Porcelain Enamel & Manufacturing Co. of Baltimore v. Jeffrey Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 March 1940
• Docket Number: 36.
• Parties: PORCELAIN ENAMEL & MFG. CO. OF BALTIMORE v. JEFFREY MFG. CO.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

11 A.2d 451

177 Md. 677

PORCELAIN ENAMEL & MFG. CO. OF BALTIMORE v. JEFFREY MFG. CO.

No. 36.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 5, 1940

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; Joseph N. Ulman Judge.

Proceeding for declaratory judgment bye the Porcelain Enamel & Manufacturing Company of Baltimore, a body corporate, against the Jeffrey Manufacturing Company, a body corporate, and another. A demurrer interposed by the named defendant was sustained and from a judgment for the named defendant plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

F. Gray Goudy, of Baltimore, for appellant.

R. E Lee Marshall, of Baltimore (Marshall & Carey, of Baltimore on the brief), for appellees.

Argued before BOND, C.J., and OFFUTT, PARKE, MITCHELL, and DELAPLAINE, JJ.

BOND, Chief Judge.

The appeal is from a judgment on demurrer to an application to a court of law for a declaratory judgment under the Act of 1939, chapter 294, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, to determine which of two contractors with the plaintiff for construction work caused delay for which the plaintiff may claim damages, or whether both did. The two contractors were made defendants, but only one, the Jeffrey Company demurred the other, Dietrich Brothers, Incorporated, answered. The chancellor in the case concluded that the suit could not be maintained at law, and sustained the demurrer; and judgment for the defendant followed.

The application, entitled a bill of complaint, alleges that the Jeffrey Company entered into a written contract with the Porcelain Enameling Company for the erection of machinery and equipment, and Dietrich Brothers entered into another written contract with the same company for the erection of storage bins, both in a manufacturing plant of the plaintiff's in Baltimore; that time was of the essence of each contract, but that by reason of delay of either or both defendants completion of the plant, parts of which they constructed, was delayed beyond a specified limit, causing the plaintiff a heavy total loss as a consequence of inability to carry on its work; that the plaintiff has withheld from both defendants payments of parts of the contract prices, and both are demanding payment; that each defendant blames the other for the delay, and the plaintiff is unable to determine which defendant caused it; and that the plaintiff seeks a judicial determination whether either or both caused it, so that it is entitled to withhold or offset the amount of its loss from one or both. It has also prayed that the contracts be construed and the rights, duties and obligations of the parties be outlined in a declaratory judgment, but the recitals in the application seem to show, and the arguments in the case support the inference, that only the cause of the delay is to be inquired into, and declared. No joint contract or obligation is alleged. A separate contract was made with each contractor, and the connection of the work of each with that of the other appears to have been only that each was on equipment of the owner's plant. It may be inferred, in addition, from the recited charges of the contractors, that delay on one contract might obstruct progress on the other.

The case is that the owner finds the completion of the plant by means of the contracts delayed, and lacking knowledge of the facts to show which one, or whether both, of the contractors caused the delay, is afraid that in separate suits each contractor, unresisted by the other, may obtain a verdict of immunity by casting blame on the other. The owner therefore seeks to bring the two into one proceeding to bind them both with a single ascertainment of the facts.

The court below concluded that the relief provided was equitable in its nature, and that for litigation of issues on the two contracts the common law jurisdiction as defined in the state was not appropriate. The appellant asks, however, that if this view should be upheld on the appeal, the case may not be disposed of by an adverse judgment but merely ordered transferred to a court of equity, under the Code, article 26, section 44, and article 75, section 124. And this would necessitate a decision of the question whether the relief sought might be obtainable in equity.

...