in motion transactions in the territory of that Dominion which, at least indirectly, resulted in the creation of obligations to its citizens. The right now evidenced by this judgment is founded upon those transactions. Whether, in the circumstances,the Canadian government could by such a law empower its courts to exercise over the defendant in his absence, a jurisdiction which we would recognize, is a question thus suggested. The validity of such a foundation for judicial power has been intimated. Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, 142-146. That view, however, has been broadly discountenanced in this state in the few instances in which it has been presented on similar facts. Cf. Bank of China, Japan & The Straits v. Morse, 168 N. Y. 458, 469,61 N. E. 774,56 L. R. A. 139, 85 Am. St. Rep. 676; Anderson v. Haddon, 33 Hun, 435. We indicate the problem, without undertaking an answer, because the decision of the present case, we hold, is controlled by collateral consequences that would follow enforcement in our courts of this judgment.

Were the judgment that of a sister state, it could not have the persuasiveness now sought to be attributed to it. In that case, the adjudication would be conclusive in respect of the fact and amount of the corporate indebtedness determined by it, but would not operate to deprive the defendant of his right to litigate, in accordance with the requirements of due process, the fact of his status as stockholder and defenses personal to him. Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U. S. 41, 12 S. Ct. 541, 36 L. Ed. 338;Selig v. Hamilton, 234 U. S. 652, 34 S. Ct. 926, 58 L. Ed. 1518;Converse v. Stewart, 192 N. Y. 578, 85 N. E. 1107, writ of error denied 218 U. S. 666, 31 S. Ct. 226, 54 L. Ed. 1202;Shipman v. Treadwell, 208 N. Y. 404, 410,102 N. E. 634. Cf. Howarth v. Angle, 162 N. Y. 179, 56 N. E. 489,47 L. R. A. 725.

The theory of these cases is that the nonresident stockholder impliedly agrees that the corporation shall represent him within the limits stated. Marin v. Augedahl, 247 U. S. 142, 38 S. Ct. 452, 62 L. Ed. 1038, was an action is North Dakota by a receiver of an insolvent Minnesota corporation to enforce against one of its stockholders an order of a Minnesota court laying an assessment on the stockholders generally. The court said (pages 150, 151 of 247 U. S., 38 S. Ct. 452, 455): ‘Whether the stockholder against whom the order is here sought to be enforced was personally a party to the suit in which it was made does not appear;...