Porretto v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.
| Docket Number | 4:21-cv-464-MW-MJF |
| Decision Date | 21 April 2023 |
| Parties | PAUL PORRETTO, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Paul Porretto, proceeding pro se, has filed a second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C § 2254. Doc. 21. Respondent (“the State”) answered, providing relevant portions of the state court record. Doc. 29 (Answer); Doc. 30 (Exs.). Porretto replied. Doc. 36. The undersigned concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter, and that Porretto is not entitled to habeas relief.[1]
On May 18, 2011, Deputy Beam of the Wakulla County Sheriff's Office was dispatched to the 1000 block of River Plantation Road to investigate a possible physical altercation. The complaining party was Nathan Deanda. Beam drove to the area-which was heavily wooded-and spotted Deanda waving his arms to get Beam's attention. Deanda was on foot. While Beam was conversing with Deanda, Porretto approached driving a white van with an attached trailer. Porretto was the sole occupant and registered owner of the van and trailer.
Beam made contact with Porretto and observed-in plain view from the driver-side window-numerous items that are commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine. Beam ordered Porretto out of the van and detained him. Porretto consented to a search of his van and trailer.
Investigator Giddens conducted the search of Porretto's van and trailer. Giddens was specially trained in the search and disposal of methamphetamine labs. Giddens observed that Porretto had removed the rear seats of his van to accommodate the transportation of methamphetamine-manufacturing materials.
Giddens found a variety of evidence inside the van and trailer that proved Porretto was manufacturing methamphetamine, including: (1) a homemade burner between the driver and passenger seats; (2) tubing attached to bottle caps with holes in them- commonly used for making a homemade generator to use in producing methamphetamine-between the driver and passenger seats; (3) glass paraphernalia-commonly used to smoke methamphetamine-underneath the hood of the van; (4) glass tubing between the driver and passenger seats; (5) a scale in the glove compartment; (6) a large glass cylinder in the back of the van; (7) a dresser containing unknown chemicals inside the trailer; and (7) a bucket containing Coleman fuel and butane fuel inside the trailer.
Inside Porretto's van, Giddens also found “pure methamphetamine” powder in a clear glass measuring cup behind the passenger seat.[3] A sample of the powder field-tested positive for methamphetamine. Giddens weighed the pure methamphetamine powder on site. The powder weighed 2 grams. Giddens sent the pure methamphetamine powder to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) for further testing and identification.
Inside Porretto's trailer, Giddens also found the waste product of a recent methamphetamine cook-a liquid-solid mixture-that was still undergoing a chemical reaction inside a bottle.[4] A sample of the methamphetamine waste product field-tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine. Giddens weighed the methamphetamine waste product on site. The waste product weighed 394.8 grams. Giddens sent a sample of the methamphetamine waste product to the FDLE for further testing and identification.
Sam Catalani, a laboratory analyst with the FDLE, tested the methamphetamine powder from the clear measuring cup. The powder was pure methamphetamine. Catalani also tested the sample of the methamphetamine waste product from the bottle. The waste product was a mixture of methamphetamine and non-controlled substances.
In Wakulla County Circuit Court Case Number 11-CF-195, Porretto was charged with three crimes: (1) Trafficking in Methamphetamine, 200 Grams or More, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(f) 1.c. (Count I); (2) Possession of Methamphetamine With Intent to Sell or Deliver, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a) 1. (Count II); and (3) Sale of Methamphetamine, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a) 1. (Count III). Doc. 30, Ex. A at 4-5.[5] Prior to trial, the State nolle prossed Count III.
Porretto's defense was that all of the methamphetamine, methamphetamine waste product, and manufacturing materials belonged to Deanda. The jury found Porretto guilty of Trafficking in Methamphetamine as charged with a special finding that the quantity involved was 200 grams or more. Ex. A at 6. The jury found Porretto not guilty on Count II. Id. at 7.
The trial court adjudicated Porretto guilty of the trafficking charge and sentenced him to a 15-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. Ex. A at 819. On October 24, 2014, the Florida First District Court of Appeal (“First DCA”) affirmed the judgment and sentence per curiam without written opinion. Porretto v. State, No. 1D13-4986, 150 So.3d 1139 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (Table) (copy at Ex. E).
On March 18, 2015, Porretto filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the First DCA alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Ex. F. On April 14, 2015, the First DCA denied the petition on the merits. Porretto v. State, No. 1D15-1362, 218 So.3d 893 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (per curiam) (copy at Ex. G).
On May 18, 2015, Porretto filed in the state circuit court a pro se motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which he twice amended. Ex. K (Orig. Mot.); Ex. O (Am. Mot.); Ex. Q at 11-43 (Second Am. Mot.). On October 8, 2018, the circuit court summarily denied relief. Ex. Q at 122324. The First DCA affirmed without written opinion. Porretto v. State, No. 1D19-2236, 312 So.3d 857 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (Table) (per curiam) (copy at Ex. AA). The mandate issued March 16, 2021. Ex. AA.
Porretto filed his pro se federal habeas petition on November 17, 2021. Doc. 1. Porretto's second amended petition raises four claims. Doc. 21. The State asserts that Porretto is not entitled to habeas relief because he fails to satisfy § 2254(d)'s demanding standard. Doc. 29.
A federal court “shall not” grant a habeas corpus petition on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The United States Supreme Court explained the framework for § 2254 review in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).[6] Justice O'Connor described the appropriate test:
Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
529 U.S. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In applying the “unreasonable application” clause, the federal court defers to the state court's reasoning unless the state court's application of the governing legal principle was “objectively unreasonable” in light of the record before the state court. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409; Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652 (2004). In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011), the Supreme Court warned that, “even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. at 102.
Section 2254(d) also allows habeas relief for a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court where that adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The “unreasonable determination of the facts” standard is implicated only to the extent the validity of the state court's ultimate conclusion is premised on unreasonable fact finding. See Gill v. Mecusker, 633 F.3d 1272, 1292 (11th Cir. 2011). As with the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), the federal court applies an objective test. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (). “The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). AEDPA also requires federal courts to “presume the correctness of state courts' factual findings unless applicants rebut this presumption with ‘clear and convincing evidence.'” Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473-74 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
The Supreme Court has emphasized often that a state prisoner's burden under § 2254(d) is “difficult to meet, . . . because it was meant to be.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. The Court elaborated:
As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal-court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings. Cf. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (discussing AEDPA's “modified res judicata rule” under § 2244). It...
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